

**The Tipping Behavior and Motives of U.S Travelers Abroad:
Affected by Host Nations' Tipping Norms?**

Michael Lynn ^a

School of Hotel Administration
Cornell University

And

Zachary W. Brewster^b

Wayne State University

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^a Address correspondence to Michael Lynn at: 552 Statler Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-6902, (607) 255-8271, WML3@cornell.edu.

^bZachary W. Brewster (zbrewster@wayne.edu), Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202.

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ABSTRACT

Despite the size and interdisciplinary scope of the extant literature on domestic tipping behaviors, little research has been done on the tipping behaviors of tourists when traveling abroad. In response, this study presents results from a hypothetical scenario experiment indicating that tipping by U.S. tourists follows the tipping norms of the visited nations and increases with future-service, reciprocity and altruism motives for tipping as well as with favorable attitudes towards the custom. National tipping norms did not moderate the effects of tipping motives but did moderate the effects of respondents' attitude towards tipping. Specifically, the likelihood that tourists would tip increased with their positivity towards the practice, but significantly less so when tipping was customary and expected in the host country. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for the generalizability of previous tipping research and strategies for increasing tipping by foreign tourists.

Keywords: tipping attitudes, foreign tourists, international travel, consumer behavior

INTRODUCTION

Many service workers around the world receive a large portion of their income in the form of voluntary gifts of money (called “tips”) from their customers. Exact measures of this consumer behavior are unavailable, but estimates place the amount given annually to food service workers in the United States alone at over \$45 billion (Azar 2011), so worldwide tipping across all service professions is substantial. This pervasive and economically important behavior touches the interests of many disciplines. It has been studied by:

- (i) economists as an unnecessary, and therefore, irrational payment (c.f., Azar 2007; Lynn 2006),
- (ii) human resources and management scholars as a form of employee compensation and incentive (c.f., Eddleston, Kidder, and Litzky 2002; Lynn, Kwortnik, and Sturman 2011; Shy 2015),
- (iii) marketing scholars as a measure of customer satisfaction or perceived service quality and as a form of buyer monitoring, status display, voluntary pricing, price discrimination, and price partitioning (c.f., Kim, Natter and Spann 2009; Kwortnik, Lynn and Ross 2009; Lee, Noble, and Biswas 2016; Lynn and Withiam, 2008; Van Vaerenbergh and Holmqvist 2013), and
- (iv) hospitality, services and tourism management scholars as a prominent feature of consumer service in the hospitality and tourism industries (c.f., Barkan and Israeli 2004; Bujisic, Wu, and Mattila 2014; Brewster 2013, 2015; Brewster and Mallinson 2009; Lynn and Brewster 2015; Schwartz 1997).

However, the vast majority of this extant scholarship has focused on the antecedents and implications of tipping behaviors within a domestic context. As such, despite the size and cross-disciplinary scope of the tipping literature, we know little about consumers' tipping behaviors while visiting foreign nations. In fact, only a few studies have examined the tipping of tourists traveling abroad (see Artuger and Cetinsoz 2013; Chiu and Chang 2006; Dewald 2001a, 2001b; Neto, Nowak, and Ross 2018; Tsaur and Wang 2009; Wang and Lee 2012). Given that the tipping behavior of tourists is likely to affect the recruitment, retention, motivation, and service delivery of hospitality employees in areas with a high density of tourists (see Barkin and Israeli 2004; Brewster 2013, 2015; Lynn 2002; Lynn, Kwortnik, and Sturman 2011; Kwortnik, Lynn, and Ross 2009, for related effects of domestic tipping) owners and operators in the tourism industry have a financial interest in actively affecting the tipping behaviors of their foreign visitors.

Unfortunately, the availability of extant knowledge that would allow managers in the tourism industry to make evidence driven decisions about investment strategies intended to manage or influence the tipping practices of international tourists is limited. In fact, a thorough review of the tipping and tourism literatures offers limited insights into even the simple question as to whether international travelers' tip their service providers in accordance with the tipping norms of their homeland or alternatively the norms of the nations they are visiting. Given the many cross-cultural differences that largely define the international traveling experience, the comparatively developed literature on the determinants and predictors of consumers' domestic tipping practices (for reviews, see Azar 2010; Lynn 2006, 2015b) is not very informative when it comes to the psychology underpinning tourists' tipping practices. It is possible, if not likely, for instance, that the operant determinants of a consumers' tipping behaviors differ when at home

and abroad due to a variety of factors including the psychological effects of international travel (see Berno and Ward 2005; Furnham 2012; Nawijn 2011), the differences between home and visited nations in service expectations (Becker, Murmann, Murmann, and Cheung 1999), service providers' incomes (Gittleman and Wolf 1993), and tipping norms (Lynn and Lynn 2004).

In an effort to advance our understanding of the behavior and psychology of tipping among international tourists the current study aims to 1) examine the causal effect of national tipping norms on tourists' prospective tipping behaviors, 2) assess whether previously observed associations of individual differences in U.S. consumers' attitudes towards tipping and self-reported motivations for tipping with their domestic tipping behaviors are generalizable to their tipping behaviors when traveling abroad, and 3) assess whether previously observed interactions between tipping attitudes/motivations and occupational specific tipping norms on domestic tipping behaviors are generalizable to national tipping norms and tipping practices of U.S. international tourists. These aims are further developed in the following section wherein we review the extant literature that has centered primarily on domestic tipping norms, tipping attitudes/motives, and tipping behaviors. We then advance this literature by presenting results from a hypothetical vignette experiment that was administered to a large and geographically diverse sample of U.S. Amazon Mechanical Turk workers.

BACKGROUND

Role of Tipping Norms

Nations around the world have social norms regarding tipping, so it is not surprising that researchers have documented substantial effects of both descriptive and injunctive tipping norms on this behavior. For example, research indicates that people are more likely to tip occupations that they perceive many others as tipping (Lynn 2016). In addition, restaurant tip sizes in the

U.S. increase with bill size in a manner consistent with the 15 to 20 percent restaurant tipping norm (Lynn and Graves 1996) and that relationship is stronger among individuals and social groups more familiar with the norm (Lynn 2011). However, it is not clear if tourists follow the tipping norms of other nations as they do the tipping norms of their home countries.

From a theoretical perspective, foreign visitors might comply with foreign tipping norms much as they do with their home country's tipping norms and for similar reasons. They may take foreign tipping norms as information about the adequacy of service workers' non-tip wages or about the likely social consequences associated with tipping or not tipping. They may also feel an obligation to comply with the social norms of the countries they are in -- e.g., "When in Rome do as the Romans do." Alternatively, foreign visitors may be less inclined to comply with foreign tipping norms than with home tipping norms because the former may not convey the same information about servers' non-tip wages or may seem strange and unreasonable. They may also be less concerned about the social consequences of non-compliance because they will not be in the host country long enough to face those consequences and can claim ignorance of the norm as a justification of non-compliance if confronted about it.

This theoretical uncertainty reflects the scarcity of extant studies that have questioned the relationship between national tipping norms and tourists' tipping behaviors. In fact, we are aware of only three such studies that speak to the relationship between national tipping norms and tourists' tipping behaviors. In a pair of studies analyzing data derived from a survey of 985 foreign tourists, from six different countries (Chinese Taipei, Mainland China, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States, and Australia), as they departed from Hong Kong Dewald (2001a, 2001b) found that a majority (68.1 – 90.3%) of the tourists tipped their service providers during their visit even if tipping was not customary in their home countries. In a second study, Shrestha

(2014) presented results from a survey of a convenience sample of Oklahoma State University faculty, staff, and students showing that domestic participants claimed to tip their restaurant servers a significantly higher percentage of the bill than did their foreign counterparts (i.e., international students who have been in the U.S. for less than five years). Importantly, it was shown that the relationship between participants' familiarity with the 15% to 20% U.S. tipping norm and their self-reported tipping behavior was stronger among foreign compared to domestic participants.

While the results from these studies suggest that many consumers traveling abroad conform to the tipping norms of the nations they visit, each study is plagued with limitations that undermine our ability to confidently draw this conclusion. The cross-sectional nature of the data analyzed in these studies, coupled with the lack of variation in host-country tipping norms (e.g., it is customary to tip in the U.S. and Hong Kong), alone makes it impossible to draw strong causal inferences about the relationship between national tipping norms and tourists' tipping behaviors. The current study's manipulation of foreign tipping norms (with random assignment to conditions) thus provides a needed test of the causal effects of these norms on tourists' tipping behaviors. Importantly, even if Dewald's (2001a, 2001b) and Shrestha's (2014) findings do indeed reflect the causal effects of national tipping norms on foreign travelers' (or international students) tipping behaviors, they show only that people will tip when visiting countries where it is customary to do so (i.e., Hong Kong and the United States). Whether people accustomed to tipping will refrain from doing so when visiting countries where it is not customary has not been addressed. Thus, the current study also aims to extend the work of Dewald (2001a, 2001b) and Shrestha (2014) by assessing whether U.S. tourists, and presumably others who are used to tipping at home, will tip less when visiting countries where it is not customary.

Attitudes toward and Motivations Underpinning Tipping

As a voluntary decision to part with money that could be kept for other uses, tipping is seen by many as an irrational practice. Thus, numerous scholars have theorized about and empirically tested the attitudes and motivations underlying this behavior (see Azar, 2010; Becker, Bradley, and Zantow 2012; Lynn 2009, 2015b; Saunders and Lynn 2010; Shrestha 2014; Whalen, Douglas, and O’Niel 2014). In general, this body of work suggests that consumers tip because they like the practice and because they want to: (1) financially help service workers, (2) gain or keep preferential service in the future, (3) gain or keep the esteem (approval, liking and admiration) of others, (4) reward good service, and (5) satisfy feelings of obligation or duty to tip. For example, individual differences in self-reports of these motivations for tipping have been found to predict the likelihood of tipping and/or tip size in many, though not all, published (see Table 1) and unpublished (Shrestha 2014) studies. This research has also found that attitude toward tipping predicts unique variance in tipping likelihood above and beyond that predicted by self-reported tipping motives (Lynn 2016b, 2018).

Theoretically, there is little reason to doubt that the effect of attitude toward tipping would replicate in the context of foreign tourism. However, for a host of logical reasons the motivations underpinning tipping practices may not operate the same in a foreign country (regardless of that country’s tipping norms) as they do in the tipper’s home country. First, most international visitors are less likely to know much about the non-tip compensation of service workers in a foreign country that they are visiting thereby affecting altruistic and reciprocity motives for tipping. Second, prospects of future interactions with the service worker will logically be lower in a foreign country that is visited for only a brief time thereby affecting social-esteem and future-service motives for tipping. Finally, internalization of a host country’s

norms may logically be weaker given the shorter duration of norm exposure thereby affecting duty motives for tipping. Thus, it is unclear if existing research on the motives for tipping generalize to tipping by foreign tourists. The current study addresses this issue by attempting to conceptually replicate previously observed effects of individual differences in altruistic, reciprocity, future-service, social-esteem, and duty motives for tipping, as well as in attitude toward tipping, on domestic tipping behaviors in the new context of foreign tourism.

Interaction of Tipping Norms with Tipping Motives

Lynn (2015b, 2016b, 2018) has argued that the motivations underlying tipping should depend on, or vary with, descriptive and injunctive tipping norms. Selectively using and modifying his evolving ideas, we theorize that altruistic, reciprocity, and duty motives underpinning tipping are likely to be weakened when tipping is rare and not customary because the absence of tipping may suggest/signal that the service worker is adequately compensated via wages. As such, altruistic and reciprocity motives for tipping should become stronger as tipping becomes more common and normative, because larger numbers of tippers and injunctive tipping norms suggest/signal that additional compensation for service workers is needed either to help them make a comfortable living or to fairly compensate them for their efforts. Duty motives for tipping should also be stronger in the presence of institutionalized descriptive and injunctive tipping norms given that such norms are likely to create a social obligation to tip that is internalized. In addition, social-esteem and future-service motives for tipping (which have both acquisitive and avoidant components) should affect tipping across all levels of tipping norms, but should become more loss-avoidant and stronger the more common or normative tipping is, because servers are more likely to disapprove of, and discriminate in service delivery against,

non-tippers the fewer of them there are and third-party observers are more likely to disapprove of, and socially sanction, non-tippers when their behavior violates injunctive tipping norms.

Insert table 1 about here

Lynn (2016a, 2018) has conducted two studies testing the interactive effects of tipping norms and tipping motives on consumers' tipping practices. Specifically, he examined the effects of individual differences in altruistic, reciprocity, future-service, social-esteem and duty motives for tipping on the likelihood of tipping rarely, occasionally, and commonly tipped occupations. The results of those two studies support some but not all the theoretical expectations described above. In particular, Lynn reported that altruistic, reciprocity and duty motives for tipping have stronger effects for occupations that are more frequently tipped than for less frequently tipped occupations, while social-esteem and future-service motives for tipping do not (see Table 1).

Although informative, Lynn's findings are not dispositive for three reasons. First, some of the findings are inconsistent across studies (see Table 1). In particular, the interactions of tipping norms with social-esteem and reciprocity motives differed across the studies and deserve to be re-examined. Second, the operationalization of tipping norms via different occupations confounded the differences in tipping norms with other occupational characteristics, such as frequency of use, occupational status, and service customization (see Lynn 2016b, 2018). Lynn (2018) controlled for many of these potential confounds one at a time in occupation level analyses, but did not have the sample size needed to simultaneously control for all of them. Thus, it is unclear if the effects observed by Lynn were due to occupational differences in tipping norms or to other occupational characteristics. Finally, even if his results do reflect the effects of

tipping norms rather than the effects of other occupational characteristics, those effects may not generalize to national differences in foreign tipping norms. As discussed previously, the effects of tipping norms and of individual differences in tipping motives may both differ across domestic and foreign contexts, so the interaction of these factors may also vary across these contexts. For all of these reasons, more research is needed to test the interaction of foreign tipping norms with individual differences in tipping motives. The current study contributes to the tipping and tourism literatures by providing such a test.

Interaction of Tipping Norms with Attitude toward Tipping

Theoretically, the effects of injunctive tipping norms should be weaker among individuals with more positive attitudes toward tipping. Consumers who like tipping should be more inclined than those who dislike tipping to tip when it is unexpected and socially unnecessary. This means that injunctive norms compelling tipping will change the behavior of consumers who dislike tipping more than that of consumers who like it. Put another way, attitudes toward tipping should predict tipping behavior more strongly when tipping norms are weak and less strongly when injunctive tipping norms compel people to tip whether they like to do so or not.

The expected interaction of tipping norms with attitude toward tipping is supported by numerous studies finding that attitudes predict behavior more strongly when situational constraints on the behavior are weaker (see Meyer et. al. 2010). It is also supported by two studies finding that attitude toward tipping predicted the likelihood of tipping in rarely and occasionally, but not frequently, tipped occupations in the U.S. (Lynn 2016a, 2018). Similar interactions of attitude toward tipping with national tipping norms should be observed in

international tourism contexts as long as foreign nations' tipping norms compel visiting tourists to tip. A final contribution of the current study is to test this expectation for the first time.

In sum, while the extant literature on consumers' tipping behaviors in a domestic context is informative it is nevertheless equivocal when it comes to the tipping behaviors of international tourists. In response, this study aims to shed light on several empirical questions. First, are the tipping practices of foreign tourists sensitive to the tipping norms of the host nations that they visit, as extant research on domestic tipping would suggest? Second, do the attitudes towards and motives underpinning tipping behaviors operate similarly in a foreign context as they have been shown to operate domestically? Finally, does a nation's tipping norms interact with tipping attitudes and motives to predict international tourists' tipping practices in a similar way as occupational tipping norms have been shown to interact with tipping attitudes/motives to predict domestic tipping behaviors?

METHOD

Overview

The above empirical questions are advanced with an online survey that asked Amazon MTurk workers how often they would tip various service workers when traveling in a country where tipping was either (i) not customary and rarely done, (ii) not customary but occasionally done, or (iii) customary and frequently done. In addition to providing basic demographic information, respondents were also asked questions about their motivations for tipping and about their attitudes toward the custom.

Sample

One thousand nine hundred and sixteen individuals completed a short online survey about tipping in a foreign country in exchange for a small monetary payment. Participation was

solicited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing platform. MTurk is an online labor market where individuals can act as employers, or "requesters," to recruit employees, or "workers," to complete human intelligence tasks (HITs) in exchange for monetary payments. In their capacity as requesters, researchers from a variety of disciplines have capitalized on the ease in which survey instruments (i.e., HITs) can be posted, viewed, and completed by workers (i.e., participants) for an agreed upon payment. Although not without concerns (e.g., see Aruguete, Huynh, Browne, Jurs, Flint, and McCutcheon 2019; Rouse 2015; Smith, Roster, Golden, Albaum 2016), survey methodologists generally agree that data drawn from the MTurk platform is more representative of the United States population than conventional convenience samples and is particularly well suited for experimental research (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Casler, Bickel, and Hackett 2013; Hauser and Schwarz 2016). Of the 1,916 MTurk respondents that initiated participation in this study, 219 were dropped from analysis because they did not indicate that they were from the United States, did not answer an attention check question correctly, or disagreed that their responses were serious, honest, careful and accurate (the proportion of dropped respondents did not reliably vary across experimental conditions -- Chi-square (2) = 3.42, n.s.). Several of the 1,697 retained respondents failed to answer one or more questions, so sample sizes vary slightly across the analyses reported below.

Based on end-of-survey geodemographic questions, our respondents came from 52 states/territories of the United States and their ages ranged from 18 to 83 with a mean of 35 years and a standard deviation of 11 years. Seventy-four percent were white, 53 percent were male, 63 percent had a four-year-college, graduate, or professional degree, 15 percent earned less than \$20,000 per year, and 25 percent earned \$70,000 or more per year. Consistent with prior research on the demographic representativeness of MTurk samples (e.g., see Berinsky et al, 2012; Huff

and Tingley 2015; Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016), our participants on average had lower incomes, were younger, more highly educated, and disproportionately White compared to the U.S. population.

Experimental Manipulation of Tipping Norms

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the following three conditions:

(i) Tipping rare - “Imagine you are visiting some foreign country in Eastern Europe. Your travel guide says that tipping in restaurants, hotels and taxis is not customary and that workers do not expect tips but will gladly accept them if/when they are offered. Locals rarely (if ever) tip anything.”

(ii) Tipping occasionally done - “Imagine you are visiting some foreign country in Eastern Europe. Your travel guide says that tipping in restaurants, hotels and taxis is not customary and that workers do not expect tips but will gladly accept them if/when they are offered. Locals do occasionally tip discretionary amounts of their own choosing.”

(iii) Tipping common - “Imagine you are visiting some foreign country in Eastern Europe. Your travel guide says that tipping in restaurants, hotels and taxis is customary and workers expect tips, but that tipping is still voluntary and tip amounts are at the discretion of the customer. Locals almost always tip something.”

Tipping Likelihood

The dependent measures were adopted from Lynn (2018) and appeared immediately below the experimental manipulation. Respondents were asked: “How often would you tip the following service providers in this country assuming that they did a good job in serving you during your trip to their country.” Response options ranged from 1 = never to 5 = all of the time. The list of service workers was: restaurant waiters/waitresses, bartenders, taxi drivers, parking

valets, hotel bellmen/porters, hotel doormen, hotel maids, and hotel room service delivery persons. Rated likelihood of tipping was averaged across service workers into an index with a coefficient alpha of .94.

Manipulation Check

A manipulation check followed the dependent measures on a separate page. Respondents were asked: “In your opinion, how often do locals in the country described previously tip the following service providers in their country when those workers provide good service?” The response options and list of service workers were the same as those for the dependent measures. These ratings were averaged into an index with a coefficient alpha of .97. The manipulation of tipping norms was perceived as intended – respondents thought that local’s likelihood of tipping was low under the tipping rare condition ($M=2.14$), intermediate under the tipping occasionally done condition ($M=2.56$), and high under the tipping common condition ($M=3.70$), with the differences between all of these conditions being reliable at the .05 level ($F=387.10$, $df=2,1693$).

Insert table 2 about here

Tipping Motives

Following the manipulation check, respondents were asked about their motives for, and attitude toward, tipping. Specifically, they were asked: “Listed below are several statements expressing possible reasons or motives for tipping service workers (aka, servers). Thinking about your own tipping behavior across a variety of service situations, indicate how much YOU agree or disagree with each statement.” A list of the tipping motives statements was constructed to have four items each reflect social-esteem, future-service, reciprocity, duty, and altruistic

motives for tipping (see Table 2). Each of these statements were adopted from Lynn's (2016a, 2018) previously published studies on tipping motives. In an effort to minimize the length of our survey and thus enhance data quality, we presented respondents with 17 fewer tipping motive statements than Lynn (2018). Response options were: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = moderately agree, and 7 = strongly agree. A factor analysis extracting five factors using generalized least squares and Promax rotation indicated that not all the items loaded as expected and as such were omitted from further analyses. Therefore, indices of each motive/factor were constructed by averaging only three items per motive/factor. All the included items loaded highly only on the relevant factor and referred explicitly to reasons or motives for tipping. The excluded items were those referring to conditions under which the respondent would tip more or less rather than to explicit reasons for tipping. In constructing these indices, any missing values were replaced with the mean of the other items as advocated by Roth, Switzer and Switzer (1999). These motivation indices had coefficient alphas of .86 (social-esteem), .90 (future service), .89 (reciprocity), .71 (altruistic), and .89 (duty).

Attitude toward Tipping

At the end of the motivation questions, and using the same response scale, were two statements adopted from Lynn (2016a, 2018) that were used to measure participants' attitudes toward tipping—"I like the custom of tipping," and "I would like to see tipping abolished." The latter item was reverse scored and averaged with the first item to create an attitude to tipping index, with a Spearman-Brown coefficient of .68.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics for, and correlations among, the variables in this study are presented by tipping norm condition and across all conditions in Table 3. Table 4 presents the main effects of the experimental manipulation of a host country's tipping norms on our respondents' reported tipping likelihood. To assess the net effects of host country's tipping norms, tipping motives, and attitudes toward tipping on respondents' reported tipping likelihood in a foreign context we estimated a single OLS regression model and the results from this model are presented in Table 5. Finally, to assess whether the associations between motivations, attitudes towards tipping, and U.S. travelers' tipping behaviors are conditioned by the host country's tipping norms we estimated OLS models predicting tipping likelihood under each tipping norm condition and then compared the sizes of the coefficient across conditions. The results from these models are presented in Table 6. Key findings from these analyses are briefly described below.

Insert tables 3 thru 6 about here

Main Effect of Tipping-Norm Manipulation

As shown in Table 4, respondents tended to comply with the local tipping norms of their travel destination. Their self-rated likelihood of tipping was low under the tipping rare condition ($M=2.89$), intermediate under the tipping occasionally done condition ($M=3.04$), and high under the tipping common condition ($M=3.86$), with the differences between all of these conditions being reliable at the .05 level. In addition, within cell correlations between respondents' self-rated tipping likelihood and perceptions of locals' tipping likelihood (manipulation check) ranged from .51 to .59 (all p 's $<.01$, see Table 3).

Main Effects Tipping Motivations and Attitudes

Consistent with the bivariate results presented in Table 3, results from multivariate (see Table 5) analysis indicate that the reported likelihood of tipping increases with respondents' endorsement of future-service ($b=.07$, $p<.001$), reciprocity ($b=.18$, $p<.001$), and altruistic ($b=.16$, $p<.001$) motives for tipping. However, neither social-esteem ($b=.01$, n.s.) nor duty ($b=-.02$, n.s.) motives for tipping were found to be significantly associated with respondents' reported tipping likelihood when traveling abroad. Additionally, and as shown in Table 5, we find that consumers' attitudes towards the custom of tipping ($b=.17$, $p<.001$) makes unique contributions (above those of tipping motives) to the prediction of tourists' tipping likelihood in a foreign country. Finally, we replicate Lynn's (2015a, 2018) previous findings that attitude toward tipping is positively correlated with future-service, reciprocity and altruistic motives for tipping but is negatively correlated with duty motives for tipping (see Table 3), which suggests that people like tipping more when they perceive it as providing positive benefits to the self or others and like it less when they perceive it as an obligation.

Tipping-Norm Moderation Effects

As shown in Table 6, the associations between each of the theorized motivations underpinning tipping behaviors and respondents' reported likelihood of tipping did not reliably vary in size across tipping norm conditions. That is, the main effects of the tipping motivations on the likelihood that respondents would reportedly tip service workers when traveling abroad were not found to be sensitive to the tipping norms of the host country. We do find, however, that the positive association between consumers' attitudes towards the custom of tipping and the likelihood that they would report tipping in a foreign country is significantly stronger when tipping is done only rarely ($b=.23$, $p<.001$) or occasionally ($b=.23$, $p<.001$) than when it is normative ($b=.06$, $p<.05$) in the host country (see Figure 1).

Insert figure 1 about here

DISCUSSION

In 2017 alone over 1.5 billion individuals participated in the international tourism industry and spent nearly 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars doing so (World Bank, 2019). The size and economic saliency of this industry underlies the vast body of extant literature centered on the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of international travelers. Nonetheless, there is little to be learned from this literature about international travelers' tipping behaviors in the host nations that they visit. International variability in the presence and strength of norms prescribing that consumers tip their service providers adds a layer of uncertainty surrounding tourists' tipping practices when traveling abroad. It is unknown, for instance, whether the tipping behaviors of international travelers' are governed by domestic tipping norms or alternatively the norms of the host nations they visit. Moreover, given cross-cultural differences across a laundry list of macro, meso, and micro level factors it is impossible, without considerable caution, qualifications, and caveats to draw any inferences about the psychology underpinning international travelers' tipping practices from the comparatively developed extant literature on domestic tipping behaviors.

The current study addresses this shortcoming by presenting results that offer several contributions to our understanding of the tipping behaviors of tourists traveling abroad. First, we show for the first time that national tipping norms have a causal effect on international tourists' tipping behaviors. This finding suggests that all else being equal tourists who are aware of the host nation's tipping norms are likely to comply with such norms, rather than the norms of their

homeland, when deciding whether or not to tip their service providers. Second, the positive associations between future-service, reciprocity, and altruistic motives for tipping and tipping likelihood that we observed in this study conceptually replicate those observed in many, though not all, previous studies of domestic tipping (Azar 2010; Becker et al. 2012; Lynn 2009, 2015a, 2016b, 2018) and suggest that these motives operate to govern tipping behavior in a foreign as well as domestic context.

The null associations between social-esteem and duty motives for tipping and self-reported tipping likelihood are also common in the domestic tipping literature. In fact, extant tests of these associations, in particular, have produced a mixed bag of negative (e.g., Becker et al. 2012; Lynn 2015a, 2018), positive (e.g., Azar 2010; Lynn 2009, 2016b) and null results (Azar 2010; Lynn 2015a, 2016b). The current findings considered alongside those of previous studies suggest that consumers' sense of obligation and desire to gain social esteem may not be meaningful motivations underpinning consumers' foreign or domestic tipping behaviors. However, that we were not able to replicate results from two recent studies showing that duty motives increase the likelihood of tipping frequently tipped occupations in the U.S. (see Lynn 2016b, 2018) may also suggest that feelings of duty to tip in one's own country do not generalize to feelings of obligation to comply with the tipping norms of other countries.

Third, the positive association we observed between attitudes towards tipping and tipping likelihood is consistent with extant studies involving domestic tipping behaviors (see Lynn, 2016a, 2018) and suggests that consumers' who harbor favorable attitudes towards tipping will be more likely than their counterparts to tip their service providers whether the services were rendered domestically or while traveling abroad. Fourth, this study has provided the first test of the multiplicative effects of national tipping norms and individual differences in tipping

attitudes/motives on the likely tipping behaviors of tourists while traveling abroad. We found no evidence to suggest that the associations between tipping motivations and the likelihood that respondents would reportedly tip service workers when traveling abroad were conditioned by the tipping norms of the host country. That we were not able to replicate extant research (Lynn 2016a, 2018) showing that the associations between many of these motives and tipping behaviors did vary across different occupation-specific tipping norms in the United States suggests that these moderation effects are not generalizable to tourists' tipping behaviors while traveling abroad. Finally, we show that the association between favorable attitudes towards tipping and tipping behaviors is significantly stronger when tipping is done only rarely or occasionally in a host nation. This conceptual replication (Lynn 2018) indicates that, whether they want to tip or not, tourists as well as locals feel compelled to tip when doing so is common and expected.

Before discussing the theoretical and practical implications of these findings readers should be cognizant of a couple of salient caveats. First, while an important strength of our sample is that it is quite large and demographically diverse it is nevertheless not representative of the United States population and as such, readers should refrain from drawing strong inferences about the external validity of our results. While we have no strong reasons to believe that the substantive conclusion drawn from our results would not generalize to the U.S. population (see Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, and Freese 2015), establishing this to be the case was not a principal aim of this study. Rather, our primary goals were to provide the first controlled test for the causal effect of national tipping norms on U.S. tourists' tipping behavior and the impact of such norms on the behavioral effects of attitudes towards and motives underpinning travelers' tipping behaviors. While our design and sample were particularly well suited for these goals (see Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Casler, Bickel, and Hackett 2013; Hauser and Schwarz 2016),

future research should nonetheless be conducted to ascertain whether results are sensitive to the over or under representation of certain demographic characteristics in our sample.

Replication efforts using samples that include a greater proportion of older and higher income individuals, in particular, are encouraged given that such individuals are on average more likely to travel to Europe for leisure purposes than their younger and low-income counterparts (National Travel and Tourism Office, 2019).

Additionally, we did not observe the actual tipping practices of U.S. tourists but rather asked them to report their tipping intentions under hypothetical, controlled, and manipulated conditions. As such, our results should be interpreted as proxies or strong predictors of how tourists visiting foreign countries would actually tip in the presence of strong, intermediate, and weak national tipping norms. Extant studies showing there to be a high level of congruence between what people say they would do in hypothetical scenarios and what they actually do in comparable real-life scenarios (e.g., see Brauer, Day, and Hammond 2019; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015; Murphy, Herr, Lockhart, and Maguire, 1986) gives us considerable confidence in the validity of the predictive conclusions drawn from our results. Nonetheless, because of the presence of “Super-Turkers,” or habitual participants in MTurk experiments, it nevertheless remains possible that our estimates have been biased by practice, experience, demand, or social desirability effects (see Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014). In other words, while MTurk workers are incentivized to pay close attention to the experiments, and most do, the cost of such attentiveness is that some MTurkers “may also exhibit experimental demand characteristics to a greater degree than do respondents in other subject pools, divining the experimenter’s intent and behaving accordingly (Berinsky et al. 2012, p. 366).” Replication and extension efforts that utilize MTurk samples should be cognizant of this potential source of

response bias and take efforts to assess whether the treatment effects observed in this study are sensitive to habitual participation in experimental HITs.

Behavioral Effects of Foreign Tipping Norms

Notwithstanding the above cautions, our results have important theoretical and applied implications. The current finding that U.S. consumers reported being more likely to tip in a foreign country the more common and expected tipping was in that country suggests that tourists generally follow local tipping customs when traveling abroad. Evidence of such compliance with foreign tipping norms suggests that descriptions and reminders of those norms are likely to increase tipping when it is normative and decrease tipping when it is not. This implication is important because under-tipping by tourists is likely to undermine not only service firms' efforts to recruit, retain, and motivate qualified service personnel in tourist districts (see Barkin and Israeli 2004; Lynn 2002; Lynn, Kwortnik and Sturman 2011; Kwortnik, Lynn and Ross 2009, for related effects of domestic tipping) but importantly also their ability to ensure that foreign tourists are extended optimal levels of service quality. For instance, perceptions of aggregates of consumers, including international tourists, as inferior tippers have been shown to not only be quite common in the U.S. but also linked with discriminatory service delivery (see Brewster 2013, 2015; Shrestha 2014). Even over-tipping by some tourists can create problems by encouraging service discrimination favoring the better-tipping group at the expense of service to other tourists and domestic clientele (Brewster 2013, 2015). Thus, managers in the tourism industry should inform their foreign guests of local tipping norms as a way of increasing the guests' compliance with those norms and, thereby, reducing problems with recruiting and retaining employees as well as with discriminatory delivery of services.

Interaction of Foreign Tipping Norms with Attitude toward Tipping

The current finding that injunctive (but not purely descriptive) foreign tipping norms increase the tipping behavior of those who dislike tipping more than that of people who like tipping (see Figure 1) clearly indicates that those foreign injunctive tipping norms compel many people to tip even if they do not want to. Since social-pressure and internalized norms provide the only plausible sources of compulsion, this makes the failure to find stronger social-esteem and duty motive effects when tipping is customary and expected puzzling. Why don't the effects of social-esteem and duty motives for tipping when tipping was described as "customary and expected" reflect the social-pressures and feelings of obligation that subjects must have felt if the attitude effects are to be taken seriously? It is tempting to argue that the social pressure in this condition was strong enough to constrain everyone's tipping and diminish all dispositional differences, but the positive effects of dispositional differences in altruistic, reciprocity, and future-service motives were not reliably smaller in this condition than in the other conditions. Perhaps the failure to find a stronger social-esteem or duty motive effect when tipping is described as normative and expected is related to the fact that these motives do not linearly increase tipping likelihood at all (see Table 6). Both the null main-effects and null interaction-effects involving these motives may reflect incomplete and/or insensitive measurement of the constructs.

The items in the social-esteem motive index capture desires to gain respect, appear generous and avoid appearing cheap, but not desires to avoid others' disapproval or anger. Similarly, the duty motive index captures intentions to obey the tipping norms of the respondent's own country, fulfill obligations, and do one's duty, but not feelings of obligation to comply with foreign norms or to meet novel social expectations. Thus, the current measures may

be insensitive reflections of those dimensions of the constructs most important in the context of tipping in a foreign country. Consistent with this explanation, the social-esteem and duty motive indices were only modestly related to a self-reported tendency to tip based on social expectations (see Table 2)—they correlated at .37 and .53 ($n = 1,689$, $p < .001$) respectively with respondents' agreement that "I would tip less often if I was not expected to tip." Agreement with that statement (about tipping to satisfy social expectations) did reliably interact with the foreign tipping norm conditions to affect tipping likelihood ($F(2, 1683) = 9.15$, $p < .001$), such that tipping based on social expectations was more negatively related to tipping likelihood the less common and expected tipping was described as being (B's for the rare, occasional, and common conditions respectively = $-.21$, $-.15$ and $-.07$, all p 's $< .001$). However, the social-esteem and duty motive indices captured this tendency too weakly to produce comparable interactions with the tipping norm conditions. Future tourism and tipping researchers may want to use different measures of social-esteem and duty motives for tipping to more fully capture all their components and nuances.

Interactions of Foreign Tipping Norms with Tipping Motives

That national tipping norms did not moderate the relationship between tipping motives and tipping likelihood in this study is in stark contrast to Lynn's (2016a, 2018) findings that the effects of many of these motives did vary across different occupation-specific tipping norms in the United States. These failures to conceptually replicate have implications for (i) the generalizability of, and processes underlying, previously observed effects of occupation specific tipping norms on tipping motives, (ii) theory and research on the evolution of tipping norms, and (iii) the effectiveness of strategies for increasing tipping by foreign tourists as discussed below.

Generalizability of tipping-norm effects. The current failures to conceptually replicate Lynn's (2016a, 2018) findings that altruistic, reciprocity, and duty motives for tipping reliably moderated the effects of tipping norms are unlikely to reflect Type 1 errors by Lynn (2016a, 2018) because those effects were observed in more than one study. Furthermore, they are unlikely to reflect Type 2 errors in the current analyses because the sample sizes in this study included over 500 people per condition and the standard errors of the motivation coefficients in each condition were very small (all $\leq .04$). Instead, it is most likely that the reliable moderation of occupation-specific tipping norm effects within the U.S. reported by Lynn (2016a, 2018) simply do not generalize to the moderation of foreign tipping norm effects on tourists.

Perhaps the consumer inferences about the adequacy of wages for tipped vs non-tipped workers that Lynn (2018) used to explain his reliable interactions of occupation-specific tipping norms with altruistic and reciprocity motives for tipping depends on the existence of (i) large numbers and varieties of service workers who are commonly tipped and/or (ii) minimum wage laws that allow tipped service workers to be paid less than non-tipped workers – both of which are true in the U.S. but not necessarily elsewhere. Similarly, the effect of injunctive tipping norms on feelings of obligation to tip that Lynn used to explain his reliable interaction of occupation-specific tipping norms with duty motives for tipping may also require consumers' identification with the society responsible for the tipping norms – which would be true of domestic but not foreign tipping contexts. Further exploring these and other potential boundary conditions for tipping-norm effects is a potentially rich direction for future research.

Development and spread of tipping norms. The current findings also have implications for a recent theory about the development and spread of tipping norms. Tipping norms are not dictated by any central authority. Nor do they spring spontaneously and full-grown from the

masses. Rather, they emerge from the independent behaviors of some individuals and those behaviors spread to other people to varying degrees by some unknown process or processes. Lynn (2015b) has theorized that the processes underlying the evolution of tipping norms involve changes in the motivation for tipping caused by changing numbers of other tippers. Specifically, he suggested that tipping begins with individuals seeking to help the service worker, reward the server for his/her efforts, acquire better future-service, and/or acquire the servers' and/or other observers' esteem. Other consumers then model this behavior for similar reasons/motivations. As the number of tippers grows through social modeling, servers' favoritism toward tipping customers increases and become less tolerable to non-tippers, who begin to tip in order to avoid loss of the servers' esteem and service efforts and the resulting growth in tippers fuels this process even more in a positive feedback loop. Eventually, tipping becomes so common that non-tippers are perceived as deviant and are socially sanctioned – further enhancing social-esteem motivations for tipping and giving rise to duty motivations for tipping. The results of the current study undermine key elements of this theory and challenge the relevance of previous tests of the theory as explained below.

Lynn's (2015b) theory that social-esteem and duty motives play a role in the development and spread of tipping norms is challenged by the failure of the current study to find any effects of these motives on tipping likelihood. However, these null results may reflect problems with the measurement of these motives as described previously rather than problems with the theory. Most problematic for the theory is the fact that future-service motives, in this and previous studies (Lynn 2016a, 2018), failed to predict tipping likelihood more strongly when tipping was common and expected than when it was rare. This null finding clearly undermines

Lynn's (2015b) idea that a positive feedback loop between the number of other tippers and loss-avoidant future-service motives drives the evolution and spread of tipping norms.

Lynn (2015b, 2016b, 2018) has argued that cross-sectional occupational differences in tipping norms can be used to shed light on the effects of historic changes in tipping norms. This argument is challenged by the failure of the current study to conceptually replicate his (2018) tipping norm by reciprocity motive interaction. If the effects of occupational differences in tipping norms that Lynn (2018) observed are not generalizable to national differences in tipping norms for a common set of occupations, as the current data suggest, then it is reasonable to question their generalizability to historical differences in tipping norms as well. Thus, future researchers are encouraged to test ideas about the evolution of tipping norms using content analyses of historical writings about tipping in the popular press over time rather than cross-sectional research like that advocated and used by Lynn (2015b, 2016b, 2018).

Effectiveness of strategies for increasing tips. Variations in the motives for tipping across different descriptive and injunctive tipping norms (or the lack thereof) also have implications for efforts to increase servers' tip incomes. It seems reasonable to assume that such efforts to increase tips will be more effective if they appeal to or engage those motives most likely to prompt tipping in that normative context. Lynn (2018) used this reasoning, together with his findings at the time, to argue that attempts to increase tipping should appeal only to altruistic and future service motives when the tip recipients work in rarely tipped occupations, appeal only to altruistic and reciprocity motives when they work in occasionally tipped occupations, and should appeal to altruistic, reciprocity and duty motives when they work in frequently tipped occupations.

Lynn's (2018) advice may be sound in the U.S., where his study was situated and where occupational differences in receipt of tips may say something about the workers' wage and income levels. However, the results of the current study suggest that Lynn's advice does not apply to efforts to increase tipping in other nations (even when the targets of those efforts are U.S. citizens). More specifically, the current findings suggest that appeals to altruistic, reciprocity and future-service motives are likely to enhance tipping by tourists visiting other nations regardless of whether tipping in those nations is rare, occasional, or common. Furthermore, appeals to duty motives are unlikely to increase tipping from foreign travelers even when tipping is very common in a country. Although consistent with the pattern of motivation effects observed here, these practical implications go well beyond the current data, which did not test the effects of different types of tipping appeals. Providing such tests would be another interesting direction for future tourism and tipping research.

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


Figure 1. Stronger norms for tipping attenuate the behavioral effect of attitude toward tipping.
Note: ATT was classified into low, medium and high categories only for purposes of graphing; all statistical testing involved a continuous measure of ATT. Also, the graphed relationships control for the effects of each motivation in each norm condition.

Table 1. Summary of self-reported tipping motivation effects on tip size and tip frequency/likelihood in the existing literature.

	Self-Reported Motivation for Tipping				
	Future Service	Status/ Esteem	Altruism/ Helping	Duty/Guilt/ Pride	Gratitude/ Reward
Lynn (2009)					
- Tip Frequency ^a	+	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
- Restaurant Tip Size	n.s.	+	+	n.s.	n.s.
Azar (2010)					
- Restaurant Tip Size in U.S.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	+
- Restaurant Tip Size in Israel	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	+
Becker, et. al. (2012)					
- Restaurant Tip Size for Good Service	+	n.s.	n.s.	-	+
- Restaurant Tip Size for Bad Service	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-
Lynn (2015a)					
- Tip Likelihood ^a	n.s.	n.s.	+	+	+
- Tip Size Index ^b	n.s.	n.s.	+	-	+
Lynn (2016b)^c					
- Likelihood of Tipping Rarely Tipped Occupations	+	+	+	n.s.	-
- Likelihood of Tipping Occasionally Tipped Occupations	+	+	+	n.s.	n.s.
- Likelihood of Tipping Frequently Tipped Occupations	n.s.	n.s.	+	+	n.s.
Lynn (2018)					
- Likelihood of Tipping Rarely Tipped Occupations	+	-	+	n.s.	n.s.
- Likelihood of Tipping Occasionally Tipped Occupations	n.s.	-	+	n.s.	+
- Likelihood of Tipping Frequently Tipped Occupations	n.s.	n.s.	+	+	+

^a Index of past frequency or hypothetical likelihood of tipping service workers in various occasionally and frequently tipped occupations ^b Index of size of hypothetical tips to service workers in various occasionally and frequently tipped occupations. ^c Future-service and status/esteem motives were measured together in this study.

Table 2. Pattern matrix for motivation statements.

	Social- Esteem Motives	Duty Motives	Reciproc ity Motives	Future- Service Motives	Altruistic Motives
- I tip to help servers.	-.033	.007	.195	-.036	.635
- I tip because servers need the money more than I do.	.215	-.070	-.072	.119	.556
- I tip to make up for servers' low wages.	-.077	.102	-.132	-.039	.883
- I would tip less if servers were paid higher wages.	.010	.297	-.003	-.073	.245
- I tip to reward good service.	-.066	.008	.846	.030	-.056
- I tip out of gratitude for a positive service experience.	.048	-.060	.889	.006	.052
- I tip as a way of saying "Thank You."	.006	-.018	.781	.047	.100
- I would tip less if servers did a poor job serving me.	.045	.095	.535	-.070	-.180
- I tip so the server will remember me positively the next time I encounter him/her.	-.033	.055	.011	.868	.027
- I tip because it improves the service I get from that server in the future.	-.077	.027	.028	.950	-.016
- I tip in order to get preferential treatment on my next visit.	.204	-.038	-.035	.760	-.022
- I would tip less if I never expected to see the server again.	.638	-.025	-.022	.204	-.108
- I tip in order to gain social status/respect.	.819	-.072	-.084	.078	.089
- I tip in order to appear generous.	.867	-.038	.045	-.018	.092
- I tip because I do not want to appear cheap or stingy.	.702	.207	.069	-.092	.076
- I would tip less if tipping was anonymous and no one knew how much I tipped.	.748	.104	.026	-.047	-.134
- I tip to obey social norms.	-.004	.888	-.010	.052	-.019
- I tip because doing so is a social obligation.	-.057	.957	.002	.081	-.030
- I tip out of a sense of duty.	.006	.732	.024	.031	.152
- I would tip less often if it was not expected.	.273	.473	.010	-.148	-.119

Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. Shaded areas mark items used in the index for that motive/factor.

Attitude to Tipping (ATT)	537	3.89	1.82								
<u>Tipping Common and Expected</u>											
Respondent's Tip Likelihood (RTIP)	603	3.85	.90	.55**	-.06	-.01	.35**	.13**	.26**	.24**	
Locals' Tip Likelihood (LTIP)	603	3.70	.91		-.03	.02	.23**	.03	.16**	.12**	
Social-Esteem Motives (SEM)	602	3.28	1.70			.53**	-.15**	.44**	.11**	-.02	
Duty Motives (DM)	602	4.62	1.71				-.06	.16**	.15**	-.16**	
Reciprocity Motives (RM)	602	6.00	1.06					.21**	.27**	.33**	
Future Service Motives (FSM)	602	4.19	1.69						.22**	.20**	
Altruistic Motives (AM)	602	5.19	1.23							.23**	
Attitude to Tipping (ATT)	602	3.89	1.82								

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 4. Means (and standard errors) of respondents' tipping likelihood by experimental condition.

	Tips Not Expected and Locals Rarely Tip (R)	Tips Not Expected, but Locals Occasionally Tip (O)	Tipping is Expected and Locals Always Tip (C)	F-test of difference between means
Respondents' Tipping Likelihood (RTIP)	2.89 ^a (.05) n = 556	3.04 ^b (.05) n = 538	3.86 ^c (.04) n = 603	131.94*** (df = 2, 1694)

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Means with different superscripts are reliably different at the .05 level.

Table 5. Coefficients (and robust standard errors) from a regression of respondents' tip likelihood on tipping norm condition, tipping motives, and attitude toward tipping (n = 1,693).

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error
Tipping Rare (R)	-.88***	.06
Tipping Occasionally Done (O)	-.73***	.05
Social-Esteem Motives (SEM)	.01	.02
Duty Motives (DM)	-.02	.02
Reciprocity Motives (RM)	.18***	.02
Future Service Motives (FSM)	.07***	.02
Altruistic Motives (AM)	.16***	.02
Attitude toward Tipping (ATT)	.17***	.01
Constant	1.09***	.14
R ²	.38***	

Significance of coefficient: * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

STATA code: regress RTIP R O SEM FSM RM AM DM ATT, vce (robust)

Table 6. Coefficients (and robust standard errors) from a regression of respondents' tipping likelihood on tipping motives and attitude toward tipping under each local tipping norm condition.

	Tips Not Expected and Locals Rarely Tip (R)	Tips Not Expected, but Locals Occasionally Tip (O)	Tipping is Expected and Locals Always Tip (C)	F-test of difference between coefficients (df = 2, 1672)
Social-Esteem Motives (SEM)	.01 (.03)	.05 _a (.03)	-.05 _b (.03)	2.64
Duty Motives (DM)	-.03 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	.02 (.03)	0.90
Reciprocity Motives (RM)	.18*** (.03)	.13*** (.04)	.21*** (.04)	1.04
Future Service Motives (FSM)	.09** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.03 (.02)	2.04
Altruistic Motives (AM)	.17*** (.04)	.16*** (.03)	.12** (.04)	.063
Attitude toward Tipping (ATT)	.23 _a *** (.03)	.23 _a *** (.03)	.06 _b * (.02)	19.61***

Significance of coefficient: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Coefficients with different subscripts are reliably different at the .05 level.

STATA code: regress RTIP R O RxSEM RxFSM RxRM RxAM RxDM RxATT OxSEM
OxFSM OxRM OxAM OxDM OxATT CxSEM CxFSM CxRM CxAM CxDM CxATT, vce
(robust)