Central Bank Policy Impacts on the Distribution of Future Interest Rates

By

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Abstract

The century low, near-zero short-term interest rates in the USA, Euro Area, the UK and Japan after the Great Recession of 2008/2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010-2013 make the non-normality and non-lognormality of short-term interest rates quite clear. To uncover the changing implicit state prices and risk-neutral densities for future short-term interest rates, we use the prices of interest rate caps and floors with various strike rates and maturities from 2 to 5 years. We show that butterfly spreads of time spreads of cap and floor prices give sensible implied risk-neutral densities and state prices that reflect key moves made by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. The state prices and risk-neutral densities computed are largely distribution-free, preference-free and model-free results, building from the arbitrage-based computations of state prices from option prices that were presented in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978).
I. Introduction.

In the “Great Recession” of 2008/2009 (a modern financial panic) and the aftermath, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board policy reduced short-term interest rates to near zero in December 2008 in an attempt to provide liquidity and stimulate the economy. While the unemployment rate dropped from over 10% to below 8%, it remained historically high five years later in 2013. In response, the Fed kept rates near zero for over 4 years and on multiple occasions announced their intent to keep rates historically low for increasingly distant periods, at least until the unemployment rate drops below 6.5%. Similarly, the European Central Bank also dramatically provided liquidity and reduced rates during Europe’s Sovereign Debt Crisis. In March 2013, short-term interest rates were still below 0.50% in the U.S. and the Eurozone, while longer-term interest rates and derivatives contracts appear to reflect market expectations that rates will eventually increase. We show that these long-term interest rates reflect probability distributions that were very positively skewed for the distribution for 3-month LIBOR in 3-5 years. In May and June, 2013, the Federal Reserve announced its intention to start “tapering” asset purchases as the economy strengthens. Interest rates increased significantly in response and risk neutral rate distributions shift to higher rates and somewhat more symmetric distributions.

Despite the lack of rigorous justification, for many years market participants used the Black-Scholes formula to estimate values for options on interest rates using the assumption that the short-term interest rate itself was lognormally distributed. However, market prices are not constrained by Black-Scholes pricing and presumably reflect traders’ true assessments of probabilities for future interest rates, as well as the supply and demand equilibrium risk adjustments for hedges of those rates. To uncover the implicit state prices and risk-neutral densities for interest rates, in this paper we use the prices of interest rate caps and floors, which are portfolios of relatively long-term call and put options on interest rates. We show that butterfly spreads of time spreads of cap and floor prices give sensible implied risk-neutral densities and state prices that reflect key policy moves made by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. State prices and risk-neutral densities computed are largely distribution-free and model-free results, building from the arbitrage-based computations based on options with different strikes presented in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). The use of option prices to
derive risk neutral densities has subsequently been used by many other authors, including researchers at U.S. and European central banks. Unlike many of these papers which interpolated options prices between prices for quoted strikes and extrapolated beyond the range of quoted strikes, the current paper uses only quoted strikes to estimate histograms of risk neutral probabilities.

Our work builds on prior work on options, using arbitrage insights, led by the Nobel Prize winning works of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). Merton demonstrated that many results could be obtained just by prohibiting arbitrage or using stochastic dominance rather than making distributional assumptions (such as lognormality) or preference assumptions (such as power utility). In particular, Merton’s arbitrage result that option prices are convex functions of exercise prices directly implies positive state price densities. Ross’s (1976) elegant article showed how options with different strike prices could span the state space and complete markets. This led to Breeden and Litzenberger’s (1978) derivation of the state price density as proportional to the second derivative of the option pricing function with respect to the exercise price. Once one has the state price density, prices of many types of derivative securities can be found from their functional payoff relationships with the underlying asset’s price, integrated with the pricing density, so this result stimulated many applications. Like Merton’s and Ross’s results, their result is arbitrage based and does not depend upon preferences, beliefs or the underlying probability distribution.

In the ensuing years, the Breeden-Litzenberger model and a variety of estimation techniques have been used by many authors to estimate state prices or risk neutral probability densities from option prices. These risk neutral densities have been used to price more complex derivative securities. Articles estimating risk neutral densities and/or applying them to price more complex securities include academic works by Banz and Miller (1978), Shimko (1993), Rubinstein (1994), Longstaff (1995), Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998), Ait-Sahalia, Wang and Yared (2001), Longstaff, Santa-Clara and Schwartz (2001), Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003), Carr (1998, 2004, 2012), Bates (2000), Li and Zhao (2006), Figlewski (2008), Zitzewitz (2009), Birru and Figlewski (20010a,b), Kitsul and Wright (2012), Ross (2013), and Martin (2013), to name a few.
Central banks have also estimated “option implied (risk-neutral) probability distributions” using these techniques. Central bank applications are discussed in articles of Bahra (1996, 1997), Clews, Panigirtzoglous and Proudman (2000), and Smith (2012) of the Bank of England.; Maltz (1995,1997) of the Federal Reserve Board of New York; and Durham (2007) and Kim (2008) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Washington. Kocherlakota’s (2013) research group at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis uses Shimko’s (1993) statistical method of applying the Breeden-Litzenberger formula to regularly estimate and publish risk neutral density functions and tail risks (e.g., risk neutral probabilities of moves of +/- 20% or more) for many assets, such as stocks, crude oil, wheat, real estate, and foreign exchange.

A typical Wall Street or Central Bank application is to estimate the volatility surface over time and across strike prices for an underlying asset, which then is used with the Black-Scholes formula to give the option pricing function. Volatility estimation is parameterized so as to give a thrice-continuous option pricing function, from which the second derivatives can be estimated and used as state prices and implied risk neutral densities. Many papers have been written about alternative ways to best estimate the volatility surface to replicate observed option prices.

Our approach is a bit different, as it is wholly arbitrage based and nonparametric, using market prices from well-traded markets. We use long maturity cap and floor prices and, by calculating the price difference between a longer maturity and a shorter maturity cap, we create forward caps for the $3^{rd}$ and $5^{th}$ years. We then use butterfly spreads of these forward caps to derive the arbitrage prices for triangular payoffs for various possible interest rate ranges. We show that if the risk-neutral density is approximated by a linear function over the rate range covered by the butterfly, then these prices will be the same as the prices of more intuitive “digital options” that pay $1 in a range, and zero elsewhere.

In Section II, we show how the triangular payoffs of the butterfly spreads aggregate in portfolios to trapezoidal payoffs, and how tail spreads of caps and floors can complete the portfolio and give riskless payoffs. From this demonstration, we are able to then find implied state prices and risk neutral probabilities for each rate range for future 3-month LIBOR. This
approach is used in Section IV with LIBOR cap and floor prices, where we examine the computed risk-neutral densities for 3-month LIBOR, 3 and 5 years out, for each of the 10 years from December 31, 2003 to February 28, 2013. We find risk-neutral densities that are relatively symmetric until the Great Recession of 2008/2009. With the drop in LIBOR to near zero, the shift to a very positively skewed risk-neutral density becomes increasingly prominent in the 2009 to 2013 period. Prior to that, Section III derives equilibrium relationships between risk neutral probabilities and true probabilities and shows how changing betas of nominal bonds affect this relationship as well.

Section V shows before and after state prices/risk neutral densities for interest rates around major actions of the Federal Reserve Board in the 2008-2012 period, a time of historic levels of Fed intervention in markets and the economy. Sections VI and VII show similar analyses around policy actions by the European Central Bank, as it dealt with the sovereign debt crises in Europe in the 2010-2012 period. These analyses show not just the impact of the Fed’s and ECB’s actions on the level of the short rate or a long rate, but also on the entire state price distribution and risk neutral density for future 3-month dollar and Euro LIBOR possibilities. Section VIII shows the movements in risk neutral densities in the USA and Europe in 2013 when the Federal Reserve announced that they were considering “tapering” their historic levels of asset purchases and possibly ending them in 2014. Section IX presents some concluding remarks.

II. **Triangles, Trapezoids and Tail Spreads:**

*Interest Rate Cap and Floor Payoffs, State Prices and Risk Neutral Densities*

The purchaser of a standard 5-year interest rate cap on 3-month LIBOR, with a “strike rate” (exercise price) of K% and a notional principle amount of $10 million, has a portfolio of 5 years of quarterly option payments that are computed as:

\[
\text{Interest rate cap payment at time } t = 10,000,000 \times \text{Maximum}(0, \text{LIBOR}_t - K)/4,
\]
So if LIBOR is 6% and the fixed strike rate is K=4%, the purchaser receives $200,000/4 = $50,000 for that quarter. Caps are often used for hedging interest rates, for as rates increase, the cap has cash flows that will increase and pay the increased floating rate interest on a liability that moves in step with LIBOR. Since caps win when rates increase, they are like portfolios of put options on bond prices. (Note that as it is assumed that the liability hedger has initially borrowed for 3 months fixed, caps contractually do not cover rate risk for the first quarter, so there are 19 quarterly payments on a 5-year cap and only 11 quarterly payments on a 3-year cap.)

Correspondingly, interest rate floor payments are:

Interest rate floor payment at time t = $10,000,000 x Maximum(0, K - LIBOR_t)/4,

So if LIBOR is 6%, the purchaser of a K=4% floor receives nothing. If, instead, LIBOR is 3%, the purchaser of a 4% floor would receive $100,000/4 = $25,000 for that quarter. Floors pay off when rates drop, so floors are like portfolios of call options on bond prices.

It is easy to verify that a portfolio that is long a 5-year cap and short a 4-year cap for the same strike rate and notional principal would receive payments only in year 5, as the net cash flows for years 1 to 4 would all be zero. This portfolio is called a “caplet” for year 5. A cap is a portfolio of quarterly caplets. “Floorlets” are defined correspondingly as time spreads of floors with the same strike rate.

Interest rate cap and floor prices have moved dramatically in the past few years, as interest rates have plummeted. A 10-year, 4% cap traded at $13.30 on June 30, 2007, then dropped 75% to $3.28 on December 31, 2008 and then tripled back to $10.25 on December 31, 2009, and then dropped again by 70% to $3.50 on December 31, 2012. Note that many banks that hedge would say that the cost of hedging and “locking in” a 4% LIBOR rate for the next 10 years went from approximately 133 basis points ($13.30/10) per year in 2007 down to 33 bp/year at the end of 2008, then up to 102 bp at the end of 2009, and then down again to 35 bp/year at the end of 2012. Floor prices moved in opposite directions, but by similarly dramatic amounts.
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) demonstrated that “butterfly spreads” of options create unit payoffs in certain states of the world. For example, if cap payments were made only annually and interest rates could only move discretely by 1% increments from 0% to 10%, then a butterfly spread of 5-year floorlets with 3%, 4% and 5% strike rates would create a unit payoff if and only if LIBOR was 4% in year 5. A butterfly spread is a spread of spreads. In the example below, we will be long a spread of 5% - 4% floorlets and short a spread of 4% - 3% floorlets, which nets to long a 5%, short 2 floorlets with 4% strike rate and long a 3%. A single spread converges to a first derivative as rate increments go to zero, whereas a butterfly spread converges to a second derivative with respect to the exercise price, which is the strike rate here.

To see this, let $F_{T,K}$ represent the vector of payoffs for a floorlet that pays off at time $T$ and has strike rate $K$. Then the butterfly spread described would have payoffs, $A_{5,4}$ as in Figure 1. We will call these butterfly spread portfolios “delta securities.”

Thus, the butterfly spread of 3%, 4% and 5% floorlets creates a payoff of $1 if and only if LIBOR = 4% in year 5. As shown by Breeden-Litzenberger, the same unit payoff can also be created by a similar butterfly spread of caplets with 3%, 4% and 5% strike rates.

If one allows the underlying state variable to have continuous values at the future payoff date, like in 5 years, then Breeden-Litzenberger showed that the butterfly spread produces a
triangular payoff as in Figure 2A that starts at zero for all rates below the lower strike rate, then increases linearly and peaks at $1 at the middle strike rate and then declines linearly back to zero at the upper strike rate and remains at zero for all rates higher than that.

Figure 2A

Thus, the butterfly spread is a bet that pays off if rates are between the lower (3%) and upper (5%) rates of the spread, with a peak payoff of $1 in the middle (4%). In equilibrium, informally stated, they showed that the value of such a payoff should depend upon the probability of being in that rate range, multiplied by the conditional expectation of the marginal utility of $1 of consumption if that state range occurs, relative to the marginal utility of $1 of consumption today. We will call the cost of the 5%-4%-3% butterfly spread the “state price for a $1 payoff if the 3-month LIBOR rate is 4% in 5 years.” By arbitrage, it would have to be that in equilibrium, as these payoffs can be constructed by this cap portfolio for that cost. Thus, state prices reflect both probability and risk adjustments, in that payoffs that occur in bad economies, when consumption is low, have higher values, due to higher marginal utilities then.

If one purchased a portfolio of 7 butterfly spreads with strike rates centered on 2% to 8%, respectively, the butterfly spreads would have overlapping payoffs, as illustrated in Figure 2B, which gives a total payoff pattern that is a trapezoid, as shown in Figure 2C:
A riskless $1.00 payoff is created starting with the trapezoid of Figure 2C (a portfolio of butterfly spreads) and then “completing it” by adding on complementary tail spreads for the left and right tails. As Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) showed, a spread that is long a 2% floorlet and short a 1% floorlet gives the complementary payoff pattern for the left tail, as indicated in Figure 2D. For the right tail, one simply uses a spread of caplets that is long an 8% and short a 9% to get the complementary tail payoff. Figure 2D shows the payoffs on the two portfolios of floors and caps that give the “tail spreads” for left and right tails. Figure 2E shows how these tail spreads combine with the trapezoid of butterfly spreads to give a riskless $1.00 payoff.
To summarize, we have shown that the portfolio of 7 butterfly spreads (centered on strike rates from 2% to 8%), plus the left tail spread of floorlets (with strikes of 2% and 1%), plus the right tail spread of caplets (with strikes of 8% and 9%) gives a riskless payoff of $1.00. As a result, to prevent arbitrage, the cost of this “complete portfolio” must be the cost of a zero coupon bond for this maturity. We can then divide each component of the complete portfolio by the total and get fractions that are like a risk neutral density. Let us now explore whether prices
for these triangular payoffs might be similar to the prices for digital option payoffs in the same ranges.

Within the range of rates for a butterfly spread, e.g., from 3% to 5%, the risk–neutral density will not be constant, as the true probability density likely changes throughout the range, as do the conditional expected marginal utilities of $1.00. However, as a first approximation, let us assume that the risk neutral density changes linearly with the interest rate inside of the range. With that linear approximation, we can prove the following Proposition:

**Proposition: The relationship between butterfly spread values and digital option values:**

If the risk-neutral density (RND) is a linear function of the interest rate within the range of the butterfly strikes, then the value of a digital option that pays off $1.00 over the middle half of the range is equal to the value of the butterfly.

**Proof:** Let \( x \) be the interest rate, such that \( x = c \) at the lower strike of the butterfly, \( x = c + 1 \) at the mid-point strike of the butterfly, and \( x = c + 2 \) at the high strike of the butterfly.

Assume that between \( c \) and \( c + 2 \) the risk-neutral density \( \text{RND} = a + b(x - c) \)

The forward value of a digital option that pays off $1.00 between \( x = c + 0.5 \) and \( x = c + 1.5 \) is:

\[
\int_{c+0.5}^{c+1.5} [a + b(x-c)] \cdot 1 \, dx = a + b
\]

The forward value of a butterfly is

\[
\int_{c+1}^{c+1.5} [\frac{3}{2} + b(x-c)](x-c) \, dx + \int_{c+1}^{c+2} [\frac{3}{2} + b(x-c)](c+2-x) \, dx
\]

\[
= \left[ \frac{1}{3} bx^3 + \frac{1}{2} (a - 2bc)x^2 + (bc^2 - ac)x \right]_{c}^{c+1} - \left[ \frac{1}{3} bx^3 + (bc + b - \frac{1}{2}a)x^2 + (2a - 2bc - bc^2 + ac)x \right]_{c+1}^{c+2} = a + b
\]

Of course, since forward values are equal at the same date, present values are also equal.

Q.E.D.

From the Proposition, under the assumption that the risk neutral density is linear in interest rates between 3% and 5%, the price of the 3%/4%/5% butterfly (with triangular payoffs) would be identical to the price of a claim that paid off $1.00 when interest rates were between
3.5% and 4.5% (digital payoffs). The 4%/5%/6% butterfly would have a value equal to that of a digital option that pays off between rates of 4.5% and 5.5%, and so on.\(^2\)

Thus, if the price of each component of our earlier “complete portfolio” of caplets and floorlets is divided by the riskless bond price (the sum of the portfolio’s component prices), these normalized prices give the integrals of the “risk-neutral density” over 1.0 percentage ranges centered on the mid points of the butterflies, and the histogram of risk-neutral probabilities will sum to 1.0. The risk-neutral density for date \(T\) is just given by the state price distribution for the butterfly spreads and tail spreads at \(T\), normalized by dividing by the sum of those state prices for date \(T\). We will use the phrases “risk-neutral density” and “state prices” synonymously, as they are proportional and have the identical shape as a distribution across rate levels.

To illustrate this, let us take the prices for 5-year and 4-year caps and floors on December 31, 2012 and compute the butterfly spreads of the time spreads between the 5-year and 4-year securities. We use floorlets for 1% to 3% butterflies, caplets for 7% and 8%, and an average of caplets and floorlet butterflies for 4% to 6% centers. We use the floorlet and caplet prices to compute the costs of the left and right tail spreads. (Note that here and henceforth we start with butterflies around the 1% strike, as we assume that a floorlet with a zero strike has zero value.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spread Cost</th>
<th>“Risk-Neutral Probability”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0.290</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.320</td>
<td>0.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.180</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.080</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.037</td>
<td>0.038</td>
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<tr>
<td>$0.028</td>
<td>0.028</td>
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<tr>
<td>$0.014</td>
<td>0.014</td>
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<tr>
<td>$0.007</td>
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<td>$0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>$0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$0.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) Do note that there is a macro inconsistency in applying this approach with RNDs linear in rates where the \((a,b)\) coefficients change from rate range to rate range, as would be realistic. With overlapping triangles, this would give an RND for the 4% to 5% range that is different for the 3/4/5 butterfly than for the 4/5/6 butterfly. Thus, this Proposition’s result is just an approximation that is for useful intuition about butterflies and digital options.
III. True Probabilities vs. Risk Neutral Probabilities (State Prices Normalized).

While it is tempting to think of shifts in the state prices and risk neutral densities as predominantly due to shifts the true probabilities of future interest rates, that is not necessarily true, as alluded to in the previous section. As stated, marginal utilities affect state prices and the risk neutral density, in addition to true probability shifts. In this section, we will explore that relationship and derive the theoretical relationship between true and risk-neutral probabilities, both in a relatively general state preference context and for the special case of constant relative risk aversion utility function, combined with lognormally distributed consumption.

The basic time-state preference model used is the same as used by Breeden-Litzenberger (1978). With a complete market, each individual, $k$, chooses consumption plans that maximize a time-additive utility function, subject to the usual budget constraint:

$$
\max L = u_0^k(c_0^k) + \sum_{t} \sum_{s \in S_t} \pi_{ts}^k u^k(c_{ts}^k, t) + \lambda^k [W_0^k - c_0^k - \sum_{s} \phi_{ts} c_{ts}^k]
$$

(1)

First-order conditions for a maximum give:

$$
\frac{\partial L}{\partial c_0^k} = u_0^k - \lambda^k = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda^k = u_0^k
$$

Define: $u_{ts}^k \equiv \frac{\partial u^k(c_{ts}^k, t)}{\partial c_{ts}^k}$, evaluated at $c_{ts}^k$

(2)

$$
\frac{\partial L}{\partial c_{ts}^k} = \pi_{ts}^k u_{ts}^k - \lambda^k \phi^k = 0
$$

(3)

$$
\Rightarrow \phi_{ts} = \frac{\pi_{ts}^k u_{ts}^k}{u_0^k} = \text{price of $1 in time-state } ts.
$$

(4)

$$
\Rightarrow \frac{u_{ts}^k}{u_0^k} = \frac{\phi_{ts}}{\pi_{ts}^k} \Rightarrow \frac{1}{u_0^k} \left( \begin{array}{c} u_{ts_1}^k \\ \vdots \\ u_{ts_T}^k \end{array} \right) = \frac{\phi_{ts}}{\pi_{ts}^k} = \left( \begin{array}{c} \frac{\phi_{ts_1}}{\pi_{ts_1}} \\ \vdots \\ \frac{\phi_{ts_T}}{\pi_{ts_T}} \end{array} \right)
$$

(5)
so if ordered from high to low, price/probability ratios at the optimum are positively and
monotically related to marginal utilities in different states, and negatively related to consumption
across states.

Note: $B_i = \sum_{s \in S_i} \phi_s$ = zero coupon bond price  $\Rightarrow B_i = \sum_{s \in S_i} \pi^{s k}_{ts} u^k_{ts} = \frac{E^k(\tilde{u}^k_t)}{u^k_0}$ (6)

$\Rightarrow \frac{\phi_{s}}{B_i}”$risk neutral probability” (normed state price)$\equiv \phi_{s}^* = \frac{\pi^{s k}_{ts} u^k_{ts}}{E^k(\tilde{u}^k_t)} = \pi^{s k}_{ts} \frac{u^k_{ts}}{E^k(\tilde{u}^k_t)}$ (7)

Thus, $\pi^{s k}_{ts} = \phi_{s}^{*} \left[ \frac{E^k(\tilde{u}^k_t)}{u^k_{ts}} \right]$ and $\phi_{s}^{*} = \pi^{s k}_{ts} \frac{u^k_{ts}}{E^k(\tilde{u}^k_t)}$ (8)

So, risk-neutral probabilities = “true” probabilities x [(conditional marginal utility for state s,
time t consumption)/unconditional expected marginal utility for time t consumption]. The risk-
neutral probability for a state is higher, the higher the probability of the state and the higher the
marginal utility in state (the lower the consumption in the state).

Our analysis so far has been for price/probability ratios for general states of the world.
Can we say anything about prices of claims that pay off if 3-month LIBOR is, say, $r_j$, where
\{j=1,…N\} represents different possible interest rate levels at time t? Note that, in general, the
interest rate could end up at the same level in a variety of different states. To analyze this, we
partition all states at time t into sets of states that all have the same chosen interest rate’s level, $r_j$,
where j goes from 1 to N. Every state is included in one and only one of the partitions at time t
by interest rate level $r_j$ for $s \in S_j$

Let $\phi_{r_j} =$ Price of $1.00 received at t if the interest rate $r = r_j$, with zero received otherwise.

$\phi_{r_j} = \sum_{s \in S_j} \phi_s = \sum_{s \in S_j} \pi_{ts} u^k_{ts} \frac{u^k_{ts}}{u^k_0}$ (9)

The definition of conditional probabilities: $[ P(A \cap B) = \frac{P(A \& B)}{P(B)} \leq 1 ]$ implies $\Rightarrow \pi_{ts} = \pi_{ts}^{r_j} \pi_{r_j}$
\[
\phi_{tr} = \sum_{s \in s_{tr}} \pi_{tr|s} \pi_{tr} \frac{u'_{tr}}{u_0} = \pi_{tr} \left[ \sum_{s \in s_{tr}} \pi_{tr|s} \frac{u'_{tr}}{u_0} \right] = \pi_{tr} \left[ \frac{E \left[ \frac{u'_{tr}}{u_0} \right] r_j}{} \right]
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \frac{\phi_{tr}}{\pi_{tr}} = \frac{E \left[ \frac{u'_{tr}}{u_0} \right] r_j}{u_0}
\]

Inserting eq. 6 for the zero coupon bond gives:

\[
\frac{\phi_{tr}^*}{\pi_{tr}} = \frac{E \left[ \frac{u'_{tr}}{u_0} \right] r_j}{E[u'_{tr}]} \quad \text{(note: re-type this equation)}
\]

Thus, we see that the risk-neutral probability to true probability ratio at the optimum for \(r_j\) is equal to the expected marginal utility of consumption, conditional upon the interest rate being at the specified level, divided by the unconditional expected marginal utility of consumption at time \(t\). So if we are looking at butterfly spreads or digital options centered upon LIBOR = 2%, we need to compute the conditionally expected marginal utility of consumption, given that 2% rate.

If one wanted to gain further insight into the sizes of the potential fluctuations in risk neutral/true price to probability ratios, one could make two further assumptions, one on preferences and one on distributions: (A1) constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility and (A2) lognormally distributed consumption.

**A1: If we assume power utility:**

Let \(u_i^k (c_{is}^k) = \frac{e^{-\rho} (c_{is}^k)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}; \quad \text{then } u_{is}^k = e^{-\rho} (c_{is}^k)^{-\gamma} \quad \text{and } \text{RRA} = \frac{-u^c}{u'} = \gamma
\]

Suppressing the \(k\) superscript:

\[
\frac{\phi_{is}^*}{\pi_{is}} = \frac{u'_{is}}{E^k (\tilde{u}_i')} = \frac{e^{-\rho} c_{is}^{-\gamma}}{E[e^{-\rho} \tilde{c}_i^{-\gamma}]} = \frac{c_{is}^{-\gamma}}{E[\tilde{c}_i^{-\gamma}]}
\]

**A2: If we assume consumption is lognormally distributed:**
Note: Lognormal $Y \equiv e^x$ where $x \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2) \Rightarrow E(Y) = e^{\mu + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2}$ (15)

Assume lognormal $c_u = c_0 e^{\delta_t}$, where $\tilde{g}_t \sim N(t\mu, \sigma_t^2) \Rightarrow -\gamma \tilde{g}_t \sim N(-\gamma \mu_t, \gamma^2 \sigma_t^2) t$ (16)

\[
\frac{\phi^c_t}{\pi_t} = \frac{c^{-\gamma}_t}{E[\tilde{c}_t^{-\gamma}]} = \frac{c^{-\gamma}_0 e^{-\delta_{it}}}{E[c^{-\gamma}_0 e^{-\delta_{it}}]} = \frac{e^{-\delta_{it}}}{e^{-\gamma \mu_t + \frac{1}{2} \gamma^2 \sigma_t^2 t}}
\] (17)

Taking logs of both sides, we get:

\[
\log\left(\frac{\phi^c_t}{\pi_t}\right) = -\gamma \mu_t t - \left(-\gamma \mu_t + \frac{1}{2} \gamma^2 \sigma_t^2 t\right) = \gamma [\mu - g_u] t - \frac{1}{2} \gamma^2 \sigma_t^2 t
\] (18)

\[
\log\left(\frac{\phi^c_t}{\pi_t}\right) = \gamma \left[ \mu - g_u - \frac{1}{2} \gamma^2 \sigma_e^2 \right] t
\] (19)

As expected, higher growth states for consumption have lower $\left(\frac{\phi^c_t}{\pi_t}\right)$ ratios. One could input different estimates of relative risk aversion and different states’ growth rates and consumption volatility into the eq. 19 and compute the estimated log of the risk neutral probability to the true probability.

Returning to the general case (not assumed lognormal or CRRA), Eq. 12 shows that the risk neutral probability for a certain rate level will exceed (be less than) the true probability if marginal utility, conditional upon that rate level, exceeds (is less than) the unconditional expected marginal utility for that date. This would typically be true when real consumption is less (more) in the state than it is expected to be on average for that date.

**Expected Marginal Utility, Conditional upon a Certain Nominal Interest Rate, Varies Over Time: Changing Real Betas for Nominal Bonds**
Next, let’s consider issues related to the fact that our interest rate cap and floor prices are based on nominal interest rates, not real rates. Of course, marginal utilities are based upon real consumption, not nominal consumption. The relation between inflation and real economic growth is an unstable one over time. In the big recessions in 1974-1975 and 1981-1982, we had high inflation and high nominal interest rates (giving negative realized bond returns) at times of recession (with stocks and real consumption negative), which would indicate positive real consumption and stock market betas for holders of long-term nominal bonds. We would characterize this as “supply-oriented inflation,” as it was a situation of high inflation caused by constrained supplies of oil and grains.

In contrast, in recent years of the Great Recession and its weak recovery (2007-2013), market participants are well aware of the very positive correlation of daily interest rate changes with the stock market. The logic is that aggregate demand issues are the dominant inflation risks, and higher stock prices are viewed as leading better economic growth, which would give higher inflation and interest rates. Thus, we have in these recent years, negative real consumption and stock market betas for nominal long-term bonds, in contrast to the positive betas in the 1974-1975 and 1981-1982 recessions. This recent relationship is consistent with the “flight to quality” reactions that drive up nominally riskless bond prices on days when the stock market plummets.

To verify that the betas of nominal bonds have indeed changed signs over the years, as supply and demand inflation uncertainties alternate in volatility, we gathered daily data on nominal interest rates from the Federal Reserve’s website for 1962 to September 12, 2013. We also gathered daily index prices for the Standard and Poor 500 from Yahoo! Finance’s website, which gives them back to 1950 daily. Using windows of 3 or 6 months of daily data windows, the graphic results are very similar, so only the 6-month window data are shown here. Figure 4 shows the moving window correlations of daily changes in nominal rates with daily percentage changes in the S&P 500 from 1962 to 2013. (We have not gotten daily dividends in, as these are likely an order of magnitude smaller effect.) Figure 5 shows the same calculations for betas, rather than correlations, which picks up the effects of changing interest rate and stock market volatility time.
Of course, betas for bond returns will be opposite in sign from those for rates. The negative correlations and betas for rates in the 1970s and 1980s correspond to positive betas for nominal long-term bonds relative to the S&P 500 and relative to real consumption growth. The positive correlations of rates with stock returns in recent years demonstrates the negative betas for long term nominal bonds, which reflect their flight to quality appeal. From Figure 5, recent interest rate beta estimates averaged approximately 0.03, which would imply that a 10% increase in stock prices is associated with a 30 basis points move in the 10-year interest rate, which is not implausible.

The fact that the betas of interest rates and bond returns have changing betas over time lead us to conclude that the ratios of risk neutral probabilities to true probabilities should also change, depending upon which regime we are in. If we are in a situation like that of the 2007-2013 period, then low interest rates (1% or 2%) are associated with low real growth forecasts and high conditional marginal utilities, so the risk neutral probabilities for those low rate states should exceed true probabilities, and the reverse should be true for states with high interest rates (perhaps 6% to 9% rates).

If we return to a situation where high inflation is associated with very poor economic growth and poor stock returns (as in the 1970s and 1980s), then the pattern would reverse, and low rate states would have low ratios of risk neutral probabilities to true probabilities.

Figure 6 shows an illustration of how true probabilities should be related to risk neutral probabilities if one made the CRRA-Lognormal model assumptions, which yielded equation 19. Two alternative regimes are estimated – the 1998-2011 recent period, where nominal interest rates were positively correlated with real consumption growth, and the 1977 to 1997 period, where interest rates were negatively related to stock returns and real consumption growth. The higher the amount of relative risk aversion, the higher the premium paid for insurance against low consumption growth. In those situations of low consumption growth, the relatively high risk neutral probabilities (state prices) have to be scaled down to get proper estimates of true probabilities. In contrast, for good scenarios which have high real consumption growth, risk
neutral probabilities are low, due to low marginal utility, and have to be scaled up more to properly estimate true probabilities.

**Figure 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration of True Probabilities Related to Risk Neutral Probabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True probability = $K \times \text{Risk Neutral} \times \exp(\Gamma (g - \mu))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumes: CRRA-Lognormal real growth model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Growth on Nominal Rate: 1998 to 2011 Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slope</td>
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<td>MuCgrowth</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Risk Aversion (Gamma)</th>
<th>Relative Risk Aversion (Gamma)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Real</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.39</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4.81</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.19</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*=Up to a scalar multiple

Given the slightly negative relation of nominal rates to stock returns and real growth in the 1977 to 1997 period (in good part due to the correlation of high inflation and interest rates with the big recession in 1981-1982), Figure 6’s 2nd panel shows that the relation can reverse if that is the regime. Low interest rates were correlated with higher real growth and low marginal utilities and low risk neutral probabilities. These have to be scaled up to properly estimate true probabilities in this regime.

With these complexities of changing real risks and equilibrium risk premia of nominal bonds, the analyses of changes in the distributions for future interest rates that are in the following sections should most precisely be viewed in terms of changing state prices and risk neutral probabilities, which are what we uncover from prices of interest rate caps and floors.
IV. State Prices and Risk Neutral Densities from Data on Cap and Floor Prices

In this section, we use the data on historic and current prices of interest rate caps and floors, which was obtained from Smith Breeden Associates, who use Bloomberg as their primary source for this data. This data is used as illustrated in Section II to estimate the market’s implied distribution of “state prices” and “risk neutral densities” for various possible future rates for 3-month LIBOR. Plotting this gives us the shape of the risk-neutral density implied from market prices. Figure 7 shows the densities implied from prices of interest rate caps and floors. Floors are used for rates 0% to 3%, as they best trace out the density for lower interest rates. Averages of cap and floor implied densities are used for rates from 4% to 6%, and then the cap densities are used for 7%, 8% and 9% plus rates. Caps are most active for higher interest rates, as markets are more active for insurance that is out of the money, and therefore cheaper. We use yearend data for 2003 to 2007 for time spreads of 5-year and 4-year caps and floors, which means that these average distributions are for 3-month LIBOR from 4 to 5 years from the pricing date:

Figure 7
From Figure 7, we see that putting the information from caps and floors together gives one a relatively symmetric picture of risk-neutral probabilities for the 3-month LIBOR rate in 5 years, as seen from yearends 2003-2007. The mode for long-term forecasts of 3-month LIBOR during these years centered around a projected 3-month LIBOR rate of about 4% to 5%, depending upon the year. In Figure 8, we show the implicit risk-neutral densities from cap and floor prices at year ends from 2008 to 2012. Examining these densities carefully, after the U.S. Federal Reserve dropped short rates to near zero in December 2008, shows a very substantial shift from symmetric distributions to very positively skewed distribution. With rates near zero, market participants appear to reflect, quite reasonably, that rates have much higher probabilities of, say, 3% increases in 4-5 years than of 3% decreases, which would give substantially negative nominal rates, a very unlikely event.

Figure 8
Examining Figure 8 more carefully is instructive. It shows that the prices for the 1% (0% to 2% triangular payoffs) 3-month LIBOR state in 5 years went up dramatically from December 31, 2010 to 12/31/2011 and 12/31/2012, while the prices of payoffs in the 4%, 5% and 6% LIBOR states (triangles) dropped quite dramatically. At the same time, actual 3-month LIBOR barely changed, as it was already below 40 basis points in 2010 and remained there in 2011 and 2012. Thus, between 2010 and 2012, expectations for increases in LIBOR were substantially reduced, very likely due to Fed policy announcements, which is examined in the next section.

Please note that these drops in state prices likely were related to both factors determining state prices: (1) reduced actual probabilities for high rates together with higher actual probabilities that rates would stay low, and (2) increasingly strong beliefs of a positive relationship between interest rates and the economy. Conditional consumption betas and stock market betas may have become very high for the high LIBOR rate securities (which would drive their prices down to provide proper risk premia). At the same time, securities that pay off when LIBOR was extremely low (close to zero) likely had negative conditional consumption betas, as such low rates in 5 years likely meant that that the economy was still doing very poorly and real consumption growth and real stock returns had likely been very poor. Thus, investing in these securities had great insurance properties, which bids up their prices (and returns down), even relative to true probabilities.

Next, let us zoom in on the distributions for a few key years to gain greater insight. Figure 9A shows the estimated risk neutral densities for 3-month LIBOR forecasts for 3-year and 5-year horizons as of December 31, 2003:
Note that in 2003, LIBOR was at a low level of 1.15%. While the market apparently expected this to increase to a mode of 3% in 3 years and 4% in 5 years, there was still some significant probability that the rate would stay at 1%. Note that in 2003 there was a great deal of uncertainty about how high LIBOR would go in 5 years, as the distribution was relatively uniform for rate levels from 2% to 6% and even had a similarly large chance of rates in a tail of 9% and higher.

After the Fed regularly increased short-term rates in 2004-2006, LIBOR increased sharply from 1% in 2003 to 5% in 2006. Figure 9B shows the risk-neutral distribution on December 31, 2006. It shows that the risk-neutral probability for 1% LIBOR declined sharply, and risk neutral probabilities for rates of 5% to 6% increased sharply. Interestingly, tail prices for 9%+ came down significantly, despite the more than quadrupling of current 3-month LIBOR from 1.15% in 2003 to 5.36% in 2006. In 2006, the yield curve was downward sloping, which might indicate market participants expected rates to weaken subsequently. Apparently, at yearend 2006, there was little worry that LIBOR would exceed 9% in 5 years. That was a good
call, as the Great Recession occurred in 2008-2009 and LIBOR fell to less than 0.50% in 2010-2011.

**Figure 9B**

![USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years vs. in 5 Years, as of December 31, 2006](image)

**Figure 9C** gives the risk-neutral densities for 3-month LIBOR, 5 years hence, that were implied in interest rate cap and floor prices as of December 31, 2008. This shows the low rates and positive skewness that occurred during the Great Recession and the aftermath, when the Federal Reserve provided massive stimulus for the U.S. economy. We will discuss this period of stimulus in the next section.
Figure 9C

Figure 10 gives a list of selected major policy announcements by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board in the Great Recession and the aftermath.

Figure 10

**Major Federal Reserve Policy Announcements 2008-2013**

- **December 2008**: Cut rates to record lows in financial panic.
- **March 2009**: Will keep rates close to zero for “extended period.” Stock market bottoms March 9th.
- **August 2011**: Will keep rates extremely low “at least until 2013.”
- **September 2012**: Low “at least until 2015”
- **December 2012**: Will tie low rates to range in Unemployment (>6.5%) and Inflation (<2%).
- **May/June 2013**: **May 22**: Given economic strength, Fed is seriously considering “tapering” asset purchases (QE3). **June 19**: Housing market is strong and supportive; tapering QE3 likely in 2nd half 2013.
Major Policy Move #1

September 2008 was when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and several other financial institutions were also troubled (Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley) and did mergers or substantial capital raising. In response to the great fears and stock price drops around the globe, the U.S. Federal Reserve stepped in strongly in December 2008 to provide liquidity and reduce short-term rates to near-zero levels, and long-term rates dropped to lows for the prior 75 years (2.25%). Figure 11 shows the major shift in the risk neutral density to lower rates between June 30, 2008 and December 2008. As just discussed, in addition to this reflecting the true probabilities of lower rates in 5 years, these state prices likely also reflect changes in conditional consumption betas for these delta securities, with low rate ones having increasingly negative consumption betas, while high rate delta securities had more positive consumption betas.

Figure 11

USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years as of June 30, 2008 and December 31, 2008
Bernanke’s Fed Drove Short Rates to Near Zero
Computed for Delta Payoffs from Butterfly Spreads of Time Spreads of Interest Rate Caps and Floors
**Major Policy Move #2**

When the Fed announced in **March 2009** that they were going to keep rates low “for an extended period of time,” Figures 12A and 12B, which compare risk-neutral distributions for LIBOR on December 31, 2008 and April 30, 2009, show that the markets apparently felt that the strengthening economy would not allow the Fed to maintain rates this low for 3 or 5 years, as the risk neutral distribution for rates then actually shifted to the right, towards higher rates. The stock market hit its low on March 9, 2009, and then began a very strong bull market that took stock prices higher by more than 50% in the remainder of 2009. Market participants apparently believed that an over heated economy might have higher inflation and actually require that rates be pushed up within 3 to 5 years.

**Figure 12A**

![USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years as of December 31, 2008 and April 30, 2009](image)
Major Policy Move #3

In early August, 2011, during the budget impasse between the President and Congress on raising the U.S. Federal Debt Ceiling, the stock market plummeted and there was a huge flight to quality and drop in interest rates. In response, the Fed made a statement that surprised markets by specifically saying that they expected rates to main extremely low “at least through 2013,” i.e., for more than 2 years. This specificity and long time commitment of the Fed’s interventions dramatically affected the expectations for LIBOR rates even 5 years out. State prices for 1% delta securities doubled, while state prices for rates of 3% to 6% LIBOR in 3 years dropped in half between June 30, 2011 and September 30, 2011, as Figure 13 shows:
Note that while the histograms for June 30, 2011 and September 30, 2011 cross in Figure 13A, the cumulative frequency distributions (not shown) do not cross. If, for all levels of rates, the September 30, 2011 cumulative frequency distribution (starting from zero rates) is greater than or equal to the June 30, 2013 cdf, then we can say that the market’s projected rate distribution is clearly lower in the sense of “First Order Stochastic Dominance” (FOSD) of Rothchild-Stiglitz (1971).

The effect of the August 2011 specificity and long time commitment on the distribution for longer term, 5-year forecasts for 3-month LIBOR was even more dramatic. The gradually strengthening economy of 2009-2011 had shifted the risk neutral density for LIBOR 5 years out to a relatively symmetric distribution, with low prices for 0% and 1% rates, and a mode of 4%, with highest probability densities from 3% to 5%, then tapering off gradually. Figure 13B shows that within the 3-month period from June 30, 2011 to September 30, 2011, the mode for rates out 5-years dropped from 3% to 4% to less than 1%, and the risk-neutral density shifted to very
positive skewness. Clearly, the Fed’s actions and the stock market fall during the budget impasse transformed the state prices and risk neutral probability densities seen in 2011.

Figure 13B

**USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years**

Major Policy Move #4:
The stock market strengthened considerably in 2012, finishing the year with a gain of over 12%, as there were a variety of encouraging signs in the economic data, such as for job growth. Many market participants called for the Fed to reduce or stop its intervention. In December 2012, the Fed made a conditional statement that said that they would “tie low rates to ranges in unemployment (>6.5%) and inflation (<2.0%).” Thus, when the markets rallied an additional 6% for the S&P 500 in January 2013, the 10-year Treasury rate increased from 1.78% to 2.02%. As Figure 14 shows, the risk-neutral density bulged out in the middle to reflect greater probabilities of LIBOR rates in 5 years being 2% to 4%, and significantly less weight on LIBOR at 0.5% to 1.0% at that time. Note that the risk neutral probabilities for LIBOR greater than 5% did not significantly increase. So while the market reflected significant rate increases, they appeared to think that rate increases would remain relatively well controlled to modest levels.
Note that we can verify that the market’s implicit forecasts for LIBOR in 5 years were higher on January 31, 2013 than on December 31, 2012 in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.

**Figure 14**

USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years

Dec 2012: Fed Ties Low Rates to Unemployment > 6.5%, Inflation < 2.0%,
January 2013 stock surge bulges rate distribution in 2%-4% range. Low tail risk.

In the next section, we will similarly investigate and present what happened in Europe during this same time. Of course, from 2010 to 2013, Europe dealt with sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, so major policy actions were taken by the European Central Bank during those years.
VI. **Euro Area State Prices and Risk Neutral Densities for Euro LIBOR.**

In this section and the next, we do parallel analysis for state prices/risk neutral densities for the Euro Area. Prices for caps and floors for various maturities and strike rates for Euro LIBOR were obtained from Bloomberg. Principal cap and floor market prices used are for caps and floors with two or more years to maturity, based upon 6-month Euro LIBOR, paid semiannually.

Stock prices in the Eurozone in 2003-2013 largely paralleled moves in USA stock prices, but with a larger increase up in 2003-2007 period, a larger fall in 2008-2009, and a smaller comeback from 2009-2013, due to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis from 2010-2013. Euro LIBOR started at a higher yield than in the USA, with 2%+ in 2003, then rose similarly to 5% in 2007-2008. Euro LIBOR fell a few months later and less than did USA LIBOR in 2008-2009, as the European Central Bank was slightly less stimulative than the Federal Reserve was at that time (as Europe appeared less affected by the Great Recession than the USA). Indeed, in 2010 and 2011, when the stock market recovery was under way, the ECB under President Jean-Claude Trichet actually raised interest rates, something the Fed did not do after 2008. These rate increases were reversed when Mario Draghi became ECB President on November 1, 2011, and made clear the ECB’s commitment to provide massive liquidity in the face of the Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis. Figure 15 shows the movements in 6-month Euro LIBOR for the past 10 years:

**Figure 15**

*6-Month Euro LIBOR Percentage Yield Dec 2002 to Feb 2013*
Butterfly spreads of time spreads of interest rate caps and floors are again used to compute prices of triangular payments, which were then normalized as described in Section II to arrive at risk neutral densities for 6-month LIBOR 5 years ahead. Cap and floor prices were obtained for maturities of 2, 3, 4 and 5 years and for strike rates from 0.5% to 7.5% for floors and for 1% to 9% for caps. Figures 16 and 17 give the distributions at yearend for 2003-2007 and 2008-2012, respectively. The big picture looks quite similar to that of the USA in Figures 7 and 8. From 2003 to 2007, the market’s state prices/risk neutral densities for 6-month Euro LIBOR, 5 years hence, were approximately symmetric, with modal rates between 3% and 5%, depending upon the year.

From 2008-2012, the implied distributions are similar, but a bit different than those for the USA. In 2008, 2009 and 2010, one still sees relatively tight (low variance), symmetric distributions in Europe, whereas the USA had more spread out distributions with more positive skewness (certainly in 2008). However, when the Euro Crisis hit in full force in 2011 and 2012 and the ECB became highly stimulative under President Draghi, the distributions for Euro LIBOR 5 years out first flattened in 2011, and then inverted to a long, positively skewed tail, similar to that in the USA in 2012.

Figure 16
In Figures 18A-18D, we zoom in on the distributions for Euro LIBOR 5 years hence, as of December 31, 2003, 2006, 2008 and for February 28, 2013. Similar distributional results to the USA are evident, with large uncertainties in 2003, evolving to tight distributions in 2006. However, note that 9%+ tail risk in 2003 was much smaller in Europe than it was in the USA.
As noted, as of December 31, 2008, shortly after the fall in Lehman Brothers on September 15th, the dramatic fall of stocks globally in October, and the credit markets “seizing up” in November (*New York Times*, November 21 headline), European markets’ implied state prices/risk neutral densities for 5 years out were quite different from those of the USA. Comparing Figure 18C with Figure 9C, we see a relatively symmetric distribution for Euro LIBOR 3 and 5 years hence, whereas dollar LIBOR had a very long tail with positive skewness. Perhaps at this point Europe was not nearly as worried of a deep and lasting recession as the USA was.
However, we see in Figure 18D that the ensuing European Sovereign Debt Crisis caused the ECB to provide stimulative policy responses and market beliefs at February 28, 2013, to be quite similar to those in the USA, with very positive skewness starting from very low interest rates. Note that if one compares the February 28, 2013, distribution for Euro LIBOR 5 years hence to that for USA dollar LIBOR, the state prices for payoffs for LIBOR of more than 3% are much lower in the USA than for the Eurozone. Markets still apparently believe that chances are that LIBOR will be held at historically low levels longer in the USA than in Europe. This is consistent with Figure 18D showing that the 5-year distribution for Euro LIBOR shows much higher values for higher rates.
Figure 18D

Euro Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years vs. in 5 Years, as of February 28, 2013

*Euro rate distribution shifts to positive skewness like USA*

Computed for Delta Payoffs from Butterfly Spreads of Time Spreads of Interest Rate Caps and Floors

RND for 3-Year Deltas  RND for 5-Yr Deltas
VII. **ECB Policy Impacts in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis**

In this section, we examine key events in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010 to 2013 and policy actions by the European Central Bank in dealing with the crisis. Using timelines provided by the BBC (13 Jun 2012), Yahoo (23 Feb 2013) and a Reuters Special Report (2 Mar 2013), we identify three years of these key events in Figure 19:

**Figure 19**

**Key Events in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis European Central Bank 2010-2012**

*Source: BBC, Reuters*

- **January 2010**: Greek deficit revised upward from 3.7% to 12.7%. “Severe irregularities” in accounting.
- **April - May 2010**: EU agrees to $30 billion, then $110 billion bailout of Greece. Ireland bailed out in November 2010.
- **July 2011**: Talk of Greek exit from Euro. Second bailout agreed.
- **August 2011**: European Commission President Barroso warns sovereign debt crisis spreading. Spain, Italy yields surge.
- **November 1, 2011**: Mario Draghi takes over European Central Bank from Jean-Claude Trichet. Draghi cuts rates twice quickly.
- **July 2012**: ECB cuts rates again.
- **September 2012**: ECB ready to buy “unlimited amounts” of bonds of weaker member countries. Draghi says ECB will do “whatever it takes to preserve the Euro.” “…and believe me, it will be enough.”
- **May/June 2013**: U.S. Fed considers “tapering” asset purchases, as economy strengthens. Long term interest rates move up sharply.

Dow Jones Euro Stoxx stock price indexes plummeted in 2010 around the first Greece bailout, as well as in 2011 around the second Greece bailout and serious concerns over Spain and Italy’s debts, and then again in 2012 over intensified concerns again on Spain and Italy, as reflected in the yields on their debts. These moves are seen in Figure 20, which zooms in on Euro stock price index moves at month ends from December 2009 to February 2013. The movements of 6-month Euro LIBOR over the same period are given in Figure 21. Note that the ECB actually increased short term rates in 2010 and the first half of 2011, before short rates were dramatically reduced in late 2011 and again in the second half of 2012.
Figure 20

DJ Euro Stoxx 600 and DJ Euro Stoxx 50 Stock Indexes
Sovereign Debt Crisis: Monthly, Dec 2009 to Feb 2013

Figure 21

6-Month Euro LIBOR Percentage Yield
Dec 2009 to Feb 2013
When Greece’s budget deficit was restated from 3.7% to 12.7% in January 2010 and major irregularities found, their budget crisis ensued. The first Greece bailout was agreed in April 2010 and expanded in May 2010. While current Euro LIBOR did not decline then (see Figure 21), Figure 22 shows that the market’s implied state prices and risk neutral distribution for 6-month Euro LIBOR in 5 years did shift noticeably to lower yields. So while the ECB did not move, markets did.

**Figure 22**

*Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month Euro LIBOR in 5 Years as of Dec 31, 2009 and Jun 30 2010. First Greece Bailout*

*While short rate is unchanged, 5yr rate distribution shifts lower*

Computed for Delta Payoffs from Butterfly Spreads of Time Spreads of Interest

Following the first bailout agreements in April-May 2010, Eurozone stock prices rebounded sharply (15%+) from mid-2010 to the first half of 2011. And then, in July 2011, the worries began to intensify again and there was widespread discussion of a possible Greek exit from the Euro. In August 2011, credit default swap insurance costs jumped for Italy and Spain and their bonds’ yields surged, as worries became acute that the debt crisis would spread to these larger countries, which had much greater amounts of debt. Eurozone stock prices plummeted through the summer by more than 25% from early 2011 peaks to the month-end lows on September 30, 2011. On November 1, 2011, Mario Draghi replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as
President of the European Central Bank and quickly cut short-term policy rates twice by the end of 2011.

Figure 23 gives the implied state prices/risk neutral densities as they moved through this tumultuous period (which also had the USA’s budget impasse in August 2011). Note that the prices of “left tail spreads” labeled as “0% LIBOR” skyrocketed from June 30th to September 30, 2011, illustrating the fear that was in the minds of investors. When Draghi cut rates twice in late 2011, the risk neutral distribution shifts left to lower projected rates in 5 years, as there were much higher values of 1% and 2% butterflies, and much lower values for 3% to 5% butterflies.

The tonic of lower rates worked initially in the Eurozone, much as it had in the USA, and stock prices rebounded by about 20% from September 30, 2011 to March 31, 2012. But then the fears re-surfaced that the larger economies of Italy and Spain would default on their debts and cause massive write downs for European and global banks. In just two months, from March 31 to May 31, 2012, Eurozone stock prices dropped a sharp 10%.
In July 2012, the ECB again cut rates sharply. And then on September 6, 2012, President Draghi said that the ECB stood ready to buy “unlimited amounts” of bonds of its weaker members. And finally, on September 25, 2012, as Reuters said, Draghi at a London business conference “dropped a bombshell” and surprised almost everyone by stating that: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro.” Then he went on to say “And believe me, it will be enough.”

Figure 24 shows the significant shift in the 5-year Euro LIBOR risk neutral distribution that occurred with these strong moves. The state prices for butterfly spreads paying off for interest rates from 0% to 2% increased substantially, whereas those for rates 3% and higher dropped significantly. Right tail risks for rates, already low, became much lower yet. Stock prices rather steadily marched upward from mid-2012 to early 2013 for the Eurozone. Once again, we can verify that the market’s distributions for December 31, 2012 rates were lower than June 30, 2012 in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.

Figure 24

VIII. Impact of 2013 Federal Reserve Consideration of “Tapering” Asset Purchases

On May 22, 2013, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, testified before Congress that the Fed might “taper” its historic purchases of Treasury bonds and mortgages, which were running at $85 billion per month, an historic amount. In saying this, Bernanke noted that the labor market had shown steady improvement and the unemployment rate, while still high, had dropped considerably since the program of “quantitative easing” had started. Over the next 6 days, the 10-year Treasury rate increased by 21 basis points, from 1.94% to 2.15%, with a good part of the increase occurring after the long Memorial Day weekend holiday. Perhaps markets needed some time to digest the potential impact of this shift in policy. Figure 25A shows the day by day moves in the risk neutral density for USA LIBOR in 3 years.

Figure 25A

While U.S. rates moved up noticeably, the rate distribution for the Euro did not move as much, as shown in Figure 25B.
In testimony a month later, June 19th, the Fed Chairman made stronger statements, and markets around the world reacted sharply. Bernanke said that the tapering would likely begin “later this year” if growth picks up as the Fed projects and unemployment continues to decline and inflation moves closer to the Fed’s 2% target. Bernanke said “In particular, the housing sector, which has been a drag on growth since the crisis, is now obviously a support to growth.” Rising home prices are increasing household wealth and strengthening consumer confidence and spending, he noted. (Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2013). Both 3-year and 5-year risk neutral densities for US LIBOR moved sharply, as the 10-year Treasury rate moved 32 basis points from June 18 to June 21, 2013. Figures 26A and 26B show the moves in the risk neutral distributions, while Figure 26C shows that Europe’s risk neutral distribution also moved sharply to higher rates with this testimony:
Figure 26A

USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years
4 Days: June 18, 2013 (2.20%) to June 21, 2013 (2.52%)
June 19, 2013: Fed considers "tapering" asset purchases
Chairman Bernanke says housing strong and supportive
Risk neutral density moves towards higher

Figure 26B

USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years
4 Days: June 18, 2013 (2.20%) to June 21, 2013 (2.52%)
June 19, 2013: Fed considers "tapering" asset purchases
Chairman Bernanke now says housing is strong and positive.
During the summer of 2013, the stock market, after falling sharply following Bernanke’s June comments, recovered and moved back towards historic highs (1700+) on the Standard and Poor 500 index. Market participants appeared to believe that tapering would begin with at the Fed’s meeting on September 18th, perhaps with a monthly reduction of $10 billion of asset purchases. Interest rates drifted upward and touched 3.00% on the 10-year for the first time since the financial crisis, while the stock market regained its strength and the unemployment rate drifted lower. To see the cumulative impact of the Central Bank communications and market assessments of the economy, Figures 27A and 27B show the risk neutral distributions for May 21st (before Bernanke’s first mention of tapering) and for September 16th, prior to the Fed’s September meeting. It can be seen that the distributions had shifted quite dramatically over the summer to higher rates and to much more spread out and symmetric distributions, yet ones that now possessed visible right tail risk (9%+ LIBOR) for the 5-year forward scenario.
Figure 27A

USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years
as of May 21, 2013 (1.94%) vs September 16, 2013 (2.9%)
May 22, 2013: Fed will consider "tapering" asset purchases
Stronger economy, stock market transform rate distribution

Figure 27B

USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years
as of May 21, 2013 (1.94%) vs September 16, 2013 (2.9%)
May 22, 2013: Fed Says will consider "tapering" asset purchases
Stronger economy, stock market transform rate distribution
Figures 28A and 28B give the corresponding graphs for the Euro, showing that rate distributions there shifted similarly, although a bit less than in the U.S. From these graphs, right tail risk in Europe was smaller than for the USA on September 16th, perhaps reflecting the market’s view that Europe is recovering more slowly than the U.S. at present.

**Figure 28A**

![Euro Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years as of May 21, 2013 (2.68%) vs September 16, 2013 (3.10%)](image1)

**Figure 28B**

![Euro Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years as of May 21, 2013 (2.68% 10 Yr) vs September 16, 2013 (3.10%)](image2)
IX. Conclusions

While many markets do not have options traded for longer term maturities, like 5 or 10 years, interest rate caps and floors have been traded in size for such maturities for many years. We have shown how butterfly spreads of forward-starting caps and floors can be used to estimate state prices and risk neutral densities for LIBOR projected for the 3rd and 5th years. These risk-neutral densities have shifted from relatively symmetric distributions to highly skewed distributions in the past few years, as interest rates have approached zero, making application of the Black-Scholes option pricing model to short term interest rates particularly problematic.

We have shown that policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank can and do affect the entire probability distribution for future interest rates, not just means and variances. The tools we use are wholly arbitrage based and nonparametric, so they do not rely upon assumptions about statistical estimates for the volatility process and surface, nor on the pricing function for actual market prices for options. These tools should be helpful to policy makers and to market participants in measuring policy impacts.

Postscript
As we finished this update prior to presentation at the Fed New York/NYU conference on Risk Neutral Densities on September 20th, the Federal Reserve surprised markets on September 18th by not beginning the tapering of asset purchases. Stock market participants were very surprised and elated, and the S&P 500 soared to a new record on that day, while the 10-year Treasury yield dropped by 17 basis points from 2.86% to 2.69%. Histograms for the risk neutral densities will surely be in the next version of the paper…
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Postscript:
September 15-18, 2013 Events

September 15: Larry Summers withdraws from consideration as new Fed Chair. Janet Yellen presumed frontrunner, believed proponent of easy money longer.

September 18: Fed surprises markets and does not start “taper.” Reduces growth forecasts.
USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years
4 Days: September 13 (2.90% 10 Yr) to Sept 18, 2013 (2.69%)
Sept 15: Summers withdraws as possible Chair, Yellen frontrunner
Sept 18, 2013: Fed surprises markets, does not taper yet
Rate distribution shift