Economic Motivations and Moral Controls Regulating Discrimination
Against Black and Hispanic Diners

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ABSTRACT

Racial discrimination in restaurant service is often depicted as an economically rational response to servers’ concerns about perceived inadequate tipping by Black and/or Hispanic customers. However, drawing from sociological and criminological theories that critique the limits of economic models of human behavior, we argue that discrimination against Black and Hispanic diners may be inhibited by servers' moral concerns about discrimination. Further, such moral restraints might also buffer the influence of economic motives regulating discrimination. Ordinal logistic regression models of survey data collected from a sample of U.S. restaurant servers (n=872) are employed to assess whether race-based perceptions of customers’ tipping behaviors and moral restraints interact to predict the prevalence and frequency of servers’ self-reported discrimination against Black and Hispanic diners. Results suggest that servers' economically-motivated, race-based beliefs about the tipping practices of Black, Hispanic, and White customers are associated with self-reported discrimination. Specifically, we find that servers who harbor negative attitudes towards the tipping practices of customers of color (i.e., Blacks or Hispanics) or positive attitudes towards Whites’ tipping behaviors are also more likely to report withholding effort from their Black and Hispanic patrons. However, servers with strong moral restraints are more likely to refrain from discriminating against Black and Hispanic diners, or do so less frequently, despite expressing concerns about inadequate tipping practices among Black and Hispanic vis-à-vis White clientele.
INTRODUCTION

While an established body of sociological scholarship examines the use of racial profiling among agents of formal social control (cf. D’Alessio and Stolzenbert 2003; Weitzer and Tuch 2004, 2005; Weitzer and Brunson 2009), efforts to explore the application of racial profiling in everyday consumer markets are relatively rare (for exceptions, see Gabbidon 2003; Gabbidon and Higgins 2007; Gabbidon, Craig, Okafo, Marzette, and Peterson 2008; Harris 2003; Harris, Henderson, and Williams 2005; Williams, Henderson, and Harris 2001; see also, Pager and Shepherd 2008). However, emerging evidence documents consumer racial profiling (CRP)¹ to be pervasive in retail settings, wherein racial minorities, like most Americans, spend a substantial amount of time and money. For instance, in a recent survey on “shopping while black,” Gabbidon and Higgins (2007:6) found that African Americans living in Philadelphia, PA were more than ten times as likely to report being “racially profiled by retail clerks, managers, and security personnel” relative to their non-black counterparts. Likewise, in a subsequent survey of students enrolled in historically black colleges and universities, Gabbidon et al. (2008) found that nearly three-quarters (73%) of their subjects reported to have been victimized by profiling practices across a variety of retail establishments (e.g., grocery store, department stores, drug stores, etc.).

Dining away from home is another common consumption activity in which racial minorities experience discrimination (Brewster 2012; Brewster and Rusche 2012; Dirks and Rice 2004; Perry 2005; Rusche and Brewster 2008; Siegelman 1998; Wang 2014). For example, a 2001 nationally representative poll of consumers found that 21% of the 1,003 African Americans surveyed reportedly experienced discriminatory treatment while dining out in the past month (Gallup 2001; see also Siegelman 1998). Recent research by Brewster and Rusche (2012) lends credence to the validity of African Americans’ perceptions of mistreatment in restaurant
establishments. The authors surveyed 200 restaurant servers across 18 different restaurants and found that 38.5% of their sample admitted that the quality of their service is at least sometimes predicated on their customers’ race (also see Brewster 2012, 2013a; Dirks and Rice 2004; Rusche and Brewster 2008).

Scholars often posit that such race-based discrimination while dining out stems from common sentiments among servers that African Americans and Hispanics tend to be poor tippers relative to their white counterparts (Brewster and Rusche 2012; Brewster and Mallinson 2009; Dirks and Rice 2004; McCall and Lynn 2009; Noll and Arnold 2004; Rusche and Brewster 2008; Wang 2014). Further, servers’ perceptions of interracial tipping differences appear to be at least partially grounded in reality, as Blacks/Hispanics have been shown to tip relatively less than Whites (cf. Brewster, Lynn, and Cocroft 2014; Leodoro and Lynn 2007; Lynn 2004, 2006, 2011, 2012, 2013; Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert 2003; Lynn, Jabbour and Kim 2012; Lynn and Brewster Forthcoming; Noll and Arnold 2004). Thus, servers are thought to give less attention or lower quality service to customers of color (i.e., discriminate) because they do not perceive that these guests will compensate them fairly for their efforts (cf. Brewster 2012; Margalioth 2006).

The economic rationale presumably underlying CRP in restaurants appears similar to that used by retailers who justify racial profiling by couching discriminatory practices in economic concerns that stem from shoplifting (Williams et al. 2001). However, whereas most front-line retail employees experience no direct benefit from discriminatory service delivery, restaurant servers perceive that they are financially rewarded for differentially expending their service efforts in accordance with their a priori cost/benefit calculations deduced from ascribed customer characteristics such as skin color (e.g., How difficult is this table of black/white customers going
to be to wait on? What size of tip are they likely to leave in return for my efforts?) (see Brewster 2012).

Surprisingly, however, there is a notable scarcity of studies that have directly assessed the relationship between perceived interracial differences in tipping behaviors and servers’ motivations to discriminate against customers of color. Further, to the degree CRP is an instrumentally rational response to interracial tipping differences, there have been no attempts to establish the boundaries of such instrumental motives. Thus, it is not clear why many servers in our nation’s restaurants refrain from discriminating against customers of color even when doing so would appear to be an instrumentally rational response to perceptions that they are less likely to be adequately compensated by these diners. In response to these shortcomings, this study offers two salient contributions to the literature on CRP.

Consistent with prior work (cf. Brewster 2012; Margalioth 2006; McCall and Lynn 2009), we posit that servers’ disparate treatment of black and Hispanic clients partially reflects a form of instrumental rationality, as servers presumably deliver differential service in an attempt to maximize income in the form of tips. However, drawing from social theories concerning non-instrumental human behavior (Etzioni 1988; Tyler 2010; Wikström and Sampson 2006), we also identify servers’ moral concerns about discrimination, or the lack of moral concerns, as a previously unexplored influence on consumer racial profiling in the restaurant context. Specifically, we hypothesize that servers with strong moral restraints will be less likely to discriminate – even when discrimination would appear to be an instrumentally rational response to customers’ perceived tipping behaviors. We begin with a discussion of instrumental and moral motivations that we posit as underlying server discrimination, and then test these hypotheses using survey data from individuals who currently or recently worked as a restaurant server.
BACKGROUND

Discrimination as Instrumentally Rational Action

In linking race-based discrimination in the restaurant context to servers’ expectations of receiving good or poor tips, scholars typically assume that servers’ decisions to discriminate are economically self-interested, “instrumentally rational” actions (see, e.g., Becker 1971; Etzioni 1988:136; Weber 1968). That is, in an industry where a worker’s financial well-being is largely dependent upon clients’ provisions of tips, servers who decide to provide higher quality service to the highest-tipping customers presumably do so in an attempt to maximize tips. This notion that server discrimination is a form of instrumentally rational action is consistent with the popular utilitarian assumption that human behavior is governed by an instrumental decision-making process involving maximization of pleasure/rewards and minimization of pain/costs, as found in numerous classical and contemporary theories, including the philosophy of utilitarianism (Bentham 1948 [1789]), classical and neo-classical economics (Smith 1976 [1776]; Becker 1971), and rational choice theories (Coleman 1990; for a review see Boudon 2003). 2

Surprisingly, however, studies that assess whether instrumental concerns indeed motivate service providers’ to discriminate are relatively rare. Sallaz’s (2002) research offers a notable exception, as he showed that blackjack dealers help tippers, who tend to be “locals, regulars, and high-rollers” (p. 419), win by giving them advice or strategically reshuffling the cards to increase these players’ odds. In contrast, when advice is solicited from non-tippers dealers will often respond by claiming ignorance (e.g., “I don’t know,” “tough call,” etc.; Sallaz 2002:415). According to Sallaz (2002:414), dealers also personalize their interactions with tippers, such as by asking and addressing them by their first names or inquiring about where they are from and what they do. However, dealers seem to refrain from personalizing their service offerings to
non-tippers, and will even purposively antagonize them in an attempt to drive them off the table. Similarly, researchers have found that exotic dancers provide service that is directly commensurate to the tipping behaviors of their clientele (Brewster 2003; Forsyth and Deshotels 1997).

These cases provide evidence of discriminatory service being driven by card dealers’ and exotic dancers’ motivations to maximize profits (e.g., tips) and minimize costs (e.g., effort). However, in each line of work, discriminatory service is individualized such that service quality is predicated partially on the actual tips left following preceding service encounters with specific clients. That is, in order to maximize their tipped income, card dealers and dancers provide extra services to those who have previously shown themselves to be good tippers, thereby optimizing the size of subsequent tips while withholding services from those who have not previously shown such generosity. This type of rational discrimination can be extended to any case wherein the service provider has previous knowledge of the customer’s tipping behaviors.

However, unlike card dealers and dancers who are tipped (or not tipped) repeatedly following a series of short encounters with customers (e.g., after each hand or dance), most tipped employees, including restaurant servers/bartenders, taxi drivers, hair stylists, valet parkers, and hotel concierges, are tipped only once – after the service being sought has already been consumed. Further, most people do not utilize establishment-specific and employee-specific services with enough regularity to allow service employees to make informed predictions about the likelihood of being tipped fairly by any given customer. In response, tipped service providers attempt to circumvent some of the uncertainty inherent in receiving a tip after service provision by cognitively categorizing people into groups that are perceived to differ in their tipping behaviors (Rusche and Brewster 2008; Segrave 1998).
Thus, to the degree that most service providers, including restaurant servers, vary their service in instrumentally rational ways as a function of the remuneration system of tipping, they would presumably do so according to economic inferences about the tipping quality of the social groups to which specific customers belong. While there are many observable characteristics that servers might use to predict customers’ tips (e.g., age, gender, dress, party size; see McCall and Lynn 2009), existing research has implicated dark skin to be a particularly powerful cue denoting poor tipping at the end of the service encounter (Brewster 2013a). In other words, customer’s dark skin appears to function as a “master status” that is automatically associated with the auxiliary trait of “bad tipper” (Brewster 2013a, 2013b; Rusche and Brewster 2008; Wang 2014). Thus, when servers encounter patrons of color, their dark skin color acts as a cognitive shortcut allowing servers to bypass all other relevant demographic characteristics and arrive at an *a priori* expectation of receiving a poor tip and, likewise, the appropriateness of providing commensurately poor service.

The saliency of dark skin as a perceptional proxy for tipping outcomes undoubtedly stems, in part, from servers’ cumulative experiences with receiving relatively smaller tips from their Black and Hispanic customers. Numerous studies using a variety of different methodologies have consistently observed African Americans to tip their servers statistically less than Whites (cf. Brewster, Lynn, and Cocroft 2014; Leodoro and Lynn 2007; Lynn 2004, 2006, 2011, 2012, 2013; Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert 2003; Lynn, Sturman, Ganley, Adams, Douglas, and McNeil 2008; Lynn, Jabbour and Kim 2012; Lynn and Brewster Forthcoming; Noll and Arnold 2004). Likewise, although the data are much more equivocal, some evidence also validates servers’ perceptions of Hispanic customers as being less generous in their tipping practices relative to Whites (Lynn 2012, 2013).³
While existing research highlights customers’ race as being a particularly salient cue utilized by service providers to inform their service delivery, we are aware of only one quantitative study directly linking restaurant servers’ perceptions of interracial differences in tipping practices to their propensities to discriminate racially in their service delivery. In that study, Brewster (2012) analyzed survey data derived from a small convenience sample of servers (n=175) working in restaurants located in a single Southeastern U.S. city and found that those who expressed more positivity toward the tipping practices of blacks were statistically less likely to report that their service was predicated on their customers’ race. Consistent with the notion that service discrimination is a form of instrumentally rational action, Brewster concluded that servers utilize race-based inferences concerning the predicted revenue garnered in the form of customer gratuities to inform the amount of effort they devote to each service encounter.

Moral Restraints on Instrumentally Rational Discrimination

Overall, the research described above supports the notion that race-based service discrimination is at least partially regulated by economic motivations. However, Brewster’s (2012) research, which directly assesses links between restaurant servers’ race-based tipping inferences and service discrimination, also provides reason to doubt that economic concerns are the sole, or even the dominant, factor driving service discrimination. Brewster (2012:20) notes that servers’ inferences about black customers’ tipping behaviors accounted for only 4% of the overall variation in servers’ self-reported discrimination. The relatively modest explanatory power of this instrumental variable may suggest that restaurant servers’ decisions to discriminate are not solely motivated by the desire to maximize profits (e.g., tips). In fact, his research seems to suggest that some servers discriminate against customers of color regardless of the expected
tip received, or that servers refrain from discriminating against customers of color even when they perceive these customers to be relatively inferior tippers and, thus, less likely to compensate them for their efforts.

This finding may be explained by recent theoretical work that critiques the limits of economic models of human behavior, instead portraying human decision-making as being governed primarily by non-instrumental concerns (e.g., Etzioni 1988; Wikström and Sampson 2006; Tyler 2010). For instance, some scholars assert that economic motives are influential only when individuals cognitively deliberate about whether or not to engage in a particular behavior (e.g., discrimination); however, strong moral restraints against committing certain behaviors, such as crime or discrimination, may result in actors failing to envision those behaviors as potential action alternatives (Wikström and Sampson 2006; Wikström and Treiber 2007). Likewise, Etzioni (1988) and Tyler (2010) have characterized moral restraints as a type of normative/affective influence or a social motivation that influences behavior independently from instrumental rationality processes. According to these scholars, moral beliefs not only drive up the costs associated with some behaviors, they also act as imperatives that constitute ends in themselves – that is, people act (or refrain from acting) because it is morally right (or wrong) to do so, regardless of whether the action (or inaction) is perceived as the most efficient way to attain a desired end. Following this logic, restaurant servers who view service discrimination as morally wrong might be expected to refrain from race-based discrimination – regardless of whether or not these servers anticipate that discrimination would be economically efficient.

Thus, in this paper, we analyze a unique, large (n=872), and geo-demographically diverse data set derived from an online survey of restaurant servers in the United States to advance scholarship on CRP in general and in the restaurant market in particular in several ways. First,
we assess servers’ propensities to act in instrumentally rational ways by discriminating in response to perceived interracial differences in tipping behaviors. Specifically, we test for effects of servers’ perceptions of Blacks’, Hispanics’, and Whites’ tipping practices on their self-reported propensities to withhold effort from service encounters with Black and Hispanic patrons. Next, we explore the relationships between servers’ moral restraints against discrimination, perceptions of interracial tipping differences, and self-reported racial discrimination by examining whether moral restraints directly discourage some servers from discriminating racially in their service delivery, and whether moral restraints moderate the effects of instrumental considerations regarding the tipping practices of Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites in predicting discrimination.

**METHOD**

**Procedure**

This study analyzes data derived from a larger survey that was anonymously completed by individuals who were either currently employed as a restaurant server or had been so at some point in the past year. The survey asked a variety of questions intended to solicit information about individuals’ attitudes, opinions, experiences, and behaviors as a restaurant server. Participants were passively recruited by posting a link to the questionnaire that remained active between February 27, 2013 and March 14, 2013 on various websites that are known to attract restaurant servers. Though not without concerns (e.g., Couper 2000), web-based questionnaires are often used as a cost-effective medium to generate large geo-demographically diverse samples of individuals from occupationaly-specific or difficult to access target populations (e.g., health professionals, restaurant servers, illicit drug users; c.f., Braithwaite, Emery, Lusignan, and Sutton 2003; Lynn and McCall 2009; Miller and Sonderlund 2010). Additionally, research has shown
subjects’ responses to sensitive questions (e.g., discrimination) to be comparable across various self-administration survey methods, including traditional pencil-and-paper, internet, and touch-tone phone surveys (Knapp and Kick 2003; Tourangeau and Yan 2007). In fact, some evidence suggests that web self-administered surveys are effective in reducing or eliminating response biases attributed to a subject’s desire to respond to sensitive questions in a socially desirable manner (Chang and Krosnick 2009; Huang 2006; Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008).

Nevertheless, given the medium in which our questionnaire was delivered, we cannot ascertain a specific rate of participation. Of the 1,786 individuals who clicked on the survey link, 221 did not reside in the United States, had not worked as a restaurant server in the past year, or had worked in a restaurant that prohibited tipping, leaving a potential sample of 1,565 respondents who are current or recent servers in tipping restaurants in the U.S. Of these, 59% (n=929) completed the entire survey by clicking “submit” following the last question. We initially retained 954 respondents who completed a substantial portion of the survey, including providing responses to both of the dependent variables in this study (i.e., discrimination against Black and Hispanic customers). Next, we deleted 82 cases wherein respondents reported to not have an opinion (e.g., “don’t know”) of Black, Hispanic, and/or White customers’ tipping behaviors.

While less than 6% of the remaining 872 cases had missing values on any one of the independent or control variables in this study, multivariate listwise deletion across these variables would result in the loss of an additional 18.5% of cases (n=161). Thus, to retain these cases, a multiple imputation procedure was used to estimate values for observations with missing data on each of the independent variables included in this analysis. Multiple imputation relies on maximum likelihood estimation and information from all variables in a study to substitute
missing observations with a set of plausible values that account for the uncertainty of missing values, while simultaneously preserving the intercorrelations between variables (for a detailed discussion of multiple imputation, see Schafer and Graham 2002). Specifically, we used the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method in SPSS to substitute each missing value with a list of five different simulated values, resulting in the construction of five different imputed datasets. Regression models are then estimated using each of the five datasets, and results are combined “to obtain overall estimates and standard errors that reflect missing-data uncertainty as well as finite-sample variation” (Schafer and Graham 2002:165). These procedures resulted in a geographically diverse (48 states and the District of Columbia) final analytic sample of 872 restaurant servers.

Dependent Variable

Racial Discrimination. Respondents were separately asked to indicate on a five point scale (0=never, 1=rarely, 2=sometimes, 3=often, and 4=all the time) how frequently they give their best effort when serving Black and Hispanic customers. Subjects’ responses to these two questions were reverse coded such that higher values indicate greater propensities to discriminate racially in their service delivery. Because so few of our respondents reported to always discriminate against Black (n=11) or Hispanic (n=10) customers (e.g., never give their best effort), the “often” and “always” categories were combined.

Primary Independent Variables

Perceptions of Tipping Behaviors. Subjects’ were asked to consider 24 different groups of people who patronize restaurants and to indicate on an ordinal scale whether they have found members of each group to be very bad tippers (=1) or very good tippers (=5). Among these groups, and the focus of this study, were Hispanic, Black, and White customers. Responses were reverse coded such
that higher values indicate more negativity towards the tipping practices of each racial group. Some respondents indicated that they did not know how Hispanic (n=69), Black (n=43), and White (n=37) customers tipped. Given the ambiguity in “don’t know” responses, these cases were omitted from our analysis. However, supplementary models using alternative variables in which “don’t know” cases were coded as indicating that the subject perceived each group to be average tippers (=3) produced similar substantive conclusions.

*Moral Restraint.* Subjects were asked to indicate on a 7 point scale how much they agreed with the following three statements (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree): “Bad tippers do not deserve the same quality of service as good tippers” (reverse coded); “I would feel guilty if I treat some customers better than others”; “I think it is morally wrong to treat some customers better than others.” Subjects’ responses to these three questions were averaged to create an index measuring subjects’ moral restraint (Cronbach’s alpha = .70). These items are consistent with those comprising measures of moral beliefs or emotions used in prior work that contrasts instrumental and moral motives influencing criminal and deviant behaviors (e.g., Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Tittle Antonaccio, Botchkovar, and Kranidioti 2010; Tittle, Antonaccio, and Botchkovar 2012). Scores were averaged across the two available items for ten respondents who were missing data on only one of the items. Although mean substitution is often discouraged at the variable level because it can lead to biased estimates, this type of person-mean imputation at the item level preserves a great deal of information while yielding efficient and unbiased results when a multi-item scale is unidimensional and has a relatively high reliability (e.g., alpha >.50, c.f., Roth, Switzer, and Switzer 1999:229; Jeličić, Phelps, and Lerner 2010:823).

**Control Variables**
Our analyses also include controls for numerous exogenous factors that might account for associations between server perceptions, moral restraint, and discrimination. First, relative to male servers, existing studies have shown female servers to be less likely to report providing service that is informed by their customers’ race (Brewster 2012). Further, female servers have also been shown to harbor more favorable perceptions of African Americans’ tipping practices and less favorable perceptions towards the tipping practices of White customers (McCall and Lynn 2009). Thus, we include a dummy variable (female=1) to control for the effects of subjects’ sex. Second, if perceptions of Blacks/Hispanics as poor tippers vis-à-vis Whites indeed reflects aggregate tipping differences, then servers should be instrumentally motivated to discriminate against these customers regardless of their self-identified racial/ethnic affiliation. Nevertheless, Brewster (2012) found some evidence suggesting that non-White servers may be more inclined to report that they discriminate racially in their service delivery than are their White counterparts. Therefore, we control for respondent’s race/ethnicity by including a dummy variable coded as white (=1) and non-white (=0; i.e., black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Native American, and other).

Additionally, we include a measure of respondent’s age in years because prior scholarship documents positive associations between age and anti-minority attitudes and behaviors (Bonilla-Silva 2014). Three cases wherein the original values on the age variable were nonsensical (e.g., 1070) were coded as missing and values were subsequently imputed using the multiple imputation procedure previously described. We control for the number of years that each respondent has worked as a restaurant server (ranging from 0=less than 1 year to 10=10 or more years) because negativity towards the tipping practices of non-White customers may increase with experience (cf. Dirks and Rice 2004; Noll and Arnold 2004). Also, given existing
research implicating racialized discourse in servers’ proclivities to discriminate against restaurant patrons of color (Brewster 2013b; Rusche and Brewster 2009), we include in our analysis an averaged index constructed from responses to two items asking servers to indicate how often they “described customers using derogatory terms/phrases” or “made negative ‘behind the scenes’ comments about customers” (r = .54; from 1=never to 5= all the time).

It is possible that the relationships we test between server perceptions, moral restraint, and discrimination against Black and Hispanic customers could be confounded by servers’ general propensities to sometimes withhold effort from their tables, including those occupied by whites, for a variety of reasons unrelated to customers’ race. In an effort to partial out any effects on our dependent variables that are attributed to such tendencies we include a general measure of discriminatory service in our analysis derived from a question that asked servers to report on a 7-point scale how much they agree/disagree (strongly disagree =1, strongly agree = 7) with the statement that they "always give their best effort when serving regardless of who or what their customers are." Responses were reverse coded such that higher values indicate a greater propensity to withhold effort from customers.

Since our sample includes current and former servers who are/were employed across a variety of different restaurants located throughout the United States, we include a set of dummy variables to take into account whether respondents are currently employed as a server (1=yes), work in a restaurant where service charges (e.g., tips) are automatically added to all checks (1=yes), work in a quick service establishment where tips are less common (1=no), or work in a restaurant with large ethnic minority clientele (1=yes). Furthermore, recent work by Lynn, Pugh, and Williams (2012) suggests that the observed Black-White tipping differential may be greatest among more affluent restaurant clientele. Therefore, we include two nested dummy variables.
measuring reported expensiveness of the restaurant (expensive =1; moderately expensive =1),
with inexpensive (=0) as the baseline, to account for the possibility that servers working in more
expensive restaurants may be more sensitive to interracial tipping differences or more inclined to
utilize customers’ race to inform their delivery of service. Response patterns for these variables
were not mutually exclusive; that is, some subjects reported to be employed in a combination of
restaurants that differed by expensiveness (n=110). Since this response pattern might reflect
respondents’ employment in two different restaurants, we include a dummy variable in our
analysis to adjust for this overlap (multiple responses perhaps indicating two or more jobs =1;
mutually exclusive responses =0).

Finally, at the end of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate on a five point scale (from
1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) how much they agreed with each of the following four
statements: “I took the survey seriously”; I was completely honest when answering the questions”; “I read
each question carefully”; I tried to make my answers as accurate as I could.” Subjects’ responses to these
questions were averaged to create an index measuring engagement/honesty when completing the
questionnaire (Cronbach’s alpha = .95). Scores were averaged across the three available items for three
respondents who were missing data on only one of the items. While not included in our analysis, we note
that the very last question on the survey asked subjects to “respond ‘Strongly Disagree’ to this statement.”
Nearly 95% of the subjects in our analytic sample responded to this question correctly, thus indicating
widespread baseline engagement in the survey.

**RESULTS**

**Descriptive statistics**

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the analytic sample used in this analysis.

Consistent with existing research on CRP in restaurants, the average respondent in our study
views African American and Hispanic patrons to be below average in their tipping practice and admits to at least occasionally provide discriminate service to members of these groups by withholding service effort (cf. Brewster 2012; Brewster and Rusche 2012). In contrast, most subjects’ in our sample perceived White patrons to be above average tippers. The average subject was found to be quite ambivalent with regard to their agreement with the statements that we used to measure moral restraint. The typical subject is female (84%), White (90%), approximately 33 years of age, and has approximately 8 years of serving experience. The average respondent is likely to at least sometimes use negative/derogatory language to describe customers but tends to give customers their best effort regardless “of who or what their customers are.” Most of our subjects are currently employed (90%) in non-quick service restaurants (80%) that do not automatically add gratuities to customers’ checks (98%). Roughly half (48%) of the servers in our sample reported to work in a restaurant that has “a lot of ethnic minority customers.” Thirty-percent are employed in inexpensive restaurants, 75% in moderately expensive restaurants, and 8% in expensive restaurants (13% of respondents are thought to be employed in two restaurants). Finally, the vast majority of the subjects in our analysis reported to be engaged with the survey and to answer each question honestly.

[Table 1 about here]

**Discrimination against Black Diners**

Given the positive skewed distributions and ordinal nature of our dependent variables, we estimate multivariate cumulative ordinal regression models\(^6\) to test the hypothesized relationships between servers’ racialized perceptions of customers’ tipping behaviors, moral restraint, and self-reported discrimination against Black and Hispanic customers (see Table 2).\(^7\) Models 1 -3 of Table 2 predict the cumulative log-odds of server-reported discrimination against
Black restaurant customers. Consistent with our predictions, the results presented in Model 1 indicate that servers who harbor negative perceptions of Blacks’ tipping practices ($b = .694$, $p < .001$) and positive perceptions of Whites tipping practices ($b = -.379$, $p < .01$) have significantly higher cumulative log-odds of self-reporting to discriminate against Black restaurant patrons. A significant positive effect of using negative/derogatory language is also observed in Model 1, indicating that subjects who report using such language are more likely to confess that they discriminate against Black diners ($B = .205$, $p < .01$). This finding is consistent with extant research (Brewster 2013b; Dirks and Rice 2004; Rusche and Brewster 2008) and provides evidence suggesting that the negative/derogatory language that servers use to describe customers may sometimes be racialized. Not surprisingly, servers’ general tendencies to withhold effort from customers is shown in Model 1 to be predictive of higher cumulative log-odds of withholding effort from Black customers ($b = .393$, $p < .001$). Finally, we also observe that working in an expensive restaurant ($B = -.754$, $p < .05$) and being engaged with the questionnaire ($B = -.643$, $p < .001$) each are associated with lower cumulative log-odds of CRP against Black patrons.

Model 2 shows that servers who profess to have strong moral restraints against discrimination have significantly lower cumulative log-odds of reporting to withhold effort from Black patrons ($B = -.191$, $p < .01$) compared to those with weak moral restraints. In Model 2, the effects of subjects’ perceptions of African Americans’ and Whites’ tipping practices remain statistically reliable predictors of self-reported discrimination against Black diners as did the effects of working in an expensive restaurant and being engaged with the questionnaire. However, the coefficient for subjects’ usage of negative/derogatory language to describe customers was reduced to non-significance in Model 2, suggesting that its significant effects in
Model 1 were partially due to the fact that use of negative/derogatory language was confounded with weak moral restraints. The non-significant effects of using derogatory language to refer/describe customers after controlling for that confound may mean that there is no causal effect of using such derogatory language on discrimination against Black diners or may reflect a Type II error. Which of these interpretations is correct should be addressed in future studies.

Model 3 assesses whether moral restraints buffer the effects of servers’ perceptions of Blacks’ and Whites’ tipping practices on their propensities to engage in instrumentally rational discrimination against Black patrons. Consistent with our predictions, Model 3 shows a significant interaction between servers’ perceptions of Blacks’ (B = -.177, p < .01) and Whites’ (B = .195, p < .01) tipping practices and subjects’ moral obligations to provide equitable service in predicting the cumulative log-odds of self-reported discrimination against Black customers. Substantively, these findings imply that servers’ negative perceptions of Black and White customers’ tipping behaviors are most influential to their decisions to discriminate against Black diners when such perceptions are coupled with low moral inhibitions towards discrimination.

[Table 2 about here]

**Discrimination against Hispanic Diners**

Following the same procedure as outlined above, Models 4-6 (Table 2) predict the cumulative log-odds of server-reported discrimination against Hispanic restaurant customers. The results from these models are very similar to the corresponding findings reported for Black customers, which suggests that the operant processes implicated in discrimination against Black and Hispanic restaurant consumers are quite general. Specifically, Model 4 shows that harboring negative perceptions of Hispanics’ tipping practices (b = .954, p < .001) and positive perceptions of Whites tipping practices (b = -.325, p < .01) are associated with significantly higher
cumulative log-odds of self-reported discrimination against Hispanic patrons. In this model, servers’ use of negative/derogatory language to describe customers (B = .155, p < .05) and their general tendencies to withhold effort from their guests (B = .363, p < .001) also are associated with significantly higher cumulative log-odds of discrimination against Hispanic patrons. In addition, working in an expensive restaurant (B = -.712, p < .05) and being engaged with the questionnaire (B = -.496, p < .001) are associated with lower cumulative log-odds of CRP against Hispanic patrons.

Results from Model 5 indicate that servers who profess to have a strong moral commitment to equitable service have significantly lower cumulative log-odds of reporting to withhold effort from Hispanic customers compared to those with weak moral restraints (B = -.228, p < .001). Also, perceptions of Hispanics and Whites’ tipping practices, working in an expensive restaurant, and being engaged with the questionnaire each remain significantly associated with self-reported discrimination against Hispanic diners. However, using negative/derogatory language to describe customers was reduced to non-significance in this model. Again, this finding may reflect a Type II error or alternatively that there is not a causal link between derogatory language discrimination against Hispanic diners, as suggested by the significant effects of derogatory language observed in Model 4.

Model 6 assesses whether moral restraints buffer the effects of servers’ perceptions of Hispanics’ and Whites’ tipping practices on their propensities to engage in instrumentally rational discrimination against Hispanic customers. As was the case with regard to discrimination against Black patrons, results in Model 6 indicate that moral obligations to provide equitable service significantly moderates the effect of servers’ perceptions of Hispanics’ tipping practices on the cumulative log-odds of self-reported discrimination against Hispanic
customers (B = -.206, p < .001). Specifically, this finding suggests that servers are most likely to respond to perceptions of Hispanics as poor tippers with discriminatory service when they lack moral restraints inhibiting inequitable service. However, moral restraints were not found to significantly buffer the effects of perceptions of Whites’ tipping practices on servers’ reports of withholding effort from Hispanic diners (B = .091, p = .211).

**Visualizing Moral Restraints on Instrumentally Rational Discrimination**

Figure 1 offers a graphical display of the nature of the observed significant interactions between servers’ moral inhibitions and their perceptions of the tipping practices of Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics in predicting discriminatory service against Blacks (Model 3) and Hispanics (Model 6). Specifically, these figures display the predicted probabilities for each logit of servers’ self-reported discrimination across combinations of high and low levels of moral restraint and negativity towards Whites’/Blacks’/Hispanics’ tipping. As is evident in Figure 1, self-reported discrimination against Black and Hispanic customers is comparably low, irrespective of moral restraints, when Blacks/Hispanics/Whites are perceived to be average tippers. More importantly, Figure 1 shows that strong moral restraints inhibit servers from acting on utilitarian motivations to discriminate against Black and Hispanic customers. In other words, perceptions of Blacks and Hispanics as poor tippers (Panels A and C) primarily appear to trigger discriminatory service among servers who also lack moral restraints inhibiting inequitable service. Similarly, perceptions of Whites as above average tippers (Panel B) is most likely to trigger discriminatory service against Blacks when servers also report weak moral restraints inhibiting inequitable service.

Specifically, panel A (Figure 1) shows that among servers who perceive Blacks to be very bad tippers, the predicted probabilities of always giving these customers their best effort
(e.g., not discriminating) is 15% among servers with weak moral restraints, and more than twice as high among servers with strong moral restraints (34%). Further, among servers who perceive Blacks to be very poor tippers and who do report discriminating against Blacks, those with strong moral inhibitions discriminate less frequently than do their counterparts with weak moral restraints. For instance, servers with weak moral restraints who perceive Blacks to be very poor tippers are more than twice as likely as their morally inhibited counterparts with similar perceptions (40% versus 18%, respectively) to report that they sometimes or often withhold effort from their Black customers.

[Figure 1 about here]

Likewise, Panel B shows that the predicted probabilities of not discriminating against Black diners is 14% among those who perceive Whites to be very good tippers and who display weak moral inhibitions against inequitable service. In contrast, the predicted probabilities of reporting to never discriminate against Black diners is three times higher (44%) among servers who harbor equally favorable perceptions of Whites (e.g., very good tippers) but who harbor strong moral commitments to providing equitable service. Likewise, among servers who perceive Whites to be very good tippers, the predicted probability of reporting to provide discriminatory service sometimes or often to Black diners is over three times higher among those with weak moral restraints (41%) compared to those with strong moral restraints (13%).

Finally, the same general pattern is observed in Panel C, which displays the predicted probabilities of server discrimination against Hispanic customers at varying levels of moral restraint and perceptions of Hispanics’ tipping practices. However, one salient difference should be noted. Relative to servers’ self-reported discrimination against Black customers, the results in Panel C (Figure 1) indicate that server-reported discriminatory treatment of Hispanics is notably
and consistently more pronounced in both the likelihood and intensity of predicted occurrence. Consider, for instance, that the predicted probability of not discriminating against Hispanic customers is only 6% among servers with weak moral restraints and who perceive Hispanics to be very poor tippers, whereas the comparable predicted probability of refraining from discriminating against Black customers is 15% in Panel A. Additionally, for these same groups, the predicted probability of either sometimes or often withholding effort from Hispanic customers is 67%, whereas the comparable probability of discrimination against Black customers is 40% in Panel A. In short, these findings suggest that servers who perceive Hispanics to be very poor tippers and who have few moral obligations to provide equitable service may not only discriminate against Hispanic customers, but also do so quite frequently. Furthermore, when compared to the processes predicting discrimination against Blacks, it appears that instrumental motivations may be more strongly linked to the prevalence and frequency of discrimination against Hispanics. However, servers who perceive Hispanics to be very poor tippers are more than twice as likely to discriminate when they have weak (67%) as opposed to strong (32%) moral obligations to provide equitable service, suggesting that moral restraints are as effective in restraining instrumental motives to discriminate against Blacks and Hispanics alike.

**Supplementary Analyses**

In light of the similarities between models predicting server discrimination against Black diners (Models 1-3 in Table 2) and Hispanic diners (Models 4-6), we were somewhat surprised to find that moral restraints did not significantly mitigate the effects of subjects’ perceptions of Whites’ tipping on reported discrimination against Hispanic diners (Model 6). While servers’ perceptions of Blacks’ and Hispanics’ tipping practices logically should be more closely connected to discriminatory practices against Black and Hispanic customers, respectively, than
should perceptions of Whites’ tipping practices, this divergent finding may also stem from our
treatment of perceptions of Blacks’ and Hispanics’ tipping practices as mutually exclusive and
equally independent from perceptions of Whites’ tipping practices in our analysis. However, as
shown in Table 1, servers’ perceptions of Black-White tipping differences on average are greater
than their perceptions of Hispanic-White tipping differences. Further, the inter-item correlation
between perceptions of Blacks’ and Whites’ tipping practices is statistically significant (r = -
.076, p<.05), whereas the correlation between servers’ perceptions of Hispanics’ and Whites is
not (r =.025, p = .472). Thus, servers’ perceptions of Whites’ tipping may be developed more so
in reference to Blacks’ relative to Hispanics’ tipping practices.

We estimated supplementary analyses (results available upon request) to explore some of
the substantive implications of this relative overlap on the interaction between servers’ moral
restraints and instrumental motivations to deliver race-based service. Specifically, we re-
estimated the Models in Table 2 after including two dummy variables capturing whether subjects
either: (a) perceive Blacks/Hispanics to be below average tippers and Whites to be average or
above tippers (=1); or (b) perceive Blacks/Hispanics to be average tippers and Whites to be
above average tippers (=1). The effects of these dummy variables on the cumulative log-odds of
server-reported discrimination against Black and Hispanic diners were then assessed relative to a
reference group comprised of all other response patterns (e.g., Blacks/Hispanics and Whites
average tippers, Blacks/Hispanics above average and Whites below average, etc.). Consistent
with the results reported in Model 2 of Table 2, discrimination against Black diners was found to
be associated with positive perceptions of Whites’ tipping either alone (B = .823, p <.05) or
when coupled with negativity towards Blacks tipping practices (B = 1.17, p<.001).
However, in contrast to our conclusions derived from Model 5 (Table 2), we found that having positive perceptions of Whites’ tipping in the absence negative perceptions towards the tipping practices of Hispanics (B = .316, p = .259) alone is insufficient to encourage servers to withhold effort from their Hispanic patrons. Rather, positive perceptions towards Whites tipping practices only appears to elicit discriminatory service against Hispanic patrons when such perceptions are coupled with negative attitudes about Hispanics’ tipping (B = 1.49, p < .001). Further, relative to the reference groups, significant moderating effects of moral restraints were found only among servers who harbor both positive attitudes towards Whites’ tipping practices and negative perceptions of Blacks’ (B = -.250, p < .05) and/or Hispanics’ (B = -.308, p < .01) tipping behaviors. Taken as a whole, the results of this supplementary analysis suggest that the operant process tested in our main analysis are most pronounced among those servers who we theoretically expect to be most likely to engage in CRP – that is, servers who perceive Whites to be average or above tippers and Blacks/Hispanics to be below average tippers. Among this group, moral restraints appear to substantially mitigate servers’ instrumental motivations to withhold service efforts from both Black and Hispanic customers.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Marking Moral Boundaries on Race-Based Service

In this study, we contribute to the literature on contemporary racial discrimination in several ways, particularly as it occurs when people of color dine away from home. First, using a large, unique, geographically diverse data set comprised of current and recent servers, our findings underscore the continuing significance of everyday racial discrimination in consumer markets (Brewster and Rusche 2012; Feagin 1991). In fact, 58% (n=504) of the servers in our
analysis self-professed that they do not always give their Black and/or Hispanic clients their best efforts when waiting on them. Second, our results mirror findings from previous research documenting an empirical link between servers’ perceptions of Blacks’ tipping behaviors and their decisions to discriminate in service delivery to these customers (Brewster 2012). This finding supports the hypothesis that racial discrimination is instrumentally rational behavior that stems from utilitarian decision-making processes in which actors consciously deliberate about the costs of an action (or inaction) relative to that action’s (or inaction’s) predicted benefits.

Third, our study moves beyond prior work by providing evidence of Hispanic diners receiving discriminate service, in part, because of servers’ negativity towards the tipping practices of these customers. Furthermore, our results suggest that positivity towards the tipping practices of Whites may also encourage servers to withhold effort from their Black and Hispanic patrons. Together, these findings may indicate that servers minimize the effort they devote to their Hispanic and Black customers as a result of deliberations regarding the predicted likelihood that they will be rewarded with a fair tip (e.g., 15-20% of the bill) by these customers at the end of the service encounter, and that servers make these deliberations in reference to the predicted tips received from their White customers.

Notably, this study also advances theoretical explanations of discrimination by integrating common utilitarian depictions of discriminatory behaviors as instrumentally rational action (Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya 2005; Brewster 2012; Sallaz 2002) with ideas from social theories concerning non-instrumental human behavior (Etzioni 1988; Wikström and Sampson 2006; Tyler 2010). Specifically, we argue that individual moral restraints should directly inhibit discrimination, while also serving as boundary for instrumental calculations that motivate discrimination. Our findings support this broader view of consumer racial profiling as stemming
from both instrumental and moral considerations, as servers who have internalized strong moral obligations to provide equitable service to all customers tend to refrain from discriminating against Black and Hispanic diners, or do so less frequently, even when discrimination would be an instrumentally rational response to the perceived prospects of receiving a poor tip from these customers vis-à-vis White patrons.

**Limitations, Implications, and Future Directions**

Before discussing the broader implications of these findings, we note several limitations that warrant caution in drawing strong conclusions from results presented here. First, while self-administered surveys, including those delivered online, have been shown to curtail socially desirable reporting (cf. Chang and Krosnick 2009; Huang 2006; Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008), we were unable to control for this potential source of measurement error. Social desirability effects may be particularly problematic when asking White Americans to respond to questions designed to detect racial biases and discriminatory behaviors (cf. Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2001). Thus, our study may contain White respondents, in particular, who underreported the frequency with which they discriminate against Black and Hispanic diners. In fact, systematic underreporting of discrimination by Whites in our sample might explain the negative (but non-significant) coefficients associated with being White observed in our analyses predicting server reported race-based service.9

Nevertheless, there are several reasons why we do not think social desirability bias poses a major threat to the conclusions derived in this study. First, no identifying information was solicited and, given the medium in which the questionnaire was administered, any perceived threats to anonymity that might have encouraged socially desirable reporting are likely to be very minimal. Second, socially desirable reporting should result in truncated variability in our
dependent variable and, likewise, increase the likelihood of Type II errors, which would result in overly conservative tests of theoretically derived hypotheses. However, our measures of racial discrimination display substantial variability, as evidenced by the majority of our subjects admitting to withholding effort from Black and/or Hispanic customers at least occasionally, and we were able to identify statistically significant, theoretically specified associations between discrimination and the key variables in this study. Third, socially desirable reporting should have resulted in substantially inflated correlations between racial discrimination and moral restraint due to shared method variance, as impression management concerns would lead respondents to underreport discrimination against Black/Hispanic diners and over-report moral commitments to equitable service. However, we find only moderate bivariate associations between moral restraint and discrimination against Blacks ($r=-.314$) and Hispanics ($r=-.275$) in these data.

Furthermore, self-presentation concerns should have influenced subjects’ willingness to report withholding effort from their customers more generally. Indeed, we find that a general measure of discrimination is highly correlated with subjects’ moral commitment to equitable service ($r=-.528$) and moderately correlated with reports of discriminating against Black ($r=.33$) and Hispanic ($r=.291$) diners. Thus, by including in our analysis a measure of servers’ general propensities to withhold effort from their customers, which should have also captured self-presentational concerns, the key relationships of interest that we test in this study should be relatively free of this source of reporting bias. Nonetheless, future research should explicitly attempt to identify and minimize social desirability as a source of bias, such as by employing more variable multi-item discrimination scales and instituting methodological checks for desirability in reporting.
In addition to potential reporting biases, reliance on cross-sectional, self-reported data also limits the strength of, and confidence in, the causal inferences drawn in this study. While our findings confirm the existence of *a priori* theoretically specified causal linkages between group-based tipping perceptions, moral restraints, and discrimination, it remains possible that we have misinterpreted the true causal ordering of these relationships. We hope our findings encourage scholars to invest in efforts to collect retrospective or longitudinal (e.g., panel) data on the adoption, development, and changes in race-based perceptions, moral inhibitions, and discrimination. In the meantime, we caution readers to reserve drawing strong conclusions until our findings can be replicated using data and modeling techniques that approximate the proper temporal ordering among variables.

Finally, while the sample size, geographic diversity, and uniqueness of our data constitute important strengths of this study, the generalizable limits of our findings are unknown because subjects were not randomly selected from the population of all tipped servers in the United States. For instance, respondents in our analytic sample might differ in meaningful ways from those servers who refrain from visiting the types of websites we used to passively recruit our participants, or from servers who visit these websites yet failed to provide a completed survey (cf. Chang and Krosnick 2009). One potential limitation imposed by this type of selection bias is that the processes observed in this sample may not operate similarly among servers that are unrepresented in these data. Another important limitation is that sample selection bias, like social desirability bias, can result in truncated variability on important measures in the data and, likewise, in the increased likelihood of reporting type II errors. Again, such concerns are minimized by the substantial variability observed in our data and by confirmation of statistically significant, theoretically specified relationships in our models. Nonetheless, our results should be
replicated using nationally representative samples or, at the very least, using data from respondents who diverge in meaningful ways from the sample used in this study.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings presented in this study should be of interest to scholars working towards advancing the literature on contemporary racial discrimination, as well as to practitioners who are responsible for managing tipped employees to ensure that the quality of service extended to every customer is optimized. Recall our finding that servers’ moral commitments to providing equitable service directly inhibits discrimination and also functions to undermine economically rational motivations to racially discriminate in service delivery. Given this, we encourage CRP researchers to examine the sources and nature of moral restraints and test our interpretations of these findings against alternate possibilities. Towards this end, future research might explore the prospect that there are unique and even contradictory types of moral beliefs that operate to encourage rather than discourage discriminate treatment of Black and Hispanic customers in response to the perceived below-average tipping practices of these customers.

For instance, servers identified as having low levels of moral restraint might be operating as agents of social control when they racially discriminate in their service delivery in response to what we interpret as “instrumental” motivations – that is, due to perceptions of Blacks/Hispanics as poor tippers and/or Whites as good tippers. By allocating effort differentially according to expected tips, these servers might, for instance, see themselves as punishing deviant (i.e., non-normative) tipping behaviors and rewarding pro-social tipping behaviors. In this case, servers actually may not be acting on instrumental motivations as a result of weak moral controls; rather, they may be acting on “moral” motivations in that they think customers who “break the rules” deserve to be “punished” with comparatively bad service. Although punishing people for
anticipated failure to tip seems difficult to morally justify, servers may nevertheless use such a justification to rationalize their discriminatory behavior. In that case, it is logically possible that servers would experience no guilt or moral dissonance when they provide better service to White customers than to Blacks and Hispanics. Additional research on the reported motivations, intended goals (e.g., maximizing tips, “sending a message” to certain clients), and psychological consequences (e.g., guilt; moral justification) of discriminatory behaviors is needed to assess these alternatives.\(^1\) Interestingly, if this alternate interpretation withstands future empirical scrutiny, then morality is likely to be even more important to the genesis of discriminatory behaviors, and more complex, than otherwise suggested by our current interpretation – that discrimination is instrumentally rational behavior that emerges primarily in the absence of strong moral controls inhibiting inequitable service.

Apart from this possibility, our findings indicate that there are a considerable number of servers who allege to possess strong moral controls against racial discrimination in service delivery, yet who nevertheless admit that they at least occasionally will not give Black and Hispanic customers their best effort. We suspect that these servers might pay substantial social-psychological costs for acting in accordance with their economic self-interest, in the forms of stress, cognitive dissonance, or feelings of guilt and shame associated with moral transgressions. For instance, consider the following passage, in which Emily Noll (Noll and Arnold 2004:27) candidly describes her experiences with waiting tables at a franchised steak house:

\[
\text{I felt frustrated with my black customers. Even more so, I was distressed over the environment of crude language and attitudes of my fellow servers toward black customers, with whom they had a similar experience. Frankly, there were nights that I was not only embarrassed to be privy to the kitchen conversations but also worried that simple ignorance of tipping norms (to which I attributed the cause) was detrimental to race relations. An easy solution was elusive. I could not just go around “educating” my customers on tipping etiquette or adding an automatic 15 percent gratuity without putting my job on the line (and potentially involving the restaurant in a lawsuit). So, I pretended}
\]
it was a factor I could influence and went in providing the best service possible to all customers, hoping that things would work out. Practically, however, I found myself, too, badgering the hostess to please give me the “tipping customers”; after all, I did have to buy overpriced college textbooks.

Noll’s experiences are likely to be very similar to many of our respondents, and especially to those servers identified as possessing strong moral restraints against discrimination. Note that Noll reports experiencing “distress” and “embarrassment” as a result of the racialized nature of her workplace, her moral concerns about race relations, and her countervailing economic motivations. Likewise, it is possible that many servers feel it to be morally repugnant to discriminate against Black and Hispanic customers, yet feel that, for financial reasons (e.g., buying college textbooks), it is sometimes necessary to employ discriminatory tactics such as avoidance of these customers (e.g., “badgering the hostess”).

By acting in what she seemed to perceive as an instrumentally rational yet morally objectionable way, Noll – and other servers like her across the United States – represents an interesting dynamic worthy of future scholarship. As a point of departure, scholars might work towards determining the social, psychological, and behavioral consequences associated such moral and instrumental discord. For instance, drawing from the literature on emotional labor (e.g., emotional dissonance; cf. Grandey 2000), research in this vein might examine whether servers with strong moral restraints suffer from heightened levels of occupational stress, dissatisfaction, emotional exhaustion, and burnout. Alternatively, these servers might alter their moral beliefs or their behaviors over time in an attempt to attenuate the moral dissonance and resultant stress and feelings of guilt stemming from discriminating against Black and Hispanic customers for economic reasons.

Our study also highlights the need for additional research on everyday racial discrimination as it is experienced by non-Black consumers of color. As Harris et al. (2005:163)
note, “CRP affects members of minority groups beyond those classified as black/African American, such as Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and Arab Americans.” However, the majority of research in this area focuses solely on the experiences of Blacks or African Americans. The relative absence of scholarship assessing Hispanic Americans’ experiences with everyday discrimination is particularly problematic given the relative size of this group in the U.S. population. According to the 2010 Census, there were over 50 million Hispanics residing in the United States and, together, they comprised nearly 16% of the total population (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). Moreover, in contrast to existing research (c.f., Doxon 2006) we found that Hispanic diners might be even more vulnerable to discriminatory service in American restaurants compared to Black diners.

Future research exploring the causes underlying our finding of enhanced Hispanic vulnerability to mistreatment in the restaurant context is needed. It is possible that servers are less reluctant to discriminate against members of this group, even when they have strong moral restraints against discrimination in general, as a result of the anti-Hispanic sentiments that are embodied in much of the historical and contemporary political discourse on immigration, safety and homeland security, and domestic employment (e.g., Bender 2006; Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001; Sohoni and Sohoni 2014; Wallace and Figueroa 2012). Alternatively, the enhanced Hispanic vulnerability to CRP that we observe might reflect the deprecation of Spanish and Spanish accents in the United States (Cobas and Feagin 2008). That is, in addition to being perceived as relatively inferior tippers, Hispanics might experience further discrimination as a result of their greater tendency to use a non-English dialect (see also Hein 2000).

Hispanics’ enhanced vulnerability to mistreatment in restaurants might also reflect race-based server inferences about the costs associated with waiting on any given table. In other
words, if instrumental motivations reflected in tipping differences indeed underlie servers’ decisions to discriminate against clients of color, then it is likely that servers similarly will discriminate against customers that are perceived to be difficult to wait on (see Brewster 2012). Thus, if servers perceive that they are required to work harder when waiting on Hispanics for equal or less pay (i.e., tips) than when waiting on other customers, including Blacks, it might explain the enhanced vulnerability to discriminatory treatment observed in this study. Consistent with this possibility, Hispanic restaurant patrons are more likely to dine with comparatively larger groups and with children; both of these table characteristics tend to necessitate additional attention and effort from servers. Finally, future research needs to take into consideration the diversity that exists among different Hispanic groups in the United States. The enhanced Hispanic vulnerability to server’ mistreatment that we observed in this study may be, for instance, disproportionately driven by heightened levels of prejudice and discrimination towards dark skinned Latino(a) customers (e.g., Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, etc.) rather than Hispanics more generally, as we have implied (Bonilla-Silva 2014; Faught and Hunter 2012; Lee and Bean 2007).

### Practical Applications for Restaurants

In closing, we encourage practitioners to draw from the emerging literature on consumer racial profiling in restaurant establishments to inform their efforts towards identifying, developing, and implementing ways to abate racialized service delivery. Our findings suggest that one effective way to substantially reduce CRP in restaurants would be supplant voluntary tipping with an alternative remuneration system (e.g., automatic service charges added to customers’ bill or inclusive pricing with high wages) that is characterized by wage certainty rather than uncertainty (cf. Wang 2014). However, given the degree to which the institution of
tipping is entrenched in American culture (Segrave 1998) and the benefits that the system affords restaurant proprietors (see Azar 2011; Lynn and Withiam 2008), a nationwide abolition of tipping is unlikely in the foreseeable future. In fact, the trend towards implementing automatic service charges in lieu of tipping has to-date been restricted to upscale establishments (Wachter 2008)\textsuperscript{13} – where our findings suggest CRP is relatively less likely to occur.

An alternative approach would be to devote efforts towards reducing and eventually eliminating the interracial differences in tipping that, in part, underlie servers’ motivations to discriminate racially in their service delivery. For instance, some scholars advocate for sensitivity training programs that identify servers’ behaviors as a cause, and not solely an effect, of the poorer tips they receive from their Black/Hispanic customers (cf. Brewster 2013b; Dirks and Rice 2004). After all, Black and Hispanic customers may tend to tip less than their White counterparts because they are more frequent recipients of discriminatory service (cf. Brewster 2013b; Dirks and Rice 2004; Rusche and Brewster 2008). Furthermore, while many servers have an ability to accurately predict the size of gratuity that a customer will leave (Dombrowski, Namasivayam, and Barlett 2006), they also appear to behave in such a way that they facilitate the materialization of their predictions (Barkan and Israeli 2004).

Servers’ beliefs about Blacks/Hispanics’ tipping cannot, however, be dismissed solely as the outcome of self-fulfilling prophecies (see Jussim, Harber, Crawford, Cain, and Cohen 2005). For instance, research shows that racial tipping disparities remain even after controlling for customers’ income, education, and perceptions of service quality (Brewster et al. 2014; Lynn, 2004, 2011, 2012, 2013; Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert 2003; Lynn, et al. 2008; Lynn, Jabbour and Kim 2012; Lynn and Brewster Forthcoming). These findings suggest that servers may continue to experience receiving poorer tips from Black and Hispanic customers even if they consistently
give these customers the same service as Whites (cf. Barkan and Israeli 2004:95). As such, training initiatives that aim to teach servers that they would receive better tips from their customers of color if they did not discriminate in their service delivery are unlikely to alone be an effective way to curtail CRP.

Apart from more frequently experiencing discrimination, an additional source of Blacks’ and Hispanics’ tendencies to tip less than their White counterparts is their relative lack of familiarity with injunctive norms dictating an appropriate tip as equivalent to 15-20% of the bill (Lynn 2004, 2011, 2012; Lynn and Brewster forthcoming). This source of interracial tipping differences has led scholars to advocate for an industry-led multimedia campaign educating consumers about tipping norms (Lynn 2004, 2011, 2012; Lynn and Brewster forthcoming). Furthermore, the desire to show off and/or to appear generous has led to a slow but steady increase in the size of tips relinquished by Whites over time (Azar 2004). Reversing or capping the escalation in tipping behaviors among Whites would diminish the interracial tipping gap no less than would increasing the size of gratuities left by Blacks and Hispanics (Lynn and Brewster forthcoming). Thus, efforts to promote consumers’ awareness of tipping norms should be targeted at the general public (not just ethnic/racial minorities) and should identify maximum as well as minimum normative tip amounts.

While a national industry-led educational campaign promoting tipping norm awareness would likely reduce the racial differences in tipping practices that encourage servers to discriminate racially in their service delivery, this approach also faces substantial impediments to successful implementation. First, the restaurant industry has yet to respond despite persistent calls for such campaigns for over a decade (Lynn and Brewster forthcoming). Further, if the restaurant industry does ultimately respond, the resiliency of stereotypes (c.f. Fiske and Taylor
casting Black and Hispanic customers as poor tippers will likely continue to encourage CRP long after the desired effects of such an educational campaign have begun to materialize. Finally, even if public awareness campaigns informing consumers of tipping norms are successful in reducing or eliminating aggregate race-based tipping differences, they are unlikely to diminish servers’ general economic motivations to discriminate against customers who are expected to tip poorly based on nonracial cues. That is, if servers indeed perceive discrimination to be an instrumentally rational response to the prospects of receiving a poor tip, then educational campaigns promoting tipping norm awareness are likely to result only in a more egalitarian distribution of “good” and “poor” tipping behaviors, and discriminatory service experiences, across racial and ethnic groups.

Thus, while we believe that the aforementioned initiatives are laudable strategies, our results suggest that another possible solution may be more effective in reducing race-based service delivery and service discrimination more generally. Specifically, we encourage practitioners to take immediate steps towards developing and implementing instruments to identify applicants for serving positions who would feel morally obligated to provide good service to their customers – that is, those potential servers who feel it is important to provide good service to all clients because they believe it is the morally right thing to do, regardless of expected tip. Furthermore, rather than an explicit emphasis on race-based service as some scholars have advocated (cf. Brewster 2013b), training programs might benefit from exploratory attempts to appeal to, prime, or otherwise enhance servers’ moral restraints against service discrimination more generally. After all, as underscored by the results of this study, in the absence of strong moral obligations to providing equitable service among many servers, it seems
the markedly high aggregate levels of racial discrimination observed against Black and Hispanic restaurant patrons would be considerably higher.
Consumer racial profiling (CRP) is a phrase commonly used in the literature to refer to race-based discrimination that occurs in consumer markets. Harris et al. (2005:163) define consumer racial profiling, for instance, “as a type of differential treatment of consumers in the marketplace based on race/ethnicity that constitutes denial of or degradation in the products and/or services that are offered to the consumer.” Throughout this paper we use discrimination and equivalent terms (e.g., race-based/racialized service) interchangeably with CRP.

A parallel explanation has been offered for “hailing a taxicab while black.” Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya’s (2005) collaborated with 12 taxicab drivers who collectively provided tipping data on 1066 distinct taxicab fares in the New Haven, Connecticut area and found that drivers who take into account the race of the passenger as well as other observable curbside information (e.g., passenger sex, age, dress, luggage, etc.) can effectively use this information to make relatively accurate inferences about the likelihood of being tipped fairly. The authors empirically showed, for instance, that net of the effects of non-racial indicators of profitability (e.g., manner of dress as a proxy for social class) a driver can expect that a black customer will tip 56.5% less than a comparable white passenger. While the authors did not have data on service discrimination, they concluded that given such statistical inferences some cabdrivers would be inclined to avoid picking up African American in favor of more lucrative white passengers.

Studies conducted by Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert’s (2003) and Lynn and Brewster (forthcoming) failed to find a significant Hispanic-White tipping difference. We suspect that the equivocal state of this relationship in the literature reflects heterogeneity within the Hispanic population, inconsistencies in how Hispanic status has been measured, and/or reliance on small samples of Hispanic clients.

The blogs posting links to the survey were: www.stuckserving.com, theseamericanservers.blogspot.com, waiterextraordinaire.blogspot.com, and www.facebook.com/pages/Bitchy-Waiter.

There were 89 subjects that were not currently waiting tables but had done so at some point in the last year. These subjects were instructed to respond to questions on the questionnaire with their last serving position in mind.

Variance inflation factors were examined for each of the predictor variables included in the Models presented in Table 2 and in no instances did VIF scores exceed 1.60, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not a threat to the conclusions drawn from our analysis of these data (c.f. Allison 1999:142; Menard 1995:66). An inconsequential level of multicollinearity in our analysis is further underscored by the stability in standard errors across models, including those models that include product terms between moral restraint and perceptions of tipping behaviors. We
also note that we estimated the Models in Table 2 using OLS and multinomial regression analyses to assess the robustness of our conclusions. In addition, we recoded our dependent variables such that discriminators (=1) were compared with non-discriminators (=0) and estimated the Models in Table 2 using binary logistic regression. The substantive conclusions derived from each of these supplementary analyses support those derived from the ordinal regression analyses presented here.

7 A test of parallelism for each of the Models in Table 2 failed to reject the null hypothesis that the relationships between our predictor variables and logits are the same for all logits, indicating that the proportional odds assumption underlying ordinal regression is appropriate.

8 Equations for calculating predicted probabilities from ordinal regression models estimated using IBM/SPSS 21 are described on the IBM technical support website: http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21493526. The following equations were used to calculate conditional predicted probabilities of specific scores for display in Figure 1. The following equation calculates the cumulative conditional predicted probability of event ‘j’ occurring:

\[
\text{prob(event } j \text{)} = \frac{1}{1+e^{(-\eta_j)}}, \text{ where } \eta_j = a_j - \sum(b_k \cdot x_k), \text{ and where } a_j \text{ is j'th threshold parameter and the sum is over all variables } x_1 \text{ to } x_k \text{ in the model, multiplied by their corresponding location parameter values } b_k. \text{ Ordinal logistic regression models a separate logit function for each category of an ordinal dependent variable, while assuming that the effect of an independent variable is the same across logit functions; the threshold values that are used to calculate cumulative predicted probabilities are conceptually similar to intercepts in OLS except that a separate value is estimated for each logit function. The predicted probability of a specific score is calculated as: prob(score } j \text{) = prob(score less than or equal to } j \text{) – prob(score less than } j \text{). For example, the specific conditional predicted probability of scoring a ‘1’ on the discrimination against black customers variable (Model 3 in Table 2) is .377 for servers with low morality (X_1 = -1.53) and who perceive blacks to be average tippers (X_2 = -1.01). This value is obtained by subtracting the predicted probability of score ‘0’ occurring from the cumulative probability of score ‘0’ or ‘1’ occurring using the following equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{prob(event 0)} & = \frac{1}{1+\exp((-0.552 - ((-1.53*0.173)+(-1.01*0.647)+(-1.53*-1.01*-0.177))))} = .528 \\
\text{prob(event 0 or 1)} & = \frac{1}{1+\exp((1.59-((-1.53*0.173)+(-1.01*0.647)+(-1.53*-1.01*-0.177))))} = .905
\end{align*}
\]

9 We note, however, that results from independent sample T-tests comparing White and non-White respondents’ reports of discriminating against Black and Hispanic diners revealed no statistically significant mean differences. Further, like McCall and Lynn (2009), no significant White/non-White mean differences were found in respondents’
perceptions of Blacks'/Hispanics'/Whites' tipping practices. Finally, no significant mean differences were found on our measure of moral restraints. Thus, while White servers are overrepresented in these data, we find no discernable differences on our key variables between White respondents and their non-White counterparts. These findings coupled with the non-significant effect of respondents’ race in the multivariate analysis might indicate that all servers are equally likely to discriminate against clients that they predict will tip poorly, regardless of race of server or client.

Also, while our study contributes to a growing body of evidence underscoring the pervasiveness of consumer racial profiling in the full-service restaurant industry, we are not able to speak to the nature of such discrimination. That is, the manifestations of servers’ propensities to withhold effort from their Black/Hispanic are unclear. It is assumed that racialized restaurant service is in most cases quite subtle (cf. Dirks and Rice 2004; Brewster and Mallinson 2009) but there have been limited attempts to empirically document variations in the way service is delivered and/or experienced across racial groups (cf. Brewster et al. 2014). We hope that the current study inspires additional research on this front. As Brewster et al. (2014) point out, in the absence of such research the nature of race-based service will remain elusive thus making it difficult to resolve.

10 http://www.restaurantindustrytrends.com/snapshots.html

12 It is also possible that our finding of enhanced vulnerability to CRP among Hispanic customers, vis-à-vis Black customers reflects systematic differences in the perceived acceptability in reporting discrimination in response to customers’ race (e.g., Black) versus their ethnic affiliation (e.g., Hispanic). We are grateful to Ryan Ceresola, Department of Sociology at Southern Illinois University, for pointing this out to the authors as an alternative and yet equally plausible explanation for this finding.


14 For example, Barkan and Israeli (2004:95) explore why servers are more likely to devote ‘over the top’ service to predictably good tippers rather than devoting extra energy to predictably bad tippers in order to increase their below average tipping practices—a process the authors refer to as attaining and compensating prophecy. According to the authors, the attaining and compensating prophecy implies “that servers would invest the needed effort to attain a large predicted tip, yet would invest even more effort to change and exceed a small predicted tip.” In other words, servers may attempt to attain larger tips from tables perceived to be below-average tippers (e.g., Blacks/Hispanics) by devoting extra effort to these tables. The authors’ findings suggest that the attaining and compensating strategy is
not statistically effective in eliciting greater tips from customers whom servers predict to be below-average tippers. Consequently, servers may initially try to give Blacks/Hispanics the same quality of service as they give to Whites but, with experience, they are likely to realize that doing so is inefficient and ineffective. The economic ineffectiveness in treating everyone as if they would be good tippers as a strategy to enhance tips is illustrated in the excerpt taken from Noll and Arnold’s (2004) work, wherein Noll explains that she initially provided the best service that she could to all customers but, with time, found herself “badgering the hostess to please give me the tipping customers.”
REFERENCES


Chang, Linchiat and Jon A. Krosnick 2009. “National Surveys Via RDD Telephone Interviewing
Versus the Internet: Comparing Sample Representativeness and Response Quality.”

*Public Opinion Quarterly* 73:641-678.


Lynn, Michael. 2012. “The Contribution of Norm Familiarity to Race Differences in


**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables In Analysis Predicting Racial Discrimination (n=872)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Min. – Max.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Discrimination against Blacks</td>
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<td>.753</td>
<td>.864</td>
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<td>Never (=0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often/Always (=3)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Discrimination against Hispanics</td>
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<td>.867</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
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<td>33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often/Always (=3)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
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<td>Perceptions of Blacks’ Tipping (3=average, 5=very bad)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>.881</td>
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<td>Perceptions of Hispanics’ Tipping (3=average, 5=very bad)</td>
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<td>Perceptions of Whites’ Tipping (3=average, 5=very bad)</td>
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<td>Moral Restraint (7=high moral restraints)</td>
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<td><strong>Covariates</strong></td>
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<td>Experience (years)</td>
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<td>Survey Engagement/Honesty</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 4</td>
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<td>Perceptions of Blacks’ Tipping</td>
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<td>.677* (.089)</td>
<td>.647* (.090)</td>
<td>.954* (.089)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perceptions of Whites’ Tipping</td>
<td>-.379* (116)</td>
<td>-.352* (117)</td>
<td>-.271* (121)</td>
<td>-.325* (118)</td>
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<td>Moral Restraint</td>
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<td>-.173* (0.057)</td>
<td>-.228* (0.057)</td>
<td>-.198* (0.058)</td>
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<td>Blacks’ Tipping X Morality</td>
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<td>-.177* (0.056)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanics’ Tipping X Morality</td>
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<td>.195* (.075)</td>
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<td>Whites’ Tipping X Morality</td>
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<td>.091 (0.073)</td>
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<td>-.189 (.196)</td>
<td>-.273 (.199)</td>
<td>-.135 (.201)</td>
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<td>Age (years)</td>
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<td>-.020 (.011)</td>
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<td>Serving Experience</td>
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<td>.013 (.030)</td>
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<td>Negative/Derogatory Comments</td>
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<td>.128 (.082)</td>
<td>.115 (.082)</td>
<td>.155* (.078)</td>
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<td>.305* (.056)</td>
<td>.317* (.056)</td>
<td>.363* (.050)</td>
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<td>.248 (.265)</td>
<td>.222 (.269)</td>
<td>.103 (.274)</td>
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<td>Automatic Tip (yes=1)</td>
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<td>-.623 (.693)</td>
<td>-.687 (.690)</td>
<td>-.143 (.610)</td>
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<td>Not Quick Service (yes=1)</td>
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<td>.181 (.188)</td>
<td>.169 (.188)</td>
<td>-.047 (.186)</td>
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<td>Minority Clientele (yes=1)</td>
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<td>.036 (.142)</td>
<td>.017 (.142)</td>
<td>-.171 (.142)</td>
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<td>Moderately Expensive Restaurant (yes=1)</td>
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<td>-.205 (.178)</td>
<td>-.236 (.178)</td>
<td>-.272 (.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expensive Restaurant (yes =1)</td>
<td>-.754* (.313)</td>
<td>-.768* (.313)</td>
<td>-.785* (.317)</td>
<td>-.712* (.307)</td>
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<td>Employed in Two Restaurants (yes =1)</td>
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<td>.292 (.225)</td>
<td>.258 (.227)</td>
<td>.378 (.224)</td>
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<td>Survey Engagement/Honesty</td>
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<td>-.654* (.143)</td>
<td>-.660* (.143)</td>
<td>-.496* (.143)</td>
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<td>Threshold (=0)</td>
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<td>-.552 (.415)</td>
<td>-.735 (.407)</td>
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<td>1.64* (.419)</td>
<td>1.59* (.421)</td>
<td>1.19* (.409)</td>
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<td>Threshold (=2)</td>
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<td>3.19* (.441)</td>
<td>3.20* (.444)</td>
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<td>Cox and Snell R²</td>
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<td>.258 (.441)</td>
<td>.275 (.444)</td>
<td>.248 (.431)</td>
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</table>

*p < .05; Notes: All continuous variables have been centered at their mean values. Standard Errors are in parentheses.
Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities from Ordinal Logistic Regressions Predicting Server Discrimination against Black (A and B) and Hispanic (C) Customers, by Group-based Tipping Expectations and Moral Restraint