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ONTOLOGY

BEING A

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A BENGALI WORK,

BY

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WITH

SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONS AND ALTERATIONS MADE
BY HIM IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT.

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INTRODUCTION.

TRUE knowledge depends upon the harmony of the two great classes of truth viz., PARTICULAR and UNIVERSAL. Sensations give rise to particular truths only. Such concepts as time and space, unity and diversity, cause and effect, and others of a similar kind, give rise to universal truths. These universal truths are purely supersensuous, and are applicable to all objects alike.

Illustrations. (1.) It is only objects possessing sensible qualities, such as colour, &c., that can give rise to knowledge through the senses. An existence like infinite space can never affect our

senses. Such, however, is the necessary connection between space and the sensible world, that no object can be perceived by us without reference to space.


(2.) When we perceive different objects, it is one and the same undivided consciousness that enters into, and underlies, our knowledge of them all ; so that perception of particular objects is always accompanied by the consciousness of a perceiving self. Without such necessary and universal truths for data, no other truths would be possible. For instance, but for space, the external world would never have come within the sphere of our knowledge ; without consciousness, knowable objects would remain unperceived; and without the agency of causation nothing could occur. Necessary and

universal truths, therefore, are the ground-work of all knowledge. The science which has for its subject-matter these primary truths is called Ontology. Such truths, in the *first* place, extend the sphere of our knowledge; *secondly*, by influencing action, they serve to regulate the will; and, *thirdly*, they harmonize and embellish the mind, and thus may be regarded from an æsthetic point of view. Hence we shall divide our subject into three parts *viz* ;—

- I. The knowledge of the *true* ;
- II. The practice of the *good* ; and
- III. The enjoyment of the *beautiful*.

We shall now proceed to treat of Knowledge, the first division of our subject.

ONTOLOGY.



PART I.

ON KNOWLEDGE.



CHAPTER I.

METHOD OF ASCERTAINING FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS.

THE particular truths which we acquire by the aid of sensation, are not primary and fundamental. It is only tangible external objects of which the senses are cognizant. The essential truths which lie hidden in those objects are beyond the range of sensation. If, in our search for the source of necessary truth, we ascend

from the senses to the intellect, we shall still find that we have not reached the fountain-head. It is true that, when qualities, such as sound, light, &c., act upon the senses, the intellect can determine the various relations which these qualities presuppose as necessary, *viz.*, the relation of effect to cause, that of quality to substratum, and that of species to genus; but the fundamental notions that "every effect must have a cause," "every quality a substratum in which it inheres," and that "there must be unity in every kind of variety," are beyond the province of mere intellect.

To understand properly the meaning of fundamental truths, it is necessary to bear in mind that if we grant a cause for every effect, we cannot but admit that all

secondary causes must have a primary cause ; that if we allow that every quality must have a substratum, we cannot but admit that all the subordinate substrata must have an original independent basis to rest upon ; and that if we grant that in every kind of diversity there is unity, then we must allow that there is an original unity common to, and underlying, all the secondary unities. Thus fundamental truths, such as "that every effect must have a cause," &c., are of such kind that they bring us at once to the very root of all things, a result which intellect alone could never achieve.

Horses, elephants, and various other animals can, it is true, be perceived by our senses ; but the fact of any resemblance or dissimilarity in them can never be

determined, except by the aid of the intellect. Evidently there are numerous points of difference between horses, elephants, &c. ; but the intellect, discarding all such points of difference, abstracts the one quality, *viz.*, the fact of being quadruped, and classifies them under the genus animal. Thus it is that the intellect manifests its power by abstracting one common ingredient from a mass of apparently heterogeneous materials which it connects by a bond of union. But though the intellect can thus discover resemblances between various objects, yet the fundamental intuitive belief that there must be a unity at the root of all truths, can never be supplied by it. Indeed, it is precisely because this irresistible belief has been originally implanted in us, that

the intellect boldly sets out in search of unity amidst a mass of discordancies. Were there no such belief constantly stimulating and spurring the intellect, what could ever have induced it to engage in such a task ?

It is simply owing to the firm belief which we have in an original *a priori* notion of unity, that the intellect pursues the search after resemblances with so much vigour and steadiness. The intellect proceeds gradually, advancing, by degrees, from diversity to unity, from unconsciousness and inexperience to consciousness and knowledge, from matter to mind ; but it is quite incapable of attaining to those fundamental and original notions of unity, of spiritual being, &c., upon which, in fact, is grounded the assurance of its gradual

progress towards success in the attainment of its ends, and which are, from the very first, implanted in the minds of all men.

Now, it must be remembered that the mind has a spontaneous source of knowledge called reason. It is this reason, and not the senses or the intellect, which can alone furnish the knowledge of the fundamental truths. The intellect cannot grasp at once all the objects to which it directs itself ; its processes are gradual ; it must proceed from one object to another, and then to a third, and so advance, by successive steps, towards the fulfilment of its end. Thus we are first sensible of one kind of colour, and then of another, from which separate impressions the intellect forms the general idea of colour. At one time we see a horse, at another an ox, at

another an elephant, and so on, whence the intellect forms the idea of a quadruped. And thus it is that the intellect proceeds, step by step, towards the acquisition of truth. But such is not the case with reason. By Divine appointment all its operations are spontaneous; it has not, in order to acquire knowledge, to go through a minute and slow process of investigation and comparison of various objects, but accords an instantaneous, implicit, belief to every first truth. Thus we immediately acknowledge the validity of such truths as these,—“every effect must have a cause”; “there is a first cause,” &c.

Fundamental and primary truths—the subjects of reason—obtain at all times and in all places; there can be no doubt

about them; they are immutable and uniform. That the vicious are stung by reproaches of conscience; that the virtuous enjoy peace of mind; that the bee constructs its hive, and the bird its nest; that the tree shoots up from below the soil; that the planets revolve in their orbits round the sun, in accordance with the law of gravitation; that electricity magnetises iron; that the magnet attracts the needle; —all these and such like phenomena, must have a deep and profound meaning underlying them. Reason is full of those latent meanings and deep purposes which underlie all the phenomena of the universe, and reason can alone furnish the key wherewith to unlock them to the intellect: for instance, but for the fundamental belief that no event can take place without an

adequate cause, we could never understand how a single particle of matter could change its position. In fact, had we not such a belief, the simplest phenomena would be utterly devoid of meaning even to the best intellects. It is entirely owing to our primary belief in certain first truths that we can comprehend the most ordinary events of every-day life.

The nature of reason will be best understood by pointing out the distinction between the primary truths of reason, and the secondary contingent truths cognizable by the intellect. That the sun must rise every day is a truth which we have arrived at by means of an intellectual process. From our earliest infancy we have continually observed morning succeed to night, and the result of this repeated experience

has led to the acquisition of the foregoing truth, which is strengthened as each successive day contributes a fresh confirmation of it. If, however, a day should come on which the sun were not to rise, our induction would be somewhat weakened; two such days would still more weaken it, and should such interruptions frequently occur, its validity would be seriously compromised. Therefore, the induction, "that the sun must rise every day," gains strength in proportion to the amount of our experience, so that it depends upon experience only: hence it is that the truths cognizable by the intellect have been termed contingent truths. Let us now examine the truths of reason.

In our early years we simply gazed upon the sun as it rose or set; in course of

time we arrived, by an intellectual process, at the conclusion that the sun will rise every day : hence the intellect is brought to maturity subsequently to the senses. Again, the due expansion of reason is posterior to the proper exercise of intellect. The truth that there must be an adequate cause of the sun's daily rising may not strike the mind of a young child ; but it manifests itself as an irrepressible and fundamental principle in the minds of all men in whom reason has once been awakened. Reason does not begin its operations by investigation and induction, as is the case with the intellect. When reason is once roused to action, it instantaneously casts off the fetters of investigation, and glories in its independence. The induction that the sun must rise every day

holds good only so long as we, by actual experience, are assured of the fact indicated; but the knowledge of the primary truth, "that no event can take place without a cause," does not depend upon any such observation or induction; for reason, *per se*, indisputably establishes this truth. The sun may not rise one day: there are countries where it does not rise for six months together; but the truth that every event must have an adequate cause prevails in all places and under all circumstances alike. Contingent truths may vary according to circumstances of time, place and subject; but the fundamental truths of reason are incapable of change,—they are necessary, immutable, and universal.

The intellect, by the aid of certain mental processes, acquires ideas from the

contemplation of various external objects. Reason finds the first truths manifested in the soul itself. As sensible objects are the food of the intellect, so is the soul that of reason. As the intellect rises from the contemplation of the object to the subject, from the non-ego to the ego, so reason ascends from the knowledge of the soul to that of the first cause. The ideas of animality, life, &c., and the secondary truths of intellect, are not essential to knowledge; but reason cannot dispense with such fundamental truths as the existence of a first cause; the unity of the ego; the absoluteness of truth, &c. Such conceptions as animal, quadruped, &c., we derive from experience. The primary and fundamental truths belong to the soul; their ultimate source is GOD. Since the

knowledge belonging to the soul is the primary condition of the acquisition of our experimental conceptions, it follows that, when compared with that knowledge, these conceptions are but of secondary importance : similarly in comparison with the knowledge whose immediate source is the Divine cause, the primary truths of reason dwindle into insignificance.

The subjects which have been only cursorily noticed above will be presented with fuller detail in the second chapter.



CHAPTER II.

ON THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENSATION, INTELLECT, AND REASON.

IT will be readily observed, from the perusal of the preceding chapter, that there is a substantial difference between sensation, intellect, and reason. Now let us examine this distinction in detail.

Without sensations we can perceive no external object ; but whence arise these sensations ? They cannot come from internal self-consciousness, nor do they come from that innermost depth of our being whence springs our faith in the existence of the Deity ; but they arise from the material objects of the external world. We refer the sensations of colour,

taste, &c., to external objects as their source. Whenever an impression is made upon an organ of sense, and a sensation follows, there arises along with it a belief that there must be a cause for that sensation, and in our attempt to discover what that cause is, we find that the sensation in question is not caused by our volition; hence it follows that we ourselves could not be the cause of it, consequently this cause must be sought elsewhere.

If the ego is not the cause of our sensations, is GOD Himself their immediate cause? Now let us understand clearly what we mean by the term GOD. Undoubtedly we use the expression to denote the Being who is the root, the original cause of all. It has in fact no limitation ;

it implies that as He is the cause of light, so He is the cause of sound, and in short of every event and phenomenon in the universe. But if we mean only a limited cause,—a something that is the cause of some particular phenomenon or event, but not of any other,—of light, for instance, but not of sound, or of sound only, but not of light; then, having in view that limited cause, we cannot say that it is the cause of all, that is, GOD himself. Hence it is, when we say that GOD is the primary cause of all, we mean that though He has appointed an immediate secondary cause for every particular phenomenon or event, yet He Himself is not that secondary cause. Hence particular sensations cannot be directly traced to any other causes, but those which spring from

the external objects corresponding to such sensations.

Being conscious that sensations are not completely under our own control, we are forced to seek an external cause for them ; but it would be mere tautology to assert that we ourselves are the causes of those acts over which we exercise control. If we had been satisfied, like inferior animals, with the exercise of the organs of sense, with seeing colour, or hearing sounds, &c., then we could not have been conscious of ourselves as persons who see and hear. If when rays impinged upon the eye, we were attracted towards the light, as moths are, by a mere blind impulse ; if when sounds entered the ear, the mind was irresistibly drawn towards them ; if, upon these and other such like occasions we

could not voluntarily give or withhold our attention,—then it would be impossible so to connect the various isolated phenomena which present themselves, as to be conscious of a directing power which we possess within us, and which is a sure characteristic of the conscious self. But GOD, in His boundless providence, has seen fit to provide man with something more than the simple faculties of sensation. He has also bestowed upon him the noble prerogative of intellect. It is intellect alone which makes progress and development possible; it is through intellect that man attains that freedom of action which may be regarded as his most distinctive characteristic; for freedom does not consist in mere physical but in the activity, controlling power

which intelligence exercises over all our energies.

When we perceive an external object, we feel that we have a power within whereby we could, if we chose, perceive or imagine other similar objects; so that, in the act of perception, the mind is not wholly absorbed in the particular object that is being perceived;—indeed, however closely the mind may be engaged, there is no doubt that it still retains some control over itself: consequently, the mind can, with a slight exertion, easily pass from one object to another. When the mind consciously directs its attention from one object to another, the former is retained in the memory, while our consciousness is directed to the latter; and the combination of the two is rendered possible by an effort of

the imagination. For instance, we first perceive a horse, then an elephant, then an ox, and so on. The image impressed upon the mind by the horse is stored up in our memory ; so that when we classify horse as a member of the genus quadruped, we must have connected it with elephant and other four-footed animals by means of imagination. Thus the term quadruped does not denote any individual animal or animals, but is applicable to the whole class equally, and therefore stands as their representative.

Now it is manifest that the individual horse, elephant, &c., are alone perceptible. The genus quadruped, which embraces equally and indifferently horses, oxen, elephants, &c., can never be an object of perception or imagination. Horses, oxen,

elephants, which we perceive by the senses, are individual objects. The notion of quadruped which is formed by the intellect is the genus, and is applicable to them all. The act of applying such general notions to groups of particular objects is a function of the intellect, which is called judgment. It displays the freedom of our soul, though with reference merely to its intellectual element, to be thus able to descend from the abstract to the concrete, the general to the particular. In order, for example, that we may perceive any individual animal with reference to the genus quadruped, it is necessary that, while keeping in mind the general notion quadruped, we should especially concentrate our attention upon the individual animal in question. This act of concentration is

necessarily accompanied with a certain degree of freedom or spontaneity : hence it is that while sensations indicate external objects as their substances, so the operations of the intellect indicate self or the ego as its substance. Perception is the earliest and most prominent operation of the intellect. When we perceive a horse, we do so in particular, that is, to the exclusion of all other objects. Now it must be remembered that, as effects necessarily imply their relation to some cause, so particular objects necessarily imply their relation to some general notion, and this they do in consequence of the well-known law of correlatives : hence particular objects on the one hand must be accompanied by general notions on the other ; these general notions being, as it

were, the bonds which unite the scattered objects of perception.

The intellect deals only with general notions, particular objects being always regarded by it from a collective point of view. It is one and the same intelligence, the same self-conscious ego, that is directed to all the particular objects of the external world. In affixing a general name to a number of particular objects, we mean simply that each separate object may be referred to the same category by the aid of a certain synthetical power which is peculiar to the intellect.

It is thus by exercising itself upon various particular objects that the intellect manifests its power and, as a necessary result, there arises the consciousness of the ego as an element which remains constant

amidst all the changes of the external environment. Thus, as, in tracing our sensations to their source, we come upon the external world, so in following up the processes of the intellect, we arrive at the ego itself.

External objects then are the substrata of our sensations, and self is the substratum of the intellect. Now let us enquire what is the source of those self-evident cognitions which have their seat in reason, which do not rest upon the authority of any created being? Reason, properly so-called, relates to those truths, self-demonstrated, self-sufficient and independent, which are the necessary conditions of thought, and which, therefore, lie at the root of all knowledge. We have shewn, in the previous chapter,* that the necessary

universal truths are the objects of reason. Now let us examine the origin of these fundamental truths. They cannot spring from external objects, as such truths are beyond the domain of the senses, and they cannot emanate from the ego, since they are independent of experience. Such truths, therefore, must have been implanted in us from the very commencement. Without them we could neither perceive the objects of the external world, nor exercise our intellectual powers. We never could have arrived at such fundamental truths as—"space is infinite"; "time is eternal"; "the ego is one and indivisible"; "every event has a cause," &c., if we had been dependent upon the tardy processes of the intellect for their attainment. We believe that innumerable

stars fill the skies because we have a fundamental conviction that "space is infinite." We, now-a-days, plunge with confidence into the researches of Geology, and investigate the condition of the earth's surface during the remotest periods of past time, relying upon the principle—"time is eternal." It is owing to our *a priori* conviction of "the unity of the ego with respect to its objects" that we are enabled to colligate the multiplicity of facts that come within the domain of experience ; and we are impelled to search for the causes of every-day events simply by our inherent belief that "every event has a cause." Philosophers do not hesitate to examine and call in question the ordinary facts of experience ; but what philosopher in his senses would attempt

to subject to a process of critical investigation such questions as the following—"Is space finite or infinite?" "Am I one or many?" "Has a particular event any cause or not?" Such questions require no philosophy in order to be rightly answered. If then we have not derived these pure truths of reason from the external world, nor from the researches of our intellect, whence have they arisen? They are, as we have said elsewhere, immutable, necessary, universal, and irresistible: hence they must spring immediately from that Being who is the One Universal, Immutable, Necessary and Irresistible, or, to comprehend these last three attributes in a single term, The Almighty. As in the exercise of our intellect we become conscious of a

subjective unity underlying the external diversity, so by the unvarying revelations of reason we are led to recognize the existence of a Deity who, amidst all the shifting phenomena of the universe, remains One and Immutable. We are ourselves the source of all cognitions acquired through the exercise of the intellect: but of those intuitive cognitions which are beyond the reach of the intellect, He only can be the cause from whom the soul itself has emanated. All first truths must have directly issued from Him who first created the soul, and by whose power it is kept in existence. Truths of reason are self-evident, and hence the Being through whom they manifest themselves must be self-existent and self-demonstrative. Reason is at the root of all

knowledge, therefore the Being who is the substance of it must be the first cause. Thus it is that reason leads us by degrees to a knowledge of the nature and attributes of the Deity. As sensation points to an external substance as its originating cause, and as the intellect requires a conscious mind for its substratum, so reason directs us to the Deity as the root of all existence.

The philosophers who have treated of this subject may be classified under three heads. The first class comprehends those who maintain that all fundamental truths have sprung from a blind impulse ;—these may be termed Sensationalists. The second class embraces those who hold that fundamental truths are derived from the intellect, so that we ourselves are their originating causes ;—they may be called

Intellectualists, or Sceptics. The third class includes those who assert that the Deity is the source of all fundamental truths;—they may be designated as Theists.

The Sensationalist regards the world as the result of certain blind impulses which constitute for him the only fundamental truth. With him fate rules all things; the soul is but a kind of force which animates the body for a while. The Sceptic considers himself as the only fundamental truth. He fancies that apart from the individual there can be no world, no GOD. It is only in relation to the individual that anything can be said to exist. Hence to such a one the only fundamental truth is, *I exist*: all others are secondary and inferior. He questions

the reality of all objective truths. Truth being confined to a knowledge of the ego, it follows that nothing outside of the ego 'can be known for certain. The external world is a mere delusion, and the belief in it is only subjectively valid. The Theist maintains that the universe has sprung from the Deity, that it exists and is preserved by His instrumentality, and is ever advancing towards perfection through His merciful providence. To the Theist every thing is rendered real and true by the immediate presence of GOD, who is Truth itself. To such an one nothing is meaningless or delusive; all things work together for good,—truth being at the root of all, and perfection at the end of all. Everywhere GOD is to be found. He spans the whole universe like a bridge

from beginning to end. The Fatalist affirms that sensations are gradually transformed into intellect and reason. The Egoist regards the intellect as distinct from sensation ; but since it is his opinion, that by tracing up the intellect we come at length upon reason, he holds that the fundamental truths of intuitive belief must ultimately depend upon the doubtful operations of the intellect. The Theist asserts that the intellect is not merely the result of transformable sensations, and that reason does not spring from intellect, but that all the three,—*viz.*, sensation, intellect, and reason,—discharge their separate functions harmoniously, according to their respective offices.

As petals in the bud remain folded up, but when the flower is formed they expand

and separate from each other, so in man's early infancy, sensation, intellect, and reason are commingled and confused, but with advancing age they become developed and manifest themselves separately. During childhood, sensation begins to be developed, and the intellect works with great activity. In our infancy every phenomenon is new: at this period there is no occasion for such desponding questions as "What can we know, or of what use is it to acquire knowledge?" To learn a new language it is necessary to know its grammar and master its literature; but with what ease does an unlettered child master a language: no one is at the pains of teaching it formally; the child's own exertions are sufficient. It might appear to a superficial observer that a child learns its mother-

tongue merely by the influence of certain external stimuli, as the dog obeys the commands of its master urged by a mere sensational impulse ; but a little reflection will shew that there is a difference, not only of degree but also of kind, between the two cases. A dog will be induced to perform a particular act by hearing a particular sound from its master, but it could not acquire a single rule of grammar were it to hear the words uttered a thousand times. That animals perform particular acts impelled by particular sensations, as above described, is the result of sheer habit, but to learn the general rules of grammar, and to apply them in practice, is not possible, unless the sense of hearing is aided by the operation of the intellect. A dog merely obeys a certain sound which it hears; but a child

collects the meanings of words in accordance with the rules of grammar—the rules about the nominative, accusative, verb, &c. It is easy to see that these two modes of procedure are not identical. With what zeal does a child direct its mind to new phenomena, and how easily does it connect present perceptions with past experiences, and thus gradually extend the domain of knowledge. What thoughtful mind, after considering attentively the education imparted in that earliest of schools—the family—where the father and mother are instructors, where brothers and sisters are fellow-comrades—would be prepared to deny that the child was father to the man, that the mind of the infant contained in embryo the developed intellect of riper years.

When children part from the fond embraces and caresses of the family to enter a public school, they leave a state of ease for a harder and a sterner course of life. A child that has learned the elements of grammar, though unsystematically, in two years in the family, cannot master the same in four years, when learning systematically and scientifically, in a school. As sensation acts from without upon the mind of the child, so does intellect manifest its power from within, and reason is evoked, by the help of GOD, from the innermost recesses of the soul. How can the intellect, which is ever progressing, possibly operate without reason? There is no end to knowledge which we derive through the intellect. The mind is ever thinking, ever acquiring knowledge, never

pausing for a moment in its onward course. When it has once started upon the path of knowledge, it must ever advance. ' But where is the spring, the well-head of knowledge ; where is the beacon to guide the traveller ? Reason is the beacon, the indispensable guide, without which the intellect cannot proceed a step. Why should a child long to gain new knowledge, unless he had an insatiable desire for improvement ? The brute must be chastised in order to learn ; but a child seeks knowledge with the same avidity with which it sucks its mother's breast. It is because the child has a longing after knowledge which is infinitely progressive,—a belief in the existence of the ego rooted in his very constitution, though undeveloped and unevolved,—that it is superior to the

brute, notwithstanding its comparatively helpless state. In the mind of the child, sensation, intellect and reason all act together, but very confusedly : hence it is that at this stage they cannot be accurately distinguished. But though operating simultaneously they are nevertheless developed in a certain order—first of all sensation, then intellect, and lastly reason.

As the child advances to manhood, the objective world gains an increasing influence over him, the mind asserts its authority, and gradually the light of the Deity becomes apparent to reason. The adult man can distinguish completely in thought between sensation, intellect and reason, although in practice these three can never be wholly divorced one from another.

If we were not endowed with intellect

our sensations would be of no avail, for by their aid alone we could acquire no real knowledge. Again, if reason had not been bestowed upon us, we should have had no escape from scepticism. Hence reason, intellect and sensation act in concert at every period of life ; but reason occupies the highest place. Beneath it are sensation and intellect, both of which it controls and regulates. The processes of the intellect are alike based upon and subordinate to certain universal principles which are derived from reason. Wherefore it must not be supposed that reason looks down contemptuously upon the operations of intellect, as a solitary recluse does upon the concerns of the world. Reason has a domain of its own within which it is supreme, but it moreover assists in the operations of

the intellect, and extends its authority even to the confines of sensation: hence we divide fundamental truths into three classes:—*first*, those appertaining to sensation; *second*, those of the intellect; and *third* those of pure reason. The first class embraces those fundamental truths which render an act of sensation possible: the second includes those which assist the intellect in its operations; and the third is composed of those truths which constitute the native element of reason.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST TRUTHS WITH REFERENCE TO SENSATION.

THE real existence of matter and its phenomenal existence are two distinct things, and it is only the latter that sensation is concerned with. In order to determine the nature of the former, we must advance beyond sensation and have recourse to intellectual processes. Take, for example, the proposition, *I am walking on foot*. Here the phenomenon manifested in the act of walking, is all that appeals to the senses. But then the question arises—In what subject does this phenomenon inhere? To answer this, we

must distinguish between reality as objective and as subjective—a task which, being beyond the power of the senses, requires the aid of the intellect. Suppose that a picture were drawn to represent some historical subject, and that a description was placed beneath in order to explain it. Now if a person, ignorant of the story, should simply inspect the picture, he would not understand it; but if he should read the description, all the incidents would be clear. The coloured figures on the canvas will strike the senses of the observer, whether he reads the description or not. But to determine the various relations in which these coloured figures stand to one another, to follow out the ideas which must have suggested themselves to the artist to connect effect with cause, the intellect as

well as the senses must be brought into play. Now putting aside, for a while, the intellectual element, let us examine what fundamental truths are necessary for sensation.

The two elements inseparable from sensation are—a modification of our mental state, and occupation of space. Suppose that we see a colour, the mind immediately undergoes a change, and an essential part of the process is that the colour should be recognized as spread over a certain extent of space. Similarly, when we hear a particular sound, there is change in the state of the mind, and also a feeling which is associated with space. Now change in the state of the mind is not possible without time, and existence outside of us is not possible without space.

Though the perception of an external object involves in it the ideas both of time and of space, yet these two cognate ideas can be distinguished from each other by the attributes, external and internal, which have been shewn to be inseparably connected with sensation. Space and time are correlated terms, for it is only in relation to our internal state that external objects appear to fill space, and it is only in relation to external objects that our internal states are varied in time. If we examine the nature of motion, it soon becomes apparent that the greater the velocity of a body the stronger is its tendency to escape from its instantaneous position, and the less the velocity the greater is the tendency to remain in any given position. Of the two phenomena, motion, and rest, the

former is more closely associated with the idea of time, the latter with that of space. In fact, time cannot be imagined otherwise than as something flowing or in a state of motion, and space cannot be imagined otherwise than as something in a state of rest. To use a Kantian expression, only somewhat modified by the above consideration, time is the form of phenomena so far as they are in a state of motion or change, and space is the form of phenomena so far as they are in a state of rest. Accordingly, in the science of statics, where forces are considered as producing rest by their mutual action, we can dispense with all consideration of time. But in dynamics, which deals with the motions produced by unbalanced forces, the idea of time meets us at

the very threshold of our investigations.

It is true that we perceive objects existing in time and space by our senses, but time and space cannot themselves be thus recognized. It is true we can see colour existing in space, but the space itself cannot be seen. Similarly, we can by means of our senses apprehend events as transpiring in time, but the abstract idea of time cannot be drawn from sensual perceptions. It has been shewn that the ideas of infinite space and time are not derived from the intellect. Finite objects alone being present to the senses, how can we advance from such objects to the idea of the infinite? Intellect can decide, with some amount of certainty, that particular external objects, which have been

actually perceived, exist in space; but it can never give rise to the conviction that material objects must be manifested in space. Hence this and other such like fundamental truths must be ascribed to reason. The Deity himself has impressed upon the human soul an irresistible and necessary belief in infinite space and eternal time. It is impossible that these ideas could have been derived from any other source.

Now let us descend into particulars concerning space and time.

First, as to space. Space has three dimensions, namely, length, breadth, and depth: hence it can be viewed under three different aspects, as linear, superficial, and solid.

Secondly, as to time. It is found that external objects exercise a continuous

influence upon the mind, so that an impression, which has been produced at some past time, does not wholly disappear when the object is removed. The impression continues, and may be recalled by the power of memory, however varied and numerous the intervening mental experiences may have been. By the continually repeated combination of past impressions with present impulses, a highly complex mental condition is produced, and this complexity is ever increasing. Thus the three aspects of time, past, present, and future, are involved in the action of the external world upon the mind. External objects are presented to us in space, and their impression upon the mind are made in time. In the region of the intellect, space and time have no stand-points ; but

in sensation they are indispensable, for if the conditions which they imply were absent, there could be no sensible manifestation of external objects.

Now let us endeavour to ascertain precisely the relation between time and space on the one hand and sensation on the other.

On examining our several senses, we shall find that there is a marked difference in their respective modes of action. With reference to the elements of space and time, for metaphysical purposes we need only consider the three senses—hearing, sight, and touch, including in this last the so-called muscular sense. The usual method is to consider sight first, and hearing next. We have thought fit in this place to adopt the inverse method of

procedure. The following appears to us to be the most essential points of difference between the phenomena of sound and colour. Sounds involve only one dimension in space, and as successive, imply time past. Colours, on the other hand, occupy two dimensions in space, and, being simultaneous in their appearance, have reference to time present. As the spatial element which we have pointed out in the case of sound may be objected to by some, it may be as well to state explicitly the reasons of our assumption. First, the idea of motion or flowing accompanies all sounds, however short their duration may be. Secondly, sound regarded as an external phenomenon, involves the conception of a starting-point from which it approaches in a direct line towards the

organ of hearing. Bearing in mind these two facts, we are led to the conclusion that one dimension in space and the past in time are the formal elements which enter into the sensation of sound. For (1) the conception of motion, or passing away, which occurs in the case of sound, must be considered as motion so long as we are dealing only with the appearance of things, and not with their reality,—a condition which is imposed upon us by the very nature of our present subject; since sensation, as was remarked at the beginning, is of "a purely phenomenal nature. Now motion necessarily implies one dimension in space and no more. And (2) the conception of direction can manifestly be concerned only with one dimension in space.

Let us now proceed to consider the sense of touch. It will be sufficient for our present purpose merely to point out the distinguishing characteristics of this sense.

(1) Touch is concerned only with the resistance presented by all material bodies when we endeavour to occupy the space which they themselves either partly or wholly occupy. (2) Again, in overcoming such resistance we require to make a consecutive series of efforts, and thus the future in time is necessary for the functions performed by this sense.

To summarize our results:—(1) The forms peculiar to the sensation of sound are the *past* in time and *one dimension* in space. (2) Those which belong to the sensation of colour are the *present* in time and *two dimensions* in space. (3) Those

which enter into sensations of touch are the *future* in time and *three dimensions* in space.

The above remarks will be rendered clearer by the following :—

TIME.	SPACE.	SENSATION.
Past. Present. Future.	Linear. Superficial. Solid.	Hearing. Sight. Touch.

N.B.—Taste and smell are considered by modern philosophers to be modifications of touch. The difference between touch, taste and smell would only amount to that which exists between solids, liquids and fluids if their æsthetic aspects are not taken into account. By æsthetic distinctions we mean such as are evinced by the difference that exists between the prismatic rays of light in the case of colour; between the musical notes in the case of sound; between sweet, sour, bitter in the case of taste; between bruising, lacerating, tickling, &c., in the case of touch, &c.—*vide* page 56, marked *.

CHAPTER IV.

FIRST TRUTHS WITH REFERENCE TO INTELLECT.

THE nature of intellect and its distinguishing characteristics have been sufficiently discussed. It was shewn that the senses are acted upon by individual objects, and that the intellect furnishes general notions. The act of applying general notions to groups of particular objects is termed judgment. In determining the species to which some particular animal, for example, may belong, what, let us ask, is the process which the mind actually performs? The process consists in gradually descending

from the general notion animal till we arrive at a clear and definite comprehension of the individual under consideration,' our knowledge at each successive state becoming more and more perfect.* Thus it is the function of the intellect to descend from the general to the particular,—from the subject to the object,—through the medium of thought. The intellect cannot rest satisfied with a simple knowledge of things as they appear, but seeks for realities adequate to explain their essence. When

* The perfection of intellect is realised in the process of judgment, in which we descend from the general to the particular. But, owing to our imperfect organization, we are compelled at first to submit to a course of prolonged experience, during which we, by a reverse process, gain general notions from particular objects. To obtain a complete and clear view of the intellect, we must consider it in its perfect state, and not while it is undergoing its preliminary training: hence we have confined our attention to that state of the intellect denominated judgment.

external objects affect our senses, they merely furnish the occasion whereupon the intellect ascertains these objects as the immediate sources of the sensational phenomena which ensue. For instance, when rays impinge upon the eye, the intellect immediately concludes that light is not a quality of the mind, but of some external material object. Thus it is that the intellect grasps an object as distinct from the subject. Wherefore as the forms of time and space are the two indispensable conditions of sensation, so are the two realities—the subjective and the objective—the indispensable conditions of intellect. The intellect, in fact, could not be what it is without the primary belief in the subject as perceiving, and the object as perceived.

He who knows is preeminently the subject,
 and that which is known is the object.
 Not that which is seen, but he who sees,
 is the subject. Not the enjoyment felt,
 but the person who enjoys, is the subject.
 Not the state of apprehension in the case
 of impending danger, but he who feels the
 apprehension, is the subject. Thus we
 see that not even is a modification of
 mind^{is}_{is} entitled to hold the same place in
 our consideration as the subject. That
 conscious self, which forms the very basis
 of our intellectual organization, alone con-
 stitutes the subject. That the subject
 exists is a simple and self-evident truth :
 no one can deny that he is. If the as-
 sertion of one's own non-existence be true,
 then who is it that asserts " I am not " ?
 If the word " I " be destitute of any signi-

fication suggestive of reality, then the word "mine" would convey no meaning whatever. "I am not," yet the word that I utter is "mine,"—how can these two contradictory expressions hold good together at one and the same time? As there can be no doubt about the fact that "I am," it is equally beyond doubt that the external world exists; for every intellectual act necessarily implies a contrast between the subject and object. This is not a truth which applies in some particular cases only; it is not an hypothesis drawn from experience; but it is a fundamental principle. To be cognizant of unity, it is absolutely necessary that we should at one and the same time be cognizant of diversity, and *vice versa*. The two notions, however, *viz.*, unity and diversity, are

manifestly distinct. Both language and thought would be deprived of all meaning if we were to assert that unity is the same as diversity, subject the same as object : hence the knowledge of self necessitates a knowledge of something distinct from self ; this is the ego, and that is not the ego. It is impossible to think that the ego should exist without the simultaneous existence of an external world.

The principal faculties which belongs to the subject are three in number, *viz.*, knowledge, feeling and will. Each of these is simultaneously brought into play whenever our intellect is directed to its objects, and each is concerned with a domain peculiar to itself.

Thus, first, knowledge deals principally with the category of quantity, which

gives rise to the distinctions of genus and species, unity, and diversity, similarity and dissimilarity. Feeling is especially concerned with the category of quality which gives rise to the distinctions, intensity, distensity, positive, negative, and so forth. Will has especial reference to the category of power which gives rise to the distinction of cause and effect. An inert body, whose quality and power are insignificant, may, notwithstanding, claim a place in our knowledge as appealing to the notion of quantity; but mere quantity, that is quantity viewed apart from all reference to quality and power, cannot influence our feeling or will.

Secondly, when we apply our intellect to the qualities of things, then it is that feeling comes into play. Perfection

in quality gives rise to a feeling akin to pleasure, and the want of such perfection to a feeling of dissatisfaction. Knowledge comprehends objects synthetically or analytically according as it tends to unity or diversity ; feeling likes or dislikes objects according as their qualities imply perfection or deficiency.

Thirdly, when our intellect is directed to the powers of things, then it is that our will is called into action. Thus, as soon as the invalid understands that the medicine prescribed, although unpalatable to the taste, has in it a restorative power, his will urges him to take it.

Our position, namely, that quantity refers to knowledge, quality to feeling, and power to will, may be thus illustrated.

By means of the intellect we conceive

the ego simply as that which is one and undivided, leaving out of sight its qualities and powers. This conception is indispensable, and at the same time sufficient, if a bare knowledge is only required ; but to obtain a complete acquaintance with the ego, something more than this is required,—the intellectual process must be supplemented by the operations of feeling and will. When we contemplate the ego as endowed with virtue, purity, gratitude, devotion to truth, and other such-like noble attributes, a certain sense of joy and satisfaction takes possession of our hearts ; and when we comprehend the controlling power which it exercises over our thoughts, desires, and actions, then it is that we become fully conscious of the freedom of our will.

As regards quantity, there is this relation between the subject and its object, that it is one and the same subject which has a knowledge of various objects : for knowledge of objects necessarily implies the act of distinguishing one object from another. To know a tree, for example, we must know other objects, such as earth, stone, animal, which differ from it. Hence, in relation to knowledge first, and to the objects afterwards, the ego or subject is one ; while in relation to knowledge first, and to the subject afterwards, the non-ego or object is multifarious.

Again, knowledge, which is intermediate between the subject and object, must partake of the characteristics of both ; so far as it is conversant with the ego it is one, so far as it is concerned with the object

it is multifarious. On the one hand, there are various kinds of knowledge reflecting more or less the character of the objects to which they refer; on the other hand, there is the knowledge of the ego. Thus, it is a necessary characteristic of knowledge in general, that the diversity it contains is shaped and moulded into unity. Hence knowledge is characterized by its totality, or completeness within its proper limits.

First, wherefore, as regards quantity, the first truths of the intellect are as follows :-

(1) The subject is one in relation to its objects. (2) The objects are multifarious relatively to the subject. (3) Knowledge which is intermediate to both is characterized by its totality.

Secondly, as regards quality, there is this relation between the ego and the non-ego, *viz.*, knowledge, as a quality, belongs only to the ego and not the non-ego. Hence, with reference to knowledge first, and the objects afterwards, the ego is positive ; while with reference to knowledge first, and the ego afterwards, the non-ego is negative. Also, knowledge, which is intermediate between the two, comprises within it both the opposites, the ego and the non-ego. Since the ego, when considered in relation to the non-ego, is positive ; and since knowledge must partake more or less of the character of its objects, it is clear that the knowledge of the ego is positive in relation to the knowledge of the non-ego, just as the knowledge of light is positive in relation to the knowledge of

darkness. As totality involves both the opposites, unity and plurality, so limitation embraces in itself the two opposites, reality and negation. For instance, the light of a candle is positive in comparison with the light of a glow-worm ; but negative when compared with the rays of the sun : hence candle-light may be said to possess light within a certain limit only, which implies that beyond that limit, it is in want of it. Thus it appears that the term limited is applicable to such qualities as partake of the character of both the opposites, reality and negation : hence, as regards quality the first truths which refer to the intellect are the following :—

(1) That the ego is positive in relation to the non-ego. (2) The non-ego is

negative in relation to the ego. (3)
Knowledge which intervenes between the two opposite is limited.

Thirdly, as regards power, there is this relation between the subject and its objects. That, whereas the ego is known through its own agency, the non-ego is known through an altogether different agent from itself, namely, through the ego : hence to be known the ego depends upon itself, and the non-ego depends upon something other than itself. Therefore, in relation to the non-ego the ego is independent, and in relation to the ego the non-ego is dependent. Also, whenever we are cognizant of an object, we at the same time become cognizant of ourselves. Thus, when I perceive a book, I become at the same time conscious of myself

as he who is perceiving. Our knowledge is at one time conversant with one object, and at another time with another : hence as regards the objects, it admits of a great variety, but no such variety is possible in the knowledge which we have of the ego. Our knowledge, so far as it is conversant with the ego, is independent of outward realities, and so far as it is conversant with the external objects, it partakes of their dependent character. Thus all the cognitions of intellect necessarily point to self-consciousness as the centre round which they are co-ordinated. Co-ordination implies independence as well as subordination. Thus the member of a society taken collectively may be termed independent in relation to the individual members

who compose it ; but when viewed apart each one is dependent upon the rest of the community ; so that from one point of view the society is independent and from another, it is dependent.

Wherefore, as regards power, the first truths of the intellect are as follows :—(1) In relation to the object, the ego is independent. (2) In relation to the subject, the non-ego is dependent. (3) Knowledge is the result of processes which are mutually interdependent.

The subjects discussed above may be rendered clearer by the following---

<i>ego</i> SUBJECT.	<i>non-ego.</i> OBJECT.	<i>Knowledge.</i> INTELLECT.
One.	Many.	Total.
Positive.	Negative.	Limited.
Independent.	Dependent.	Interdependent.

It may be asked, whence are these simple truths derived? The answer is, not from experience, but by the aid of certain universal principles of reason. First, the principle of homogeneity, (that is to say, the comprehension of a variety of objects under one head) it is this alone which necessitates the belief that the ego is one and its objects are many. Secondly, the principle of substantiality, or that of referring a quality to a substance; it is this alone which gives rise to the belief that the quality or attribute of judgment resides in the ego and not in the non-ego; so that the ego is positive, and the non-ego negative, in their relation to the faculty of judgment or the intellect. Thirdly, the principle of causation, which alone renders necessary the belief that the ego is the

cause of its own revelation, and that the relation of the non-ego depends upon the ego; whence it follows that the ego is independent and the non-ego is dependent, so far as they are related to each other in consciousness, which is a function of intellect.

The three fundamental principles which have been stated above, *viz.*, homogeneity, substantiality, and causation, flow directly from reason. Had these fundamental principles been wanting in the ego with their characteristic mark of self-evidence, then all our experimental resources combined could never have enabled us to reach even such simple and undisputed truths as these—"The ego is one and non-ego many"; "Knowledge resides in the ego and not in the non-ego." "Free

causation belongs to the ego, and subjection to necessity is inherent in the non-ego." In the absence of a knowledge of such truths as these, no experience of any kind would be possible : hence, far from being derived from experience, these truths form the necessary basis upon which all experience must rest.

Lastly, it is to be observed that the ego is imperfect in its nature. It is only in our waking moments that we are in full possession of our consciousness ; on the other hand, during sleep, consciousness falls back into its nascent state ; but however varied may be the states to which the ego may be subject at different times, the primary truths remain unaltered in point of validity. Thus, there can be no question as to the fact that ego is one

both when it is awake and when it is asleep, and that this identical self is alone entitled to the possession of consciousness to the utter exclusion of all external objects. It is true that in a state of swoon or sleep the intensity of consciousness is considerably diminished, but directly consciousness revives, it cannot but resume its place in the domain of the ego : for reason imperatively assures us that it is only the subject, and not the object, that can claim consciousness as an inherent attribute.

Suppose that A and B simultaneously discover a casket of jewels lying by the roadside, and that each at the same instant claims it as his own. Under such circumstances it would seem that the right of possession was equally divided between the two. But suppose now that a third person appears

and gives his evidence in favour of A saying that he knows the casket had been purchased by A. In this case A's right to the possession of the casket must surely prevail over B's right. As in the foregoing example, the casket B, holds an intermediate position between A and B, so knowledge lies immediately between the subject and the object. Considered alone, both the subject and object may have an equal claim to the possession of knowledge. On what ground, then, do we affirm that knowledge belongs solely to the subject? Is it because we entertain some unreasonable partiality for the ego? Certainly not. It is because we accept the evidence of reason when it testifies that the ego alone has a claim to the quality of know-

ledge, and that the objects are never entitled to such a privilege.

Now if it be asked, "How can it be known for certain that the ego is one when we are in a state of sound sleep?" the answer is that the principle of homogeneity (*i. e.*, comprehension of different objects under one head), which is inherent in reason, tells us that the unity of the ego remains unalterable amidst the diversity of states, such as dreaming, sleeping, walking, &c., to which it is subjected. Indeed, we cannot but yield an implicit belief to the assurance which reason vouchsafes to us, that whatever be the amount of decrease to which consciousness may be subjected, the unity of the ego is not the least affected thereby. This may

be illustrated by the principle of the permanence of equivalent forms in mathematics. When two such forms are equivalent, it is found that the equivalence holds good, whatever may be the particular values given to the variables involved. The differential co-efficient also, in the transcendental calculus, may be instanced as being a quantity which retains an intelligible value even when the variables, whose ratio it represents, both vanish. Such illustrations may serve to elucidate the psychological principle of the permanence of the relation between the ego and consciousness, to whatever extent the diminution of the latter may be carried.

Before concluding, we shall make a few observations on the third principle, *viz.*, that of causation. By the aid of this

principle we examine the objects, attain to a knowledge of them, and then ascend to the subject. By tracing particular events to their causes, and by ascending ever higher in the scale of causation, we give full scope to the independence of the ego, which in this case is manifested as the exercise of intellect. Thus we find clearly exhibited the dependent nature of the objects, the mutually interdependent forms and methods which characterize our knowledge, and the independent nature of the ego.

CHAPTER V.

FIRST TRUTHS OF REASON.

REASON is that faculty of cognition which, unaffected by the specialities of time, place and circumstance, rises from general to universal, from soul to GOD. However general a conception may be, it still presupposes an idea which is the highest of all—truth universal and absolute. Whatever exists must exist in relation to this universal truth.

This idea of universality characterizes every fundamental truth of reason. Take such truths as the following:—(1) space is infinite in extent, and consists

of three dimensions; (2) the ego must be one, positive and independent; the non-ego must be plural, negative and dependent. Whence arises the unfailing necessity of such truths? It cannot arise from any empirical source, because this attribute of necessity cannot be dependent upon phenomena which are themselves contingent. It is because the idea of universal and necessary truth is inseparable from reason, that all the truths which belong to it, namely, reason, have in common the attributes of universality and necessity; just as the idea of infinite extension, being inseparable from that of space, all the dimensions of the latter are marked by the common quality of infinite extent. The man who asserts his disbelief in the idea of univer-

sal truth must, of course, admit that no such idea exists ; but in admitting this he contradicts himself; for if his denial of universal truth be true it can only be true inasmuch as it is in accordance with that fundamental idea of truth which enables us to distinguish the real from the unreal, the true from the untrue. The ultimate truth upon which all other truths depend must be this,—that there exists a Being who is the source of all truths : for truth unconnected with being can have no existence.

Reason requires above all that its ideas and the realities which they indicate should perfectly agree with each other ; for in this alone consists the veracity of reason, which we have all along assumed on account of its axiomatic character; thus, for

instance, the truth, that the ego is one, is made known to us by the idea of the ego that we possess, and this idea can assert nothing but what it borrows from the being which the ego represents; the same holds good with the non-ego. Thus, it is evident that the ideas of reason and their corresponding realities exactly coincide with each other, and that it is impossible that they should ever be at variance: hence it follows that in investigating the nature of the Eternal Being, we can legitimately trust to our idea of that Being.

We shall now proceed to examine the necessary attribute of universal truth as manifested to us by reason

First. The idea of universal truth is one and the same with regard to all classes of truth. By it we know both ourselves and

others to be really existing, and by it we recognize all objects, either physical or intellectual, moral or spiritual, as true : hence the original reality which answers to this our idea of reality has the attribute of being One, without a second : since it has been premised in the beginning, the ideas and their corresponding realities cannot contradict each other.

Secondly. The primary idea of universal truth is the standard which distinguishes reality from negation, with reference to the qualities of all objects. Accordingly, an object is real or positive in so far only as it agrees with this standard. For instance, take the proposition that knowledge is positive and ignorance is negative. It is *prima facie* evident that the contrary proposition *viz.*, that ignorance is

positive and knowledge negative, is untrue. Accordingly, there must be some standard by which we judge the former proposition to be true and the latter untrue ; also it is manifest that, because the quality of knowledge agrees with that standard of reality and that of ignorance does not, the former is distinguishable as positive and the latter as negative : hence the idea of fundamental truth which constitutes the standard of reality must contain in itself implicitly all those qualities which are positive, to the exclusion of all those which are negative. *Illustration*—Taking knowledge as the quality to be considered, let us see how, with respect to it, material objects and the conscious subject differ from each other, and from the standard here set forth. (1)

The only positive quality that material objects possess, under this aspect, is the quality of knowableness ; but, on the other hand, they are characterized by the negative quality of want of knowledge. (2) The conscious subject is characterized by both the positive qualities of knowableness and knowledge, and hence is endowed with a higher degree of reality than the material objects ; but, nevertheless, the subject is not free from the negative quality of imperfect knowledge. Now the Being, who is the standard of all reality, has both the above mentioned positive qualities, *viz.*, knowableness and knowledge ; but He has neither of the aforesaid negative qualities, and therefore is unlike material objects, while He is not imperfect in His knowledge like the ego. He is knowable ;

He possesses knowledge ; and, moreover, He is omniscient. The same may be said of all His other qualities, being goodness, wisdom, self-existence, power, &c. These are all positive : their sum constitutes that perfection which characterizes the one un-mistakeable idea of truth—of that standard truth which is indispensable to reason. Non-entity, evil, powerlessness, dependency, being all negative qualities, cannot enter into our idea of standard truth : hence the reality, which corresponds to the idea of standard truth, is the Being who comprehends in Himself all the positive attributes in their completeness and perfection.

Thirdly. The existence of this Original and Eternal Being depends not on our assertions. GOD does not exist merely because we say or think that He exists.

His existence is grounded solely upon Himself, in other words, He is self-existent. All truths, whether actual or possible can exist only through the one absolute truth, but not conversely. When we say that, in relation to all other truths, He is the one, perfect and self-existent Being, we mean that in relation to Him that all else is manifold, imperfect, and completely dependent.

Now let us proceed to determine the necessary attributes of reason.

First. The intellect proceeds gradually from the particular to the general; but in all its operations the particular is never lost sight of. Reason, however, advances at once from the general to the universal—to GOD, the truth of all truths, the life and soul of all living beings.

Reason is absolutely identical everywhere, and under all circumstances, only because GOD, the ultimate Being, is its immediate source. The universe furnishes reason with innumerable receptacles from the lowest objects of the inorganic world up to man himself, in whom reason first attains a conscious manifestation.

Secondly. Reason cannot rest satisfied with the material world in which imperfection is so painfully manifest. It requires a perfect and truthful being in whom it may realize its loftiest ideal. It is only as man's trust in GOD grows stronger that he advances from a lower to a higher state. It is impossible to contemplate reason without arriving at the conclusion that it is a Divine manifestation. Believing as we do in the infinite power and

bounty of the Creator, we cannot but believe that the reason which he has bestowed upon us is a gift absolutely inexhaustible. We owe all to the bounty of GOD. And as He has fully satisfied our most important wants, even independently of our request, we cannot but feel confident that He will supply all the minor necessities. He will surely not fail in time to realize those hopes which He has Himself originated. Having bestowed upon us the inestimable gift of reason, He will secure for it that unceasing progress which is essential to its due exercise.

Thirdly. Reason is necessary ; but the dominion which it exercises over us is not adverse to the freedom of the soul ; on the contrary, it is the main support of that freedom. Reason alone permits us to exercise

that power of choice which is the essence of our freedom : its authority is not based upon a blind submission, but upon a well-grounded liberty. Our desires and appetites prompt us to act from a mere impulse without paying any regard to those ideas of goodness, truth, &c., which are our guides in the pursuit of knowledge, and in all the more important actions of life. Thus, the necessary ideas of reason agree with the standard which free-will erects for our practical guidance. It is by means of this moral necessity of reason that GOD is continually drawing us into the sphere of peace, freedom and goodness, that is, into the sphere of His Divine presence. The influence of reason may be traced everywhere, and under all circumstances ; the more it is developed,

the more it brings all rational creatures under due subordination to GOD, and thus establishes order throughout the social fabric. If it be true that freedom consists in following our own convictions as based upon reason, then how boundless will be our freedom when we follow GOD, who is the starting-point and goal of reason itself. GOD is the prime agent who inspires our souls with reason ; one soul inspires another according to the degree in which reason is developed in each, and reason brings the material world under the influence of spirit : hence reason is not lifeless as matter is. When reason is clothed with Divine authority it becomes absolutely supreme. As the authority of the servant is derived from that of the master, as the confidence of the soldier

depends upon the capacity of his chief, so the authority and influence of the creature emanate from the authority and influence of GOD. The whole universe, it is true, depends upon GOD ; but we His creatures depend upon Him, in a special and intimate manner, through the bond of reason, which links us to Him by freedom, consciousness and love.

The following will exhibit at one view the results of this chapter :—

GOD.	WORLD	REASON
One without a second.	Manifold	Universal.
Perfect.	Imperfect	Progressive.
Self-existent.	Dependent	Necessary.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION.

THE fundamental truths which have been already classified in the tables annexed to the different chapters, may be all exhibited in the following form :—

GOD	WORLD.	REASON
One without a second Perfect	Manifold Imperfect	Universal Progressive, or capable of development.
Self-existent	Absolutely dependent	Necessary

WORLD.

SUBJECT.	OBJECT.	INTELLECT.
One. Positive. Independent	Many. Negative. Dependent.	Total or comprehensive Limited or definite. Interdependent.

OBJECT.

TIME.	SPACE	SENSATION.
Past. Present. Future.	Linear. Superficial. Solid.	Hearing. Sight. Touch.

With reference to the above we deem it necessary to make a few remarks.

Some suppose that the existence and attributes of GOD are not of the nature of self-evident truths, but that they are derived from experience. Such persons maintain that while the elementary truths of Arithmetic and Geometry are self-evident the

truths, of a far more important nature, which relate to GOD, cannot arise in the mind spontaneously, but must be received from teachers specially appointed by GOD to instruct mankind on all that relates to the Divine nature. No doubt the instruction which the child receives from its teachers is necessary for the acquirement of even the simplest truths ; but it must be remembered that we cannot trace back the line of our teachers indefinitely so that some one must originally have been dependent on his own unaided reason for those truths which are now the common heritage of all the sons of men. No one, therefore, could be so foolish as to call in question the self-evidence of axiomatic truths on the ground that we are indebted for such truths to the lessons of our teachers. The

axioms of Geometry, for example, are true, not because we have been taught them, but because they have a natural foundation in our reason. Truth itself must not be confounded with, or made subordinate to, the vehicles for its transmission, whether material or spiritual. It is not the chalice, but the sacramental wine which fills it, that is of importance to the worshipper. So too with the philosopher : he is not concerned primarily with the teacher or the school, which may vary from time to time and place to place, but he is ever striving to obtain that which underlies all accidental circumstances, namely truth, which is eternal and immutable. There are many books on Geometry, yet they are all based upon the self-same definitions and axioms. So in regard to the higher

truths which relate to GOD; there are many teachers and many schools, yet the truths concerning the Deity, which they hand down to us, are valid only because they are self-evident and guaranteed by the testimony of our reason.

The elementary truths of Geometry can be shown to have their origin in our reason. Thus the axiom "Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another" is contained implicitly in the idea of equality, which idea springs from reason. When two different things have some common attribute, they are considered as equal with reference to this common attribute. Thus when we write $\triangle = \triangle$, we indicate that the two \triangle 's have the same figure, though they occupy different positions in space: we then leave out of con-

sideration their mutual difference, and attend only to that which they have in common. Thus the principle of homogeneity, which we treated of in a former chapter, corresponds to the mathematical principle of equality.

It may be objected that, as the fundamental principles of number and space are of a very trifling nature compared with those higher principles which relate to GOD and Absolute Being, it is very improbable that both these classes of truths should have emanated from the same source. To this we make the following answer :—Ontology is a subject which differs essentially from both Logic and Mathematics. These latter sciences only deal with abstract truths, whereas Ontology has a more important function to perform,

vis., to trace those abstract concepts to their true concrete sources. For instance, whence could we obtain the abstract concept of unity if its concrete prototype were not given to us in the shape of the ego ? Unity can be viewed in both the following ways, *vis.*, as an abstract conception which may afford a basis for Mathematics and Logic, and as having a necessary connection with a real being—the ego—in which it is embodied. Of these two views the latter alone is appropriate to our present purpose ; nevertheless, the connection which exists between the two contrasted phases of the self-same idea of unity,—the unity abstract or logical, and the unity concrete or intuitional—does not admit of being severed. In like manner the conception of plurality is necessarily connected

with objects, and the conception of totality with our consciousness ; so that the abstract or logical unity, plurality, and totality have their sources in their respective prototypes—the ego, the non-ego, and the intellect. Thus the categories of the understanding, as Kant calls them, are supported by real entities ; and therefore admit of intuitive realization—a result which is opposed to Kant's theory of the divorce of pure reason from concrete reality. If the ego were not one and indivisible, whence could we obtain our idea of unity ? If the object world had not been diverse, whence could we acquire the idea of variety ? If knowledge were not a synthesis of various individual objects effected by means of concepts, whence could we get the idea of totality ?

From these considerations it will be easily understood how the mathematical axiom "one and one makes two,"—involving as it does the ideas of unity, variety and totality,—is connected with the metaphysical principle which asserts that the intellect binds together objective diversities by a bond of subjective union. Hence we conclude that the relative unity of the ego, the absolute unity of GOD, and the abstract unity of Mathematics, are but different phases of the self-same truth revealed in our reason.

The next subject for our consideration is whether the fundamental truths of reason are innate or acquired. The word "innate" applied to fundamental truths signifies that they are native to the soul. We have shown that without the aid of

certain fundamental truths no knowledge of any kind can be acquired. Such truths cannot be acquired by the aid of our intellectual faculties alone. When we assert that the fundamental truths are innate, we mean that they are the inseparable elements of our subjective constitution in the same sense as three dimensions are the inseparable elements of space. It is an undisputed fact in Metaphysics, that knowledge, feeling, and will are the three inseparable elements which make up our spiritual existence ; they being interwoven as it were with the very essence of our being. Also it has been shown that the principles of homogeneity, of substantiality and of causation, are each predominantly manifested in our knowledge, feeling and will respectively ; and as the

aggregate of these three faculties constitutes the ego, so the aggregate of the three principles constitutes the sphere of reason. The more completely the ego embodies these three principles, the more truly spiritual it is. It should ever aim at maintaining subjective unity in the midst of external diversity, at realizing itself as a positive unchangeable being in spite of its fluctuating states, at becoming more and more the controlling cause of the effects which are within its competence. As progressive unity, progressive being, and progressive causality, characterize the finite ego, so do absolute unity, absolute being, and absolute causation characterize the Infinite Divine Being.

But the fact of fundamental truths being innate does not preclude their being

progressively developed. For instance, the idea of equality is the same both in the unlettered mind of a peasant and in the intellect of the accomplished mathematician. But still there is an important difference, for the principle lies dormant, as it were, in the first case, while it is fully developed and active in the other. The peasant applies the truth blindly and empirically in his every-day life, whereas with the mathematician it is a fruitful principle, by the aid of which he consciously elaborates the most important and ingenious theorems.

It is not to be supposed that because the principles of reason are unalterably fixed in every mind, that they are manifested among all persons in an equal degree ; on the contrary, they admit of gradual development by means of culture, and hence are found in

various stages of perfection in various individuals. That the fundamental principles of Mathematics are unalterably fixed in the minds of all men is no doubt true; but it does not follow that all men must be equally skilled as mathematicians, nor that all mathematicians must be equally capable of applying the axioms of their science. The same may be said of the fundamental principles both of Logic and of Metaphysics. The fundamental principles, as they are present in reason, and the deductions from them which belong to the intellect, are liable to be confounded by the superficial thinker. The former alone are what we maintain to be innate, not the latter. For instance, the genus animal is only a form deduced from the fundamental and therefore innate principle of homoge-

neity so as to render it applicable to, and consequently limited by, the class of sentient creatures, and the fact of being so limited disqualifies it for an innate principle : for to be innate is an essential characteristic of knowledge, and that which is an essential characteristic of knowledge must be applicable to all objects of knowledge without exception, be they actual or possible. Hence the conception of the genus animal is not innate, simply because the principle of homogeneity from which it is deduced is so. General conceptions being in a certain sense the creations of our intellect, might have been justly regarded as innate if it had not been that they depended upon particular objects of experience. As the perfection of intellect consists in its ability to

apply general notions to particular objects, so its limits consist in being obliged at the commencement to pursue an opposite process, *viz.* to extract general notions from the experience of particular objects, and this limit is clearly inconsistent with that universality which distinguishes innate principles.

The next question which presents itself is, how are the three subjective elements, knowledge, feeling, will, which respectively bear marks of the three grand principles of reason, homogeneity, substantiality and causation related to each other? To answer this it is only necessary to observe the distinguishing characteristic of each. The distinguishing characteristic of knowledge is the retention of ideas, that of feeling is the realization of ideas and that of will

is the manifestation of ideas. The retention of ideas consists in the process of carrying them inward from the object to the subject ; the manifestation of ideas consists in projecting them outward from the subject to the object ; and the realization of ideas consists in the harmony of the two above processes, of which feeling is the index. This requires perhaps some explanation in order to be clearly understood. Harmony between the outward expression of an idea and its inward character is only possible through the intervention of feeling. When, for instance, some sad or joyful event is made known to us, we cannot correctly express our ideas concerning it without the stimulus of feeling. If the external and the internal do not harmonize, if our actions

are undecided and our conceptions vague, then feeling must step in, so as to illuminate our judgment and furnish a definite aim to our practice. Moreover, the retention of ideas is more closely related to the past, their realization to the present, and their manifestation to the future. Thus the respective correspondence between the three attributes of time and the three attributes of the ego is clearly manifest.

Now let us endeavour to determine the nature of the relation that subsists between the three necessary attributes of GOD and the three corresponding attributes of the ego. Notwithstanding that there is a marked resemblance between the two sets of attributes, yet they are divided by a barrier which prevents the one

set from being confounded with the other. It is the barrier that must for ever exist between the relative and the absolute, the finite and the infinite. The unity of the ego is relative to, and therefore limited by, its objects ; whereas the unity of GOD is absolute and therefore unlimited. Absolute unity is the original type whereof all relative unities are but copies. The first may be compared to the unity that belongs to a tree regarded as a whole, and the latter to that which belongs to each separate branch, with a limited portion of foliage* attached to it. The difference that exists between the ideal ego and the ego which is capable of being realized in our practical efforts, is the difference which exists between reason and intellect. The infinite perfection that reason points to, can

be no other than spiritual perfection, which includes in it every imaginable kind of perfection ; since perfection cannot exist apart from spirituality, for the more a being is spiritual the more perfect he must be ; and since GOD is the sole standard of perfection. He must necessarily be Spirit Absolute, The Infinite (in contradistinction to the finite) ego, which is the substance of universal reason. There are some critics who have entirely overlooked the essential difference that exists between these two distinct subjects of consideration. They suppose that the infinite ego is merely the finite ego imaginably projected to infinity ; but this is absurd : for no possible amount of effort can enable us to construct the infinite out of finite materials, even in imagination. We maintain that it

is by no means necessary to exercise our imagination in order to realize the idea of GOD within us ; that idea having been implanted in our reason from the very commencement.

We have already advanced, in an ascending scale, from sensation to reason, which is the immediate link that connects the human with the Divine ; or more strictly speaking, the universe with the Deity.

The fundamental truths become absolute only in reason, which is their original source* and ultimate destination. The lower we descend the scale, the more they become circumscribed with conditions and limitations. In reason GOD is recognized as the sole source whence the whole universe is derived, and the sole truth

whereof, reason, is the ever-expanding revelation.

Reason views the whole universe as the creation of GOD. In place of the single word "created," as applied to the world, we have substituted the words "absolutely dependent" for the sake of perspicuity. The necessity for this deviation from the usual course will be evident when it is remembered how various are the meanings assigned to the term "creation" by different schools of thought. Creation may suggest to some the erroneous idea that GOD, like an earthly king sits enthroned in a heaven, and thence superintends and directs the world. To others it may convey the idea that GOD, after having made the world, has retired from his work, leaving the mechanism of nature

to operate by the laws which he has originally impressed upon it. Others may understand by the term that GOD'S power was exhausted in producing the world. The meaning we attach to the word "creation" is that the world is the continued realization of the illimitable ideas immanent in the Deity, by means of that inexhaustible power and that supreme goodness which are altogether His own. We, His creatures, cannot realize our ideas, themselves imperfect and obscure, freely and perfectly, because our efforts are impeded by material obstacles. GOD having no such obstacles to contend with, expresses His innermost ideas with the most transcendent wisdom, and in a way which He alone can comprehend. The various

phenomena, whether physical, chemical, physiological, social, moral, or spiritual, which we are in a position to comprehend, can afford but a faint notion of the infinite capabilities of the Divine power. The world, as the result of creation, thus understood, is absolutely dependent in relation to GOD.

The next in our descending scale comes the intellect, which, keeping the absolute as it were in the back ground, views it apart from GOD, and in its objective relation to the ego.

In the sphere of the intellect, absolute reality is entirely out of question, all realities being considered as relative from the stand-point of the intellect. Ambiguities such as the following :—phenomenal realities, secondary causes, limited genera-

lities, abound in the department of the intellect : hence those philosophers who totally ignore reason are necessarily landed, at some time or other, in hopeless scepticism.

The nature of the link that connects effects with their producing causes, qualities with the substances in which they inhere, diversity with its central unity, can be rendered apparent by a reference to our consciousness, though in order to obtain a correct view, it is indispensably necessary to have recourse to the guidance of the principles of reason, and by the aid of this link we arrive at those realities which are external to the ego. For instance, the bond that connects the ego with its particular volitions being of the nature of causation, whatever outward phenomena oppose

these volitions, are immediately referred to some adequate external cause, and this is done solely because we are necessitated to do so by the prompting of the fundamental principle of causation, which, as it is universal, comprises both the subjective and the objective worlds. By the aid of mathematical symbols the process may be represented thus :—

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 A & B & C \\
 \hline
 \underbrace{\text{Effect : cause}} :: \underbrace{\text{Volition : ego}} :: \underbrace{\text{Opposing phenomena : X}}
 \end{array}$$

The ratio A is furnished by reason, the ratio B is present in our consciousness, and the ratio C is the resulting conclusion. In other words, as the ego is the immediate cause of the volition, so is X that of the phenomena under consideration. The causes which are thus discovered by the

intellect are such only as are adequate to explain the phenomena presented ; hence they can be no other than secondary causes.

The objects of the intellect are regarded as themselves the subjects of the phenomena which come within our cognizance. These objects, though they have immediate reference to the phenomenal world, may, in a limited sense, be termed noumenal ; for they must have a subjective department of their own to correspond with the ego, and to be determined by the process symbolically stated above.

Abstracting from the objective world its purely subjective elements, which may be done by a process of analogy furnished by the ego, with its consciousness, and based upon reason with its fundamental principles,

there remains nothing but the forms of space and time. These two alone are to be regarded as pure objects, that is, objects without any admixture of subjectivity. Space and time are, as it were, the fields in which phenomenal manifestations take place. Phenomena, though nothing *per se*, are indispensable as indices to the realities which they conceal. The intimate connection that subsists between the real and the phenomenal is rendered manifest in consciousness, immediately we attempt to express any truth of reason by word or act. To do so we must have re'course to sensation, which is limited by time and space. Of all the media which we employ in order to convey our thoughts outward, language comes first. It affects the organ of hearing, which is least mixed up with

the spatial element, it being concerned only with space in one dimension. Language is the most refined of all the vehicles through which we convey our ideas, being least indebted to material aids for its operation. The media of expression, which are next in order of refinement, are those which refer to sight, such as signs, gestures, pictorial representations, &c. Lastly come those which involve the sense of touch, such as shaking of hands, embracing, &c.

The difference between intellect and reason will be seen at once by contrasting the two following propositions :—(1.) We know a thing because it is true. (2.) A thing is true because we know it. In the first it is implied that truth prevails over our knowledge by its own intrinsic force

and the opposite view *viz.*, that truth is dependent on our knowledge, is involved in the second. The first applies to the fundamental truths of reason, the second, to the contingent truths of the intellect. On the one hand, there is the all comprehensive unity grounded on reason, and on the other, the limited unities which are products of the intellect. The difference between these cannot be neglected without giving rise to innumerable errors. As the subject is one of considerable importance to our argument, the following geometrical illustration may not be deemed out of place.

Suppose it were required to measure a piece of land. To do this some standard unit of surface must be fixed upon ; but there is no single invariable unit : one

person might choose a square foot, another a square yard, another an acre, and so on : so that what is a unit to one person is a multiple when referred to the standard of measurement adopted by another. Thus, any finite space may be considered one or many at the option of the individual who measures it ; but infinite space can never be regarded as otherwise than one, since it admits neither of diminution nor of increase. The unity of finite space is conventional and depends upon the option of the individual, but the unity of infinite space is unconditioned and invariable. Although the absolute unity of space is beyond the comprehension of our intellect, yet it is sufficiently manifest in our reason ; since all finite unities necessarily presuppose this absolute

unity, without which they cannot be what they are. The idea of the infinite is given *a priori* ; so *a posteriori* process of the intellect can enable us to grasp it. As, on the one hand, it is evident that each unity apprehended by the intellect in the course of experience serves as a witness to the unity of the ego which it presupposes, so, on the other hand, it is equally evident that the absolute unity which is contained *a priori* in our reason is a witness to the all-comprehensive unity of God. The sceptical philosophy of modern times maintains, on the contrary, that, though our belief in the self-evident character of certain truths considered *per se* admits of no doubt, yet, since it is impossible to render them intelligible in particular instances, we are not in a position to pro-

nounce definitely upon their certitude. In answer to this we simply observe that although the intellect cannot fully grasp such truths, yet we cannot help believing them : indeed their very nature is such that they cannot be called in question. The sceptics maintain, for example, that it is impossible to decide whether space is finite or infinite. They argue as follows :—

First. The extent of unbounded space is greater than any that can ever come within the scope of our knowledge ; for unless it were so, it would fall short of infinity : hence we cannot know space as infinite.

Secondly. It is also impossible for us to know that there is any limit to space ; for, whatever be the amount of extension

that we attribute to space, there is no reason why it should not be extended still farther : hence both sides of the question are equally entitled to our belief.

Now, we would ask : Is it really the case that the two contradictory propositions stated above are equally valid to our reason ? Does not the general consent of mankind bear witness to the infinite extension of space, and what better evidence can we require ? We must now explain how we attain the idea of infinite space while our bodily organization is such that we can never fathom the whole extent of the universe. If our knowledge were as free and as perfectly pure as the knowledge of GOD, then, and then only, could we take in the whole domain of space at a single glance : hence it is only through

our belief in GOD, as the absolute and unconditioned source of all knowledge, that we are enabled to arrive at this idea of infinite space. Truth is not less truth because it is beyond our understanding. It is enough that GOD knows it in His omniscience, nothing more is necessary to render it unquestionable. We say that space is infinite, not because its infinite expanse can be brought within the limits of our understanding, but solely because it is completely comprehended in the omniscience of GOD. Thus, to believe in the 'infinity of space it is necessary to possess faith in the perfection of GOD ; and that we are capable of cognizing the infinite can be explained only on the supposition that it is directly the work of GOD, and not otherwise, since

our intellect, with its utmost effort, could never succeed in grasping it. But if it be further asked, what is the source by which we have obtained our belief in GOD? the only answer is that it can be traced to no other source than GOD himself, who is the fountain-head of reason. In the same way our belief in the infinite development of the soul, and in the permanency of the laws which govern the universe, rests on the higher belief in the infinite perfection of GOD, which, if taken away, would render all our belief in fundamental truth null and void.

Now, having finished the explanation of our table, we proceed to summarise the above results.

First. As regards the character of Ontology, which has been all along a matter

of dispute between philosophers of various schools. One of our objects has been to rescue Ontology from the unfounded attacks which have been levelled at it from various quarters through a misconception of its end and aim. Many are of opinion that Ontology and its cognate subjects are of no utility whatever, except as affording exercise to a certain intellectual ingenuity. The objects dealt with are supposed to have a purely subjective value, and to be incapable of being submitted to the test of experience ; but this last charge is not applicable to Metaphysics alone ; it may be equally urged against the fundamental conceptions of Mathematics. Fortunately for Mathematics its axioms and definitions are accepted by the great majority of students without discussion, and few think fit to raise any

doubts as to their certainty. The case is otherwise with Metaphysics. Of all the axiomatic truths which pertain to the latter science, there is scarcely a single one to be found which has not been made a subject of controversy by opposing parties. The definition of a line in Mathematics that it is length without breadth, is never questioned, yet it is impossible to realize this ideal of a line in practice. On the contrary, metaphysical definition of effect, that it is a manifestation of power residing in the cause is still a subject of dispute to contending schools; some defining effects, to be merely the invariable consequents of certain antecedents which are said to be their cause. It must not, however, be supposed that ideal lines in Mathematics, and ideal effects in Metaphysics, are mere imaginary assump-

tions devoid of all practical utility. They are both indispensable in their own special provinces;—lines in the physical and natural sciences, effects in the sciences that relate to man's moral and spiritual organisation. Thus forces act in lines rigorously straight and centres of gravity are real mathematical points, although, in either case, our imagination is inadequate to grasp the reality. Volition is the effect produced by the power of a voluntary agent, so that there can be no mistake about the nature of the link subsisting between the cause and effect in this case, this link consisting principally of power and not of invariable antecedence or consequence. Points, lines, &c., in Mathematics, as well as power, entities, &c., in Metaphysics, are all alike beyond the reach of the imagination. They cannot

therefore, be the products of our imagination. A centre of gravity is a real point, a power of volition is a real power, however inadequately we may be able to form a conception of these realities by means of our senses and imagination. Such realities as we have been discussing above, though unattainable by sense or understanding, have a sure foundation in reason. If our reason assents to them, that is all that is requisite. Thus the science of Metaphysics is in every respect as well-established as that of Mathematics ; but it does not follow that it is not liable to suffer from the ignorant treatment of its mistaken opponents. It is often stated that, unlike Metaphysics, Mathematics admits of no contrariety of judgment with respect to any of its conclusions. To this we reply, it is not the fault of Metaphysics

that its axioms are made the subject of vain dispute by those very persons who avail themselves unhesitatingly of these axioms in the practical business of life ; nor is it on account of any peculiar excellence in Mathematics that no question is ever raised as to the certainty of its fundamental principles. No science whatever can advance satisfactorily if its very foundations are to be constantly called in question, and its first principles are to be darkened by the sophistries of sceptical logicians. What geometrician could vouch for the truth of the conclusions to which he is led by his deductive processes, if he entertained any doubt in regard to the validity of the definitions or axioms ? How, then, can Metaphysics make any progress when the reality even of the most commonly

acknowledged fundamental truths is being perpetually called in question ? To discuss whether qualities have or have not substances in which they inhere, whether effects have or have not causes by which they are produced, is precisely the same as if, in Mathematics, we were to inquire whether a point has or has not the least magnitude possible, whether a whole is or is not divisible into an infinite number of parts, and so forth. Such questions as these may be discussed to the end of time without in the least affecting the results obtained either in Metaphysics or in Mathematics. It now remains for us to point out the positive good which is to be gained from the science of Ontology.

The progress of the soul would be

greatly facilitated if the ideal after which it strives were at all times actually present to it, so that in all its feelings, thoughts, and actions it might be under the benign influence of this ideal, and be ever more and more moulded into conformity with it. But it may be asked, how can the ideal standard appeal to our reason when our attention is continually absorbed in the practical business of every-day life ? To answer this, it is only necessary to recall the distinction that exists between reason and understanding. It has been shewn before that though the senses and the intellect act conjointly in the presence of an object, their functions are quite distinct. The same distinction, only in a higher degree, holds good between reason and intellect to each of

which there is an appropriate sphere, though they both act in concert. Our intellect aids us in the manifold concerns of ordinary life, and in so doing it does not interfere with reason, which regulates our action by making them conform as far as possible to ideal types. It is a mistake to suppose that the ideal is in any way opposed to the actual, or the converse. For the ideal is such only relatively to us ; *per se*, it is as actual as any of the actualities which are the objects of our human consciousness. Thus, a region of space which is infinitely distant, and therefore beyond the bounds of our consciousness, may be termed ideal with respect to us ; but absolutely it is as real as the space which we ourselves actually fill. The highest ideal which presents itself to our reason is GOD. There can

be only one such ideal. Whilst our consciousness gives the ego as an actual existence, reason at the same time points to GOD as the ideal source and goal of all our hopes and aspirations. In the light of this ideal the ego is at once seen to be imperfect, though, when contrasted with matter, its perfections, such as freedom of will, &c., alone reveal themselves to us. That the ego is imperfect implies that it is not what it ought to be. As spiritual it should be perfect in its spirituality, that is, should be perfectly free from material bondage; but the ego is far from being so. The ego being thus, as it were, midway between spirituality and materiality, its hope of immortality and endless progress could not have the least value if that hope proceeded merely from the limited

sphere of its own consciousness ; but finite and imperfect as the ego is, it reposes upon the infinite and perfect spirit who, absolutely considered, is as actual as itself, though ideal when viewed with reference to its limited understanding. GOD is for the ego the sole model of perfection, to be by it worshipped and followed. As the work of the artist materially depends upon the model which he may choose for his guide, so the state of our soul depends upon the nature of the ideal which we propose to ourselves for imitation. If the idéal which we worship be the highest reality, we ourselves shall become more and more conformed to it ; but if we have recourse to negation, or if our ideal in any way falls short of perfection, then we shall inevitably become a prey to

indecision, sinfulness, and despair. But this last cannot be so long as reason gives us the idea of GOD as the highest reality and the centre of all perfection. The more we serve Him in thought, word, and deed, the nearer shall we approach to perfection through all eternity.



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